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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines how the interactive processes of policy construct social 
relationships, influence expert and lay perceptions of risk, and contribute to practices of 
risk management and decision making. In the context of weather and flooding in Toronto, 
Ontario, I first show how meteorologists at Environment and Climate Change Canada 
enact their roles as experts and attain operational success while adhering to policy 
constraints during ‘non-severe’ weather perceived as risky. Then, through an analysis of 
face and drawing on the concept of Goffman’s interaction ritual and Collins’s interaction 
ritual chain, I illustrate the role that ambiguous river flood situations play in shaping risk 
and policy interactions and decision making for flood forecasters at Toronto and Region 
Conservation Authority as well as various key recipients of their information. Finally, at 
the level of discourse, I compare policied river flood risk and unpolicied non-river flood 
risk in Toronto and uncover the entanglement of policy with organized government 
irresponsibility and heterogeneous public social realties. The three analyses encapsulate 
different, yet related policy and risk scenarios: (1) when official policy exists, but the 
weather does not meet risk threshold criteria; (2) when official policy exists and the 
circumstances meet risk threshold criteria but there is uncertainty related to the 
atmospheric conditions which complicates the policy negotiation process; and (3), when 
no official policy exists and people, who are neither experts in meteorology nor 
hydrology, are left to identify and manage risk on their own. Through a combination of 
participant observation, semi-structured interviewing and survey administration, the 
findings contribute to anthropology of policy and risk literature by illuminating the 
influential role of interaction in shaping these concepts and their related processes, and 
iii  
the effect interaction has in policy-work for propagating risk in unintended ways. The 
interconnections uncovered here have important implications for weather and flood 
policy-makers as well as policy implementers in Toronto as they look toward enhancing 
policy and risk management initiatives for the protection of the publics they serve. 
 
 
Keywords: anthropology of risk, anthropology of policy, expertise, interaction, 
interaction ritual chain, face, discourse, decision making, risk communication 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Background and Rationale 
On any given day across Ontario, meteorologists are paying attention to where, when and 
how risks of severe weather might evolve. The journal entry below (Figure 1) written 
during time spent observing meteorologists at Environment and Climate Change 
Canada’s (ECCC) Downsview Office illustrates this. It shows particularly well how 
under the watchful eye of meteorologists, concurrent weather threats across the province 
are assessed and managed according to threshold criteria, or policy. In other words, each 
of the atmospheric features pointed out in the image below represent a different risk to 
the weather expert, and policy is a tool dictating how each one is classified as well as 
what these experts can do about them. Risk management scholar Michael Power (2014: 
386) refers to these types of reasoning processes employed in organizational settings, on 
the one hand, as guided by an “anticipationist instinct”, and on the other, by a logic of 
auditability. The two concepts highlight the dynamics of the forecasting environment at 
ECCC. For example, the instincts of meteorologists generate a commitment to make 
sense of the atmosphere and explain the conditions so as to manage weather’s associated 
risks. Since these practices are carried out at ECCC, it concomitantly makes the 
meteorologists’ accounting and managing of contingent events open for examination or 
verification, by ECCC as well as various public groups, referred in this thesis as 
‘audiences’, who use the information produced by these weather experts.   
  
2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Ontario atmosphere at 2:50 UTC (6:50pm EST) on Tuesday, 18 August 2015 
 
ECCC Downsview Office 
August 18, 2015 
Circle 1 is the storm that is approaching northwestern Ontario from Iowa. Currently there 
is a Warning in effect for an area in NW Ontario for this system. Circle 2 is a system in 
upper Michigan that is being watched, but not too closely.  
 
Circle 3 is an 'ordinary, not well organized, short-lived (1/2hr or so) storm’. At first this 
system is assessed as posing little or no threat. As such, it is hardly being watched at all 
and is covered by information, such as millimetres of rain or high POP, in the public 
forecast. However, the motion of this kind of system is important: “If it stays for a few 
hours it could dump a lot of rain," the meteorologists say. Before long risk is re-assessed 
for this system as higher and a notification to match the risk is needed- not a regular forecast 
adjustment, but also not a Severe Thunderstorm Warning, since the predicted weather does 
not meet threshold criteria. Instead, at 8:25pm a Special Weather Statement is prepared for 
this system based on the radar signature. The draft includes: 'Risk of thunderstorms, 
through the evening, 30-40mm rainfall', words these meteorologists hope will garner the 
attention of the public.  
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The line represented by Number 4 shows an area where a weather Advisory is in effect 
(around 7:40pm), based on: risk of thunderstorms and showers, categorical rain, and details 
of a funnel report that came in from Ontario Tornado Watch. At 8:11pm, this Advisory is 
upgraded to a Severe Thunderstorm Warning to account for the evolving threat associated 
with this system. 
 
Finally, Circle 5 is a system tracking northward over Lake Ontario toward Kingston 
area/ Prince Ed County. It is being watched the most at this point. 40 POP is currently in 
the public forecast for this area, but this system may require a Watch or Warning.  
 
A great deal of scholarly research has endeavoured to understand public 
perceptions of risk as they relate to weather and flooding. These efforts have advanced 
our theoretical understanding of risk in the following contexts: communication (Casteel 
and Downing 2013; Lazrus et al. 2012; Sherman- Morris 2010), decision making 
(Demuth et al. 2012; Frisvold et al. 2013; Savelli and Joslyn 2012; Ramos et al. 2010), 
warning utility (Chiu et al. 2014; Demeritt et al. 2010); and ‘user’ perception and needs 
(Miranda-Moreno and Lahti 2013; Sheridan 2007; Pennesi 2011). Other works completed 
by physical and social scientists interested in the weather and flood interface have 
analyzed behavioural responses to flash flooding in the US (Doswell et al. 1996; Montz 
and Gruntfest 2002; Ramos et al. 2010; Wilhelmi and Morss 2013) and in other countries 
(Collier 2007; Gaume et al. 2004; Parker et al. 2009; Ruin et al. 2014). These studies 
have focused mostly on social and cultural factors in the risk perceiver’s immediate 
environment and have neglected to consider the influence of elements earlier in the 
prediction process, namely the expert’s subjective assessment of risk through their 
relation with predictive models, observations of their physical environment and 
interaction with each other.  
Daipha (2015), Fine (2007), Henderson (2016), and Pennesi (2013) are notable 
exceptions to this trend in the way that their ethnographic fieldwork with meteorologists 
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first recognizes the inability to disassociate expert production of risk from public 
perception, and second, unveils experts’ role in socially constructing risk and risk 
knowledges for public consumption vis-à-vis forecast and warning information. Taking a 
constructivist viewpoint where scientific knowledge is considered a human creation made 
with available material and cultural resources (Golinski 1998; Knorr-Cetina 1981) in this 
study I, too, broadened my analytical scope to capture expert production of risk, the 
communication of risk and the contribution these elements have on public understanding. 
Doing so required a studying up (Nader 1974) and a studying out, or moving beyond a 
single field site (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). It necessitated a tilting of the research field 
(Gusterson 1997) and a studying through (Reinhold 1994) of perceptions and decisions 
within and across multiple institutional environments. This approach facilitated my 
ability to privilege the understandings of participants in this study, the knowledge born of 
their experience and derived from their lived, everyday involvement in producing, 
communicating and using weather and flood risk-related information. 
To that end, in 2014 I reached out to ECCC and Toronto and Region 
Conservation Authority (TRCA), expert groups in Toronto, Ontario responsible for 
producing weather and flood information. I expressed my interest in studying 
meteorologists and flood forecasters, or entrenching myself as much as possible into their 
daily forecast and warning operations. During conversations with ECCC and TRCA, the 
groups conveyed their primary interest in generating greater understanding of their 
audiences’ (users’ and recipients’) needs for information. After several months of 
meeting and pitching the project, informal partnerships were created with each 
organization and the idea for my doctoral research project evolved into a collaboration 
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among myself, ECCC and TRCA where each group’s goals would be met. With the two 
organizations on board, the study grew to include several related groups involved in 
weather and flood prediction, such as the expert producers of weather and flood 
information representing these organizations, the on-air meteorologists or communicators 
(specialized conduits of information) as well as public users or intended recipients.  
By May of 2015, I had embedded myself in the ECCC forecast office at 
Downsview, spending anywhere from two to seven hours per day with meteorologists. 
While there, I observed them as they observed the atmosphere and I made every effort to 
understand the way they were understanding the tools they used to gain situational 
awareness, such as surface plots, the mesoscale numerical weather prediction models, and 
tephis (diagrams used in weather analysis and forecasting), for example. From their 
assessments of the atmosphere, I studied how meteorologists built and massaged their 
forecasts on Scribe, the in-house forecasting software program, and also how they 
constructed their Warning messages on Ninjo, a different software program used for 
generating these elevated risk messages. Over the course of these observations, I 
surveyed meteorologists to understand who they felt their target audience was as well as 
challenges they faced in communicating risk information (Appendix L for sample). The 
results of this survey informed the development of interview protocols used with public 
participants.  
Since Toronto was holding the 2015 Pan American and Parapan American Games 
(TO2015) during the summer of 2015, and since ECCC was providing a specialized 
forecasting service for the Games, I decided to take the unique opportunity to focus part 
of my investigation on weather prediction during TO2015, which meant in July and 
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August my observations shifted mostly to the TO2015 Main Operations Centre (MOC). 
While at the MOC, I paid close attention to the process of communication, specifically 
how meteorologists at ECCC communicated forecast conditions to meteorologists 
working at this temporary outpost, who then assessed risk, created Watches and 
Warnings as they deemed necessary, and then communicated the information to Outdoor 
Sport Managers at sporting venues across southwestern Ontario, who in turn used the 
information to make decisions regarding stops, delays and rescheduling of gameplay. 
During my time at the MOC, I was introduced to the Manager of Sport who then 
connected me with nine Outdoor Sport Managers of a variety of sports, including beach 
volleyball, open water canoe and rowing, along with baseball and tennis, to name several. 
These nine Outdoor Sport Managers agreed to participate and were interviewed during 
the fall of 2015 and winter of 2016. Interviews focused on Outdoor Sport Managers’ 
needs and uses for weather information, their understanding of weather knowledge, and 
also decision-making behaviour regarding different risk messages they received, such as 
the Special Weather Statement, Severe Thunderstorm Warnings, and lightning 
notifications via a smart-phone lightning application created specifically for their use 
during TO2015. This group of Outdoor Sport Managers comprises part of my general 
public sample (PUB1-9).  
Given the perspectives shared by Outdoor Sport Managers, I prepared and 
administered a second survey for ECCC meteorologists through surveymonkey.com that 
nearly mimicked the interview protocol utilized with PUB1-9. However, with experts, I 
flipped the queries to focus on their definitions for certain weather terminology, how they 
imagined their audience was interpreting each notification, and what they imagined their 
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audience to be doing with the information. The points made by each ECCC meteorologist 
during observations were matched to the greatest extent possible with both the first and 
second round of survey responses; their pseudonyms correspond to ECCC1-26 in the 
dissertation. 
Upon the conclusion of TO2015, I began observing flood forecasters at TRCA by 
making trips to their office to watch as they created their daily flood risk assessment, to 
attend the forecast and warning group’s monthly meetings, to participate in flood 
simulation exercises, and to observe their risk assessment and decision-making behaviour 
during rainy weather. In late October of 2015, Toronto experienced a small-scale flood 
event, which provided a useful case to comprehensively investigate urban river flood 
prediction in the City. Similar to the survey administered with ECCC meteorologists, in 
early 2016 I surveyed TRCA flood forecasters to learn who they believed their target 
audience was as well as challenges they face in communicating risk information 
(Appendix L for sample). The TRCA survey differed from the ECCC survey in one major 
respect, however, in that flood forecasters were specifically asked to define urban 
flooding, give their perspectives as to the causes of urban flooding and then also to 
indicate who they perceived as responsible for providing advanced or early warning for 
this type of flooding. Building from the insights of ECCC meteorologists surveyed, 
TRCA perspectives also informed the development of public interview protocols. TRCA 
flood forecasters make up the second group of experts who participated in this study and, 
again, the points made by each during observations were matched, to the greatest extent 
possible, with survey responses; their pseudonyms correspond to TRCA1-12  in the 
dissertation. 
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During the spring and summer of 2016 and with my protocols prepared, I began 
interviewing and surveying representatives of public and private organizations or 
businesses located across Toronto who were identified by TRCA as key recipients of 
their flood information. Of those I reached out to, 15 agreed to participate; these 
participants’ pseudonyms correspond to INST1-15 in the dissertation. During the same 
period of time, I solicited the interest of on-air broadcasters either through email or 
Tweeting to their Twitter feeds. In total, nine media representatives were interviewed or 
surveyed; these participants’ pseudonyms correspond to COMM1-9. And finally, during 
this same time-period and culminating in the fall of 2016, I requested the interest of 
residents of Toronto by approaching individuals in cafes, at local outdoor spaces, and also 
by posting a call on my Facebook newsfeed. In total, 12 residents agreed to participate; 
these participants comprise the second portion of my general public group and their 
pseudonyms correspond to PUB10-21 in the dissertation.  
The interview and survey protocols (Appendices J and K for sample) were made 
up of four different topical themes, including: Weather and Flood Scenarios, Weather 
Knowledge, Urban Flood specific and Demographic Information. For the section on 
Weather and Flood Scenarios, all protocols were designed so that each participant in each 
group received the same scenario and answered the same core questions. For example, 
participants in each group were presented with a handful of either: an ECCC Rainfall 
Warning, an ECCC Severe Thunderstorm Warning, an ECCC Special Weather 
Statement, a Google image of flooding on the 401, a TRCA Flood Warning and/or a 
TRCA Flood Watch. Upon receiving the scenario each participant answered questions 
like: What are the main weather threats discussed in this notification? What are you doing 
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with this information? Has the notification been issued with enough time to prepare/act? 
Is this notification intended for you? To the greatest extent possible, the same scenarios 
were presented across groups. Decisions for which scenario to present were based on 
considerations for participants’ time, the evolution of research objectives, and publics’ 
uses of certain notifications over others (see Table 1 for overview). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Overview of weather scenarios presented to each participant group by notification 
 ECCC 
Rainfall 
Warning 
ECCC 
Severe 
Thunderstorm 
Warning 
ECCC 
Special 
Weather 
Statement 
(SWS) 
TRCA 
Flood 
Outlook 
TRCA 
Flood 
Warning 
Google 
Image of 
Flooding 
ECCC 
Meteorologists 
  X    
TRCA Flood 
Forecasters 
   X   
Institutional 
Represent-
atives 
 X  X X  
Communi-
cators 
X X   X X 
General 
Public1-9 
  X    
General 
Public10-21 
 X X  X  
 
The Weather Knowledge section of the protocols teased apart publics’  
understanding of weather knowledge, and included questions specific to the terminology 
utilized by experts in the above notifications. To that end, all members from each public 
group in this section of the interview were asked questions like: What does ‘frontal 
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system’ mean to you? What does ‘localized rainfall’ mean? What does ‘low pressure 
system’ mean? What is the difference between a ‘non-severe’ and a ‘severe’ 
thunderstorm? The Urban Flood specific section, with its focus on urban flooding 
included questions such as: Define ‘urban’ flood. What causes flooding of residential 
roadways and basements? What causes flooding in urban areas away from rivers? Which 
group or organization do you imagine is responsible for providing flood information as it 
relates to flooding of roads, residences and basements away from rivers?  
Altogether, my fieldwork process included participant observation and 
observation, semi-structured one-on-one interviewing and survey administration over a 
17-month period (Bernard 2002) and resulted in numerous booklets of field notes as well 
as approximately 1450 minutes of recorded talk that was transcribed verbatim and 
qualitatively coded and analyzed using Atlasti.  
Early on in the data collection and analysis period, my investigation uncovered 
different ways predictive models informed ECCC expert production of risk knowledge. 
This often presented itself by meteorologists bestowing power onto predictive models and 
personifying the model as the thinker and doer behind the weather. The attribution of 
human character onto predictive models was a common occurrence as the examples 
below from observations with ECCC meteorologists illustrate: 
ECCC Downsview Office1 
May 22, 2015 
Elon:  it’s {the model} too much -- it has been all spring -- it’s just showing too wet.  
 
September 22, 2015 
Norma: ECMWF <The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecast> 
next week brings the front in way faster than GFS does.  
                                               
1 See Appendix C for a Transcription Key, which is applicable for the entirety of the dissertation. 
 
  
11 
 
 
September 22, 2015 
Sam: I looked elsewhere -- 
just to have a feel for what the other models were thinking.  
The models are telling me it won’t thunderstorm 
but my brain is telling me it will.  
 
In these examples, the representations of the atmosphere as shown in the models are 
communicating with ECCC meteorologists on the forecast floor by showing them, 
bringing them certain features, or telling them what is happening. In some cases, 
meteorologists’ characterization of the atmosphere and their subsequent production of 
information was based entirely on the predictive model, as was illustrated by concerns 
raised by Hazel about another’s forecast for overnight minimum temperatures. During 
observations on September 23, 2015 she said: 
ECCC Downsview Office 
September 23, 2015 
 
Hazel: the overnight lows were consistently lower than the model lows.  
For example -- yesterday’s {model} run had Armstrong, Ontario’s 
overnight low as + 3C.  
Sadie created a forecast for Armstrong’s overnight low to be +2C --
and it was actually -3C.  
We pretty much went with the model.  
 
Therefore, in much the same way as Daipha (2015) explains in her study of 
meteorological decision making under uncertainty, predictive models were shown as 
presenting ECCC meteorologists with a 3D picture or a collage of the atmosphere. This 
collage described the situation for meteorologists, and though it did not render 
meteorologists in a position of complete surrender in all situations, the representation of 
the atmosphere in the predictive models did in fact influence their decision to mitigate 
any foreseen unfavourable event with a forecast or warning, depending on the context of 
the weather scenario. Altogether, as a link connecting various versions of the future 
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weather conditions with meteorologists who interpret and make judgments upon them, 
preliminary findings supported my notion that meteorologists liaise with predictive 
models and each other to subjectively create risk information for their audiences.  
At the same time, while these early findings seemed to support my research 
intentions, it quickly became obvious that there was more about the social organization of 
the expert environment at play when it came to their production of risk. One ECCC 
meteorologist hinted at it in Survey 1 when he shared:  
ECCC Survey 1 
Samuel: We need a way to teach the difference between a non-severe 
thunderstorm and a severe thunderstorm.  
For many people -- ‘severe’ is subjective --  
based on their experience.  
I have talked to people who say “this is the worst thunderstorm 
I have ever seen”  
but it may still not be severe based on our criteria. 
 
If observations of ECCC meteorologists’ interaction and their focus on the rules during 
Warning development was not enough, Samuel’s comment cemented for me the power of 
threshold criteria, or the official rules couched within ECCC policy, on how risk 
knowledges are subjectively negotiated and communicated to the public audiences. Thus, 
while still addressing the needs of my collaborators, the anthropological component of 
the research project took a major turn to focus on the socially organizing function of 
policy, or how policy and the interactive processes of policy-work construct social 
relationships, influence expert and lay perceptions of risk, and contribute to practices of 
risk management and decision-making in weather and flood contexts.  
The central focus of the dissertation is the relationship between policy and risk. In 
it I draw on Nielsen’s (2011: 69) definition of policy as a relational triad of 
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interconnected themes that include: political rationalities, every day practices and 
methods introduced to govern people, and the perceptions and experiences of the people 
towards whom the rationalities are directed. Following in the same vein as Nielsen’s 
relational triad and in the context of weather and flooding, I distinguish, first, among 
warning policy as a set of official rules which represent specific ideals, second, the 
warning policy implementation process as the negotiation of these rules, and third, the 
manifestations of these rules as the appropriation of policy, which includes the agentive 
act of translating policy into the experts’ own image (Nielsen 2011: 73) vis-à-vis the 
creation and dissemination of weather or flood information. Thus, when it comes to 
weather and flooding hazards, policy work includes expert processes of negotiation, 
implementation and appropriation that are then taken up relationally into any number of 
social and organizational environments.  In other words, experts bring policy to life 
through verbal interaction and electronic communication over traditional and social 
media platforms, and from there, policy-based information is or will be interpreted and 
responded to depending upon the context into which it is received. 
With this description in mind, I approach policy as emerging from the everyday 
lived experiences of individuals. My standpoint is that from these experiences individuals 
develop rationalities that become the foundation for policy and its related ideals that then 
come to stand for official rules. Having said this, I similarly recognize that there is no 
easy way of knowing where a rationality stems from; often there is no single point of 
origin for political rationality, no individual clearly situated within one rationality, and no 
single policy force, but rather a multitude of experiences and forces that function to 
coalesce policy attitudes. Policy and our ideas about what it stands for are rooted in a 
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long history of these everyday experiences. In the context of critiquing the term ‘quality’ 
on education policy agendas and discourses, Elise Hunkin (2016) points to the 
importance of a term’s historical origins on contemporary social life. According to 
Hunkin, teasing apart a term brings to light the relative truth that has been constructed 
over time surrounding it; doing so offers another useful way for “seeing and reading the 
present” (2016: 37). Here I consider Hunkin’s perspective on genealogical accounting for 
making visible the embeddedness of policy in our everyday lives. This includes its related 
processes that have evolved over time and can still be felt today, such as our expectations 
to be policied and in our dependence upon policy as a guide for sense-making and action. 
Hunkin’s viewpoint adds important context for the upcoming analyses of policy 
processes in the context of weather and flooding in Toronto. 
I characterize policy implementation and appropriation similar to Nielsen (2011), 
and also similar to the way that anthropologist Trouillot (2003: 80-81) described, as a 
mechanism by which government ideals are enabled and carried out at multiple sites. In 
the forthcoming analyses I focus on policy work carried out by government experts, 
explore the function of governance through weather and flood policy, and demonstrate 
how this is done through policy tools with particular results. Thus this is an effort, much 
like Trouillot’s, to understand more deeply the effects of ‘the state’. In saying so, 
however, in this dissertation I shift Trouillot’s vision to organizational spaces mostly and 
use policy work to track and measure the occurrence and extent of identification and 
spatialization effects related to government practices of weather and flood warning 
prediction. In my exploration of policy, I also characterize its related processes of 
implementation and appropriation as reflective of goals which inspire allegiance or set 
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out clear action (Shore and Wright 1997: 16); as an assemblage, manifesting itself in 
different social and cultural forms, different social, geographic and political spaces, at 
different times, and at different ideological scales (Shore and Wright 2011; Wedel and 
Feldman 2005; Wedel et al. 2005; Wright 2006); and as embedded within particular 
social and cultural worlds (Shore and Wright 2011: 1; Wedel et al. 2005: 40) within 
varying institutional frameworks and observer viewpoints (Power 2007: 111).   
Beck (1992), Boholm (2015), Douglas (1992), and Kasperson’s group (1988) 
contributions to risk theory, on the other hand, show risk as an inescapable feature of our 
modern society yet simultaneously a constructed perception that evolves relationally. 
While in the chapters I focus on how risk operates in practice and in interaction, my 
approach is grounded in a stance wherein risk is generally defined as a danger to someone 
or to something that bears value. Zinn (2008) offers a useful historical account for the 
development of the notion of risk. While he points out there is no clear etymological 
origin for the term, he highlights (Zinn 2008: 7-8) various epistemological viewpoints of 
risk in different disciplines. These include, for example, risk as real and objective from 
the technical risk assessment and insurance perspective and risk as subjectively biased 
from the psychometric and rational choice paradigms. Additionally, Zinn includes Beck’s 
risk society work, or the idea that risk is both real and socially constructed. He adds to 
this list of epistemological viewpoints Douglas’s cultural theory perspective, or the idea 
that risk is socially transformed. Finally, he includes Foucault’s governmentality 
approach, or that risk is socially constructed and where events are risks insofar as they are 
part of a calculative technology. Together, these ideas of policy and risk serve as a useful 
frame and are utilized to different degrees in the pages that follow. Building from this 
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theoretical foundation, the work presented here is mostly structured around theories of 
interaction and discourse, particularly those stemming from the work of Goffman (1959, 
1967) and van Dijk (2014) since their scholarship explains well the on-the-ground 
workings of policy, and accounts for how risk assessments, perceptions, management and 
decision making in various weather and flood situations are developed relationally 
through face-to-face interaction and through discursive practices.  
Overview of the Chapters 
The dissertation is comprised of three main chapters, each focusing on different aspects 
of policy, risk and interaction. In Chapter Two, I examine ECCC meteorological 
expertise during ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather and the influence of interaction and 
policy on perceptions of risk and operational success. I mostly centre my analysis on 
Goffman’s classical perspective of symbolic interaction, specifically presentation of the 
self (1959) and frame analysis (1974), and also utilize perspectives from contemporary 
scholars who draw on his approach (Benford 2013; Schwalbe 2013). Goffman’s 
theoretical approach has explanatory power for my data in so much as I show how 
participants in interaction take one another’s actions and utterances into account as 
meaning is jointly created, yet simultaneously where these meanings and related decision 
making are couched within certain social, organizational and institutional structures and 
rules. Capturing multiple micro-scale interactions among meteorologists on the forecast 
floor enabled me to investigate relational aspects of face, self-presentation and expert 
identity and examine their influence on meteorologists’ achieving organizational “hits”2 
and bringing about positive social impact for the audiences they serve. In this chapter, I 
                                               
2 A “hit” is a performance metric contributing to the organization’s overall performance standings and 
indicative that the weather product was issued in the right time and that the weather reached necessary 
threshold conditions.  
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also show how meteorologists frame ‘non-severe’ weather risk in their pursuit of success, 
and subsequently draw on mental models theory (Johnson-Laird 2005; Quinn 2005; van 
Dijk 2014), Austin’s performativity of language (1962), and also on the concepts of 
institutions (Douglas 1986) and negotiated order (Fine 1984; Strauss 1993) to account for 
the various responses to ‘non-severe’ weather notifications. Moreover, I draw on these 
works to demonstrate how the behaviour of public audiences, specifically Outdoor Sport 
Managers, confirms the influence of these deep rules in the management of risk.  
Chapter Three is also an examination of policy and risk at the local level, but it 
focuses on TRCA urban river flooding and the multi-sited management of ambiguous 
urban river flood risk during a small-scale event on October 28, 2015 in Toronto. Chapter 
Three’s examination utilizes Goffman’s (1967) concept of face and examines face in 
interaction for the purpose of highlighting the relational, social, and contextual nature of 
TRCA Flood Warning generation. Similar to the interpretive-structuralist frame of 
Chapter two, through an analysis of TRCA forecaster face-to-face interaction, in Chapter 
three I show the group’s efforts to maintain multiple faces with the purpose of 
accomplishing multiple interactional goals. At the same time, I propose in the chapter that 
based on an existing arrangement for engagement between TRCA flood forecaster and 
‘key recipients’ of their information, interaction between TRCA and its key audience 
(institutional representatives) represents a type of interaction ritual (IR) chain (Collins 
2004) where producers of flood information and those who have expressed their desire or 
need for it are obliged and expected to behave in particular ways. I was motivated to 
follow Collins’s conceptual framing of the IR chain for my analysis of flood forecaster-
‘key recipient’ inter-organizational interaction since his efforts demonstrate how micro-
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events and the behaviour of individuals is determined by where they are located in the 
larger network of encounters around them in time and space. To that end, my micro-level, 
multi-sited analysis of TRCA and ‘key recipients’ risk-related decision making on 
October 28, 2015 reveals the ways these groups lived up to (or not) the obligations and 
expectations that were established in their interaction order.  
Chapter Four represents a shift from micro-scale analyses of policy and risk 
across multiple sites to an examination of policy, risk and interaction at the level of 
discourse. Using a non-river flood disaster in Toronto as a backdrop, I investigate the 
nature and implications of policied (urban river flood) and unpolicied (urban non-river 
flood) risk in the City. Building from the theme of impossibility and drawing mostly on 
van Dijk’s (2014) conceptual approach to discourse, mental models and knowledge, I 
show how particular alternative risk management possibilities have been made possible in 
the discourse, and simultaneously how such social constructions of impossibility have 
contributed to a kind of social acceptability where early non-river flood warning exists 
beyond the sphere of public accountability. 
The three analyses encapsulate different, yet related policy and risk scenarios: 
when official policy exists, but the weather doesn’t meet risk threshold criteria; when 
official policy exists and the circumstances meet risk threshold criteria but there is 
uncertainty related to the atmosphere and hydrological impacts; and finally, when no 
official policy exists and people, who are neither experts in meteorology nor hydrology, 
are left to identify and manage risk on their own. Following the main chapters, I conclude 
in Chapter 5 by summarizing what these different investigations teach us about policy 
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and risk and the contributions these research findings make to the anthropology of policy 
and risk literature. 
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Chapter Two 
When ‘non-severe’ weather is still ‘severe’: Meteorological expertise 
and the influence of interaction on perceptions of risk and operational 
success 
 
Introduction: Making the Right Decision is Always a Fine Line 
 
ECCC Downsview Office3 
June 15, 2015 
 
2 Elon:  Should we go with a Special Weather Statement or a Severe  
3  Thunderstorm Watch? 
4 Elaine: It won’t be the same as yesterday.  
5  It’s never the same. 
6 Elon: It might be rounds {of showers} with a block of nothing in between. (.) 
7  Do we even have a chance of showers {in the forecast}? 
8 Elaine: Yeah -- we do.  
9  An air mass this moist is a pretty efficient rain producer. 
10 Elon: ((hands to face with a concerned look in eyes)) 
11  What should we do about the rain? 
12 Elaine: It’s always a fine line. 
 
On June 15, 2015 Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) meteorologists Elon 
and Elaine are discussing rainfall (Appendix C for Transcription Key) as the major 
weather issue for the day, from Windsor to Sarnia and across to Hamilton. Their 
exchange is centred around which ECCC notification should be issued: a Severe 
Thunderstorm Watch or a Special Weather Statement (SWS), and highlights the 
operational anguish on the forecast floor. In other words, Elon and Elaine are assessing 
weather risk and whether or not conditions in these southwestern Ontario regions are 
favourable for the development of severe thunderstorms with short-duration, heavy 
rainfall that will produce 50mm within one hour. If the answer is yes and the ‘severe’ 
conditions meet ECCC policy’s rigid, black and white boundaries or threshold criteria, 
                                               
3 Line numbers in Chapter 2 are specific to Chapter 2. See Appendix C for a Transcription Key, which is 
applicable for the entirety of the dissertation. 
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standard operating procedures dictates a Severe Thunderstorm Watch is to be issued. If 
the answer is no, and rain is not predicted to meet the 50mm mark, the conditions are 
‘non-severe’ by official standards and a Severe Thunderstorm Watch cannot be issued 
since it will not verify as a “hit”, a metric used to evaluate organizational success. The 
problem lies in the fact that ‘non-severe’ weather can still be impactful, and thus risky, 
and when conditions do not meet ‘severe’ standards, meteorologists are left on their own 
to balance the constraints of policy, atmospheric uncertainty, and the perceived needs of 
users. Making the right decision in these ‘non-severe’ circumstances is critical for 
operational success, but this is an accomplishment not so easily attainable as the hands-
to-face anguished look given by Elon in the opening vignette confirms.  
When weather does not meet ECCC’s ‘severe’ threshold criteria and conditions 
are officially considered ‘non-severe’, meteorologists sometimes feel the right decision is 
issuing an alternative notification to account for what they have assessed as risky and 
potentially impactful weather. Much like forecasting and traditional warning generation, 
the construction of these notifications is an interactional undertaking. Meteorologists are 
relating with the weather as presented by models, charts and graphs, and also with policy 
guidelines to construct accurate and timely risk messages. However, the interactional 
process is as much, if not more so, about relating with colleagues on the forecast floor, 
and the mental image they perceive users have of them as well as the mental image they 
have of their users. These face-to-face conversations, the ideas meteorologists believe 
their users have of their meteorological expertise and the perceptions they hold regarding 
what type of information users need, play a paramount role in the construction of their 
notifications. As weather events unfold and risk notifications are being constructed, I 
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argue here that these interactions frame the management of the weather event, which has 
implications for meteorologists’ ability to achieve operational success. 
This chapter centres on the notion of operational success and the interactional 
construction and management of risk in the context of ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather 
situations. In it I mostly follow Schwalbe’s (2013) adaptation of Goffman’s 
dramaturgical approach to social interaction and consider the construction and response 
to the weather risk scenario as a social encounter framed relationally between ECCC 
meteorologists, who express certain presentations of self, and the social organization 
governing their every day forecast and warning practices. Goffman’s dramaturgy is the 
idea that people’s day-to-day lives can be understood as resembling performers in action 
on a theatre stage. In keeping with Goffman (1959), I make the case here that 
meteorologists doing policy-inspired work make presentations of self for multiple 
audiences, and where notions of the meteorological ‘self’ and the experts’ meteorological 
work is a product of interaction and generated by others’ interpretations of this 
presentation. Put another way, in the situated interactional encounters that take place 
within and across social spaces, meteorologists’ identities as experts and their 
meteorological construction of traditional and alternative risk notifications, are generated 
jointly between participants in interaction. Analyzing examples of interaction on the 
forecast floor and then comparing the expert production and public consumption of two 
alternative risk notifications utilized by meteorologists at ECCC in ‘non-severe’ weather 
situations: the Special Weather Statement (SWS) and a lightning prototype (LP) 
notification demonstrates the influence of these inter-connections on the relational 
production of sense-making in these contexts.  
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The interactional approach to the construction of alternative risk notifications is 
complemented by a discussion on the use or uptake of these notifications as explained by 
mental and cultural models as well Austin’s performativity of language (1962), which I 
utilize here to account for why these risk framing strategies summoned the desired public 
response with varying degrees of effectiveness.  
By focusing on the interactional framing of risk within the constraints of policy in 
the context of weather and the myriad ways and reasons for audiences attending to these 
alternative notifications, we begin to see more clearly the triangulated relationship among 
policy, interactions and operational ‘success’ during risk situations. Such an endeavour 
offers a necessary perspective of risk, its perception and management from earlier in the 
prediction process and is especially helpful as we seek to understand why some audiences 
respond to risk information while others do not.  
The Interplay of Policy, Risk and Interaction for Operational Success 
Policy is a guide to action that shapes, controls and regulates people and ideas (Martin 
1997: 183). At ECCC, policy is used as a tool to create classifications and categories, as 
well as spatial boundaries for these designations, along collective lines wherein 
meteorologists in their everyday practices produce and reproduce official rules through 
forecast and warning processes. Anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001: 126) 
would refer to such structural ordering brought on by policy work as examples of the 
identification and spatialization effects of the state. In other words, ECCC meteorologists, 
considered here the subjects of ECCC weather policy, are considered homogeneous 
members of a specific community located and working within a site. At this site, or on 
the forecast floor, policy is used to govern their behaviour. And in the meteorologists’ 
interpretation, appropriation and implementation of policy, the ideals upon which the 
  
29 
 
official policy was created are reified. Furthermore, ECCC policy has defined the spatial 
boundaries for which meteorological work is carried out. In other words, jurisdictional 
and conceptual boundaries have been identified through ECCC policy which are linked to 
meteorologists’ responsibility of providing service, although these same 
conceptualizations and jurisdictions are not always recognized or understood in the same 
way by audiences on the ground. Relating Trouillot with anthropology of policy scholars, 
the political ideal bound within ECCC policy reveals how ECCC official guidelines and 
rules belong to and are embedded within particular social and cultural worlds or domains 
of meaning (Shore and Wright 2011: 1). Thus connected to identification and 
spatialization, the classificatory schemes ECCC policy is built upon function to socially 
organize meteorologists’ actions, construct social relationships between themselves, the 
organization they represent, and their colleagues, and also helps build their social 
identities as successful meteorological expert. By tracking the flow of policy through the 
deployment of weather notifications and the responses made by audiences, I show how 
policy can be used to locate processes of governing in our everyday lives.  
ECCC ‘severe’ weather policy is intended to behave in the traditionalist sense in 
so much as it is structured, orderly, and considered a rational set of flows and procedures 
that move systematically (Stone 1988) to provide publics advanced notice of inclement 
weather. In a straightforward way, if meteorologists predict an approaching weather 
system will generate either wind gusts of 90km/hr or greater, or hail of 2cm or larger in 
diameter, or rainfall of 50mm or more in one hour, the weather would be considered 
‘severe’ and ‘warning’ level, and a ‘Severe Thunderstorm Warning’ (STW) would be 
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issued. Composed of mostly canned4 statements, a STW has added consistency and 
structure in its issuance. Much like what Gordon and colleagues (1997) describe of the 
policy process, and echoing Stone (1988), the practice of warning generation during 
‘severe’ weather is mostly neat and linear, and comprised of problem identification and 
implementation of a solution. More recently, anthropologist Boholm (2015: 104) speaks 
of this ideal, commenting that under this model of risk management, policy can be made 
applicable to any risk in any context. She follows that within this idealized risk 
management scenario every risk can be approached within a single framework, by a 
single procedural logic that moves in sequence from identification, analysis and 
evaluation through treatment and monitoring. Yet, Boholm’s contribution here is to 
problematize this traditionalist idealization and instead to argue that more attention 
should be paid to the contextualized nature of risk management. Answering her call, in 
this chapter I pay attention to the complex processes that meteorological experts and 
audiences engage in during ‘non-severe’ risk situations, along with their diverse goals 
and competing priorities as each makes sense of and assesses risk. Doing so reveals the 
everyday risk relations that are influenced by policy and makes more visible the often 
opaque structures of policy and governance in the context of risk. 
When the atmosphere does not present so much certainty, however, and weather 
falls on the cusp of threshold criteria, or just shy or below ‘severe’ weather standards, the 
absence of an official policy alternative to convey high risk in ‘non-severe’ situations 
leads meteorologists to develop their own informal policies and conventions for how 
these risk situations should be managed. Defined as institutions (Douglas 1986: 46), these 
                                               
4 Refers to the pre-generated text that populates in the body of the warning message 
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informal rules and conventions operate to guide meteorological perceptions in the 
organizational forecast and warning setting. Much like Douglas describes, institutions 
allow meteorologists to sift through information and lead to their coordinated actions, the 
emergence of consensus and the development of expectations for these experts as they 
navigate weather, policy and risk on the forecast floor.  Altogether, I show how 
meteorological experts build upon formal policies of ‘severe’ weather in ‘non-severe’ 
weather situations and through the enactment of informal forecast floor conventions and 
reasoning transform their assessment of ‘non-severe’ weather risk into a notification 
intended to amplify perceptions of risk and willingness of response among audiences. 
Here, meteorologists are flipping the positivistic perspective of risk and policy Boholm 
(2015: 105) mentions on its head to consider alternative meanings, interpretations, 
interests, values and ethics. Reflected upon in this way, policy and its related institutions 
on the meteorological forecast floor are major decision processors in weather risk 
environments and have a significant hold on classifying weather risk (Douglas 1992: 58).  
In this chapter, I follow Boholm’s (2015: 15) definition of risk as a contextually 
situated and relationally established concept and link this conceptual frame to somebody 
or something of value in danger or under threat. Therefore, more nuanced than simply an 
individual reaction and response to threat (Beck 2009), here I consider risk as a learned 
phenomenon connected with perceived importance and merit, and where its perception 
and management are a situated practice, embedded in specific social and institutional 
contexts (Boholm 2003). From this conceptual path, risk is considered here an inherently 
subjective phenomenon, and in the expert meteorological setting, as a blending of 
science, judgement and cultural factors (Slovic 1999). Such blending is in keeping with 
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the concept of the scientization of risk (Beck 1992), which refers to the contribution of 
social aspects into assessments of risk and is representative of scientific work as a social 
activity (Jagtenberg 1983: 6; Jasanoff 2010: 251; 2004). This is a position where STS 
scholars would contend meteorologists creatively adapt to situations in their production 
of expert knowledge (Daipha 2015: 4), and in so doing, have the ability to construct 
social realities that align with their particular viewpoints, especially during non-severe 
but risky weather (Latour and Woolgar (1986[1979]). Altogether, in the following pages I 
show how meteorologists situated in their organizational environments scientize risk in 
‘non-severe’ weather situations by relying upon their understanding of the atmosphere, 
their perception of risk, the mental image they perceive publics have of them and vice 
versa to help construct alternative risk notifications.  
Risk is a topic that has been studied empirically by many scholars who have 
measured various factors contributing to the ways it is differently perceived, including 
psychological characteristics such as optimism bias (Joffe 2003); explanations of biases 
(Epley and Gilovich 2006); and heuristics or the mental shortcuts intended to reduce 
complexity. Scholars have also looked at the effects of anchoring on risk judgements 
(Alahakami and Slovic 1994; Finucane et al. 2000; Leiserowitz 2006; Slovic et al. 2007; 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974); how trust and other emotions inform judgement (Clore 
and Huntsinger 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2001; Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000), as well as 
the influence of revealed and expressed preferences for acceptable levels of risk (Starr 
1969; Fischoff et al. 1978). In their conceptual framework, Kasperson and colleagues 
(1988) attempt to link the technical assessment of risk with psychological, social and 
cultural factors demonstrating in their approach that risk perception is either amplified or 
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attenuated as risk information travels from one amplification station to the next. More 
recently, Boholm and Corvellec (2011) have shown the value of an ethnographic look at 
risk, revealing its contextual features and drawing on these to explain how risk is assessed 
and investigated, and how it is managed in planning, regulation, and also how it is 
communicated in society. 
Furthermore, for the last several decades, scholarly efforts have sought to uncover 
influential factors contributing to perceptions of risk as they relate to public consumption 
of risk information in the weather context. For example, studies have looked closely at 
user perceptions of ‘severe’ weather events (Spinney and Pennesi 2010), at public 
differentiation of weather products (Silver and Conrad 2010); at the communication of 
weather information (Sherman-Morris 2010; Lazrus et al. 2012; Casteel and Downing 
2013), public decision making (Demuth et al. 2012; Frisvold et al. 2013; League et al. 
2010; Ramos et al. 2010; Savelli and Joslyn 2012), the capacity for publics to adapt in 
times of unpredictable weather (Hayden et al. 2017), as well as warning utility or public 
uptake (Chiu et al. 2013; Demeritt et al. 2010; Lazo et al. 2009). Researchers have also 
looked at the relationship among the production of weather information, individual 
perceptions, and decision making (Morss and Hayden 2010; Pennesi 2011; Ruin et al. 
2013; Wong and Yan 2002). Using an ethnographic approach, Daipha (2015) and Fine 
(2007) address the bureaucratic obstacles surrounding the weather forecast and warning 
process, the ritualized interaction of meteorological work in an institutionalized 
environment, and the combination of these two on decision making. Altogether the 
existing research emphasizes the presence of multiple factors influencing public 
interpretation and uptake of risk information as well as the points of connection among 
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different actors in the weather prediction process. Not as prevalent, however, are studies 
that focus on why audiences have these differing perceptions or how the why influences 
relational constructions of risk and decision-making behavior (Houser 2018, Lazrus 2009 
and McNeely and Lazrus 2014 to name a few).  
One of the whys behind the relational construction of risk is accounted for by 
mental and cultural models theory. Van Dijk (2014: 23) explains a mental models 
approach to sense-making as the cognitive process audiences use to understand events 
and actions from their daily experiences. Similar to the contributions made by Johnson-
Laird (2005) and Stevens and Gentner (1983), mental models guide reasoning, organize 
thoughts and emotions, and provide a structure that allows individuals to understand and 
imagine the world they live and work in. These mental constructions are built through 
interaction (Norman 1983: 7), stored in our episodic memory and may be combined in 
larger, hierarchically more complex models of thinking (van Dijk 2014: 50). The 
knowledge that evolves from our mental models comes to reflect reliable and correct 
patterns of reasoning and representations of the world, as Van Dijk (2014: 24) contends. 
Cultural models, on the other hand, are described as the shared understanding of the 
world that has been learned and internalized by a group of people (Quinn 2005: 3). 
Cultural models are broadly held by society, but can also be held by multiple types of 
social groups and communities, such as ideological or epistemic groups (van Dijk 2014: 
111), of which ECCC meteorologists belong.  
The differing mental and cultural models held by audiences have to do with how 
words and ideas are arranged in our minds. This process of arranging and its influence on 
the everyday, ordinary analysis of experience harkens back to the seminal writings of 
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Benjamin Whorf (1956). In what is contemporarily one of the most notable examples of 
the relationship between linguistic meaning and the behavior of people, Whorf showed in 
this classic piece how situations are patterned, understood and responded to based on the 
meanings we associate with language. Specifically, through the example of gasoline 
drums, Whorf demonstrated how the word “empty” conveyed a lack of hazard, whereas 
in reality an empty gasoline drum still poses considerable physical hazard because it 
contains explosive vapor. The example confirmed the inter-connections between 
language, thought and behavior, and demonstrates the influence of these elements on the 
construction of mental models. Furthermore, the insight he offered in this early example 
is useful for the upcoming explanation regarding the interpretation and responses made 
by ECCC audiences during ECCC’s management of ‘non-severe’ weather since it 
highlights how our conditioned understandings of language sometimes inadvertently 
amplify risks to danger. 
An individual’s mental model influences the pragmatic force of ECCC policy-
inspired risk information. Drawing on Austin’s (1962) performativity of language, in this 
chapter I show how the issuance of alternatives to manage ‘non-severe’ weather is an 
illocutionary act. Here, I refer to an illocutionary act as an instance of a culturally-defined 
speech act type (Searle 1969), one characterized by a particular illocutionary force; for 
example, promising, advising, or warning. In this case, by issuing risk notifications 
meteorologists are performing this act with the intention of amplifying attention to risk 
and bring about positive social impact. Linking this perspective to the analysis of mental 
models and risk perception is helpful in so much as together they assist in the 
forthcoming explanation on how ECCC meteorologists construct risk in ‘severe’ and 
  
36 
 
‘non-severe’ weather situations and also how different public user groups make sense of, 
and respond to, ECCC risk constructions. 
Finally, much like Strauss and Quinn (1997: 3) who assert interaction as an 
essential mediating force in meaning creation, this study draws on theory of interaction 
and highlights it as a necessary, overarching feature in policy work, risk construction, 
social organization and identity creation. Several contemporary scholars have contributed 
to the discussion of interaction and its influence on meaning creation. Linguist Paul 
Chilton (2004), for example, describes interaction as critical for developing coherence in 
discourse; Smith (2005) points to texts as a form of interaction, or those words and 
images bearing ideas that have the capacity to coordinate and generate standardization of 
meaning and practice; years earlier Bakhtin (1981: 291) and Kristeva (1984) pointed our 
attention toward an individual’s interaction with their past and how understandings from 
the past influence current ways of thinking; sociologist Goffman (1967) emphasized the 
role of face-to-face interaction, specifically that of face, on meaning creation; socio-
linguist Gumperz (1977) looked more closely at linguistic features of face-to-face 
exchanges, such as contextualization cues and indexicality, to show how people make 
meaning through interaction. Empirically, anthropologists studying weather and climate 
in North America and abroad have shown how meaning is created jointly across space 
and time between participants in the interaction and based upon the relationship that is 
held between them (Roncoli et al. 2011; Pennesi 2011, 2013; Taddei 2012). Altogether, 
these scholars illustrate that understanding is made possible through interaction; it 
becomes a socially-situated blending of one’s present with their past, of people engaging 
across and within institutional or community boundaries, an outcome of engagement at 
  
37 
 
different spatial scales and in different ways, reflective of social organizations and 
identities as well as paramount in their production.   
I ground this study primarily in Goffman’s symbolic-interaction perspective, 
particularly his scholarly contributions on presentation of self and frame analysis (1959; 
1974). While his approach does not attend to intentionality and agency in decision 
making, I emphasize Goffman’s work because it highlights well the situated and 
situational nature of interaction. In this chapter, I extend his dramaturgical approach, 
which is described by sociologist Peter Manning (2014: 271) as using theatrical metaphor 
to explore how the communication of messages to an audience conveys information and 
creates impressions that shape social interaction. This metaphor is helpful for illustrating 
the nature and purpose of meteorological interaction on the forecast floor, or that their 
creation of risk information is a type of improvisational policy-inspired performance for 
multiple audiences and where the audiences must then interpret the performance that has 
been framed for them. I make this argument by drawing heavily on more recent 
scholarship, such as the perspectives offered by Schwalbe (2013) and Benford (2013) 
whose work on the self and framing illustrate the continued relevance of Goffman to 
understanding situations, structures and meaning creation through interaction. In the 
following pages, I combine this interactional perspective on sense-making with a mental 
and cultural models perspective, and I supplement these two when appropriate with 
insights from risk, policy and linguistic anthropology literature to explain constructions 
of risk during the pursuit and achievement of operational success on the forecast floor.  
Methods 
With its focus on risk, policy and interaction in the context of weather, the methods 
employed for this study concentrated on the face-to-face interactions between and among 
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ECCC meteorologists on the forecast floor, as well as users’ interactions with various risk 
messages issued by ECCC meteorologists. To that end, ECCC’s office located in 
Downsview, Ontario was selected as a site of investigation, since meteorologists working 
at the 24/7 forecast office are responsible for providing forecasts and warning for the 
entire province of Ontario, including the City of Toronto. Areas in Toronto that 
experience ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather along with its associated impacts, were also 
selected as sites for data collection and analysis. Data were collected over a 17-month 
period used a combination of observation, survey administration, and face-to-face 
interviews with producers and users of weather and flood information.  
Meteorologists were purposively chosen based on their official role as weather 
experts with Canada’s national weather agency, ECCC, and time was spent focused on 
shadowing operational procedures and meteorological interaction during forecast and 
warning creation, an endeavour which resulted in several books of handwritten field 
notes. Observations with this group focused on their behaviour in their natural work 
setting, where understandings could be derived, and grounded in, their spoken words and 
interactions (Bernard 2002; Sandstrom, Martin and Fine 2010: 21). I combine data 
collected from observation with ECCC meteorologists at their Downsview office with 
observations of ECCC meteorologists, who worked at the satellite office embedded in the 
TO2015 Pan Am (PA) and Parapan Am (PPA) Games’ Main Operation Centre, between 
May and October of 2015. Overall, 45 visits were made on ‘severe’ weather, ‘non-severe’ 
and sunny-weather days, with each visit lasting between two and seven hours.  
In this paper, I also draw on survey and interview data to complement my 
understandings of everyday forecasting operations captured during observations. First, a 
  
39 
 
paper survey was administered to ECCC meteorologists in May of 2015 (Appendix L for 
sample), which asked this group what they imagined their publics’ needs and uses for 
weather information were, along with what they perceived publics (mis)understood about 
weather information. Responses to this survey were retrieved in April of 2015 and 
informed the development of an interview protocol for the first group of public 
participants, Sport Managers at TO2015, and conducted face-to-face one-on-one 
interviews between July and October 2015. This interview protocol measured Sport 
Managers’ understanding, reaction and response to a number of ECCC issued products 
including forecasts, Warnings, Watches, and a Special Weather Statement to name 
several. During interviews, participants were also asked about terminology and requested 
to define terms found within these products, such as ‘low pressure system’, ‘scattered 
thunderstorms’, ‘is possible’, ‘frontal system’, and ‘afternoon’.  
In January of 2016, I returned to ECCC meteorologists and administered a second 
survey with this group, this time accessible electronically through a web link to 
surveymonkey.com. This second survey replicated to a great extent the interview protocol 
used with Sport Managers and was administered to elicit comparative data with respect to 
ECCC issued products and terminology and to develop a sense for what ECCC 
meteorologists imagined end-users were paying attention to in the different weather 
products they issued. The interview protocol used for Sport Managers was revised 
slightly for a second group of public participants, Toronto residents, and interviews with 
this second group took place during the summer and fall of 2016. The revision 
maintained the core features of the original protocol, for example it included the 
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presentation of ECCC weather products and terminology, however it also included an 
additional section on general weather knowledge.  
From interview and survey data, the perspectives of 26 ECCC meteorologists are 
included here. The group is comprised of both male and female operational 
meteorologists, who have a range of operational experience. Some are recent graduates 
and are newer to the organization, whereas others have worked with ECCC for over 30 
years. Many have worked in other ECCC forecasting offices, while others in the group 
have been at the Downsview office since graduating from school. Severe weather 
meteorologists act as supervisors and represent the more senior forecasters on the forecast 
floor. These are the folks responsible for creating ‘severe’ weather warnings, ‘non-
severe’ alternatives as well as public extended forecasts. This group is compared with the 
perspectives of 21 adult members of the public: nine outdoor Sport Managers from 
TO2015 PA and PPA Games (three males and six females) who were selected 
purposively, along with 12 residents of the City (three males and nine females) who 
conveniently agreed to participate in face-to-face interviews. The public sample included 
men and women with a range of educational backgrounds, ages, length of residence in 
Toronto, and familiarity with sport as well as with weather information. All face-to-face 
and telephone interviews were audio-recorded, producing approximately 770 minutes of 
recorded talk, which was transcribed verbatim and analyzed with Atlasti, a qualitative 
software analysis program. Consent was granted by all participants of this study, either 
through their signature, by way of completing the online survey, or through their verbal 
consent. ECCC meteorologists and public participants have been referred to by 
pseudonyms in this study to ensure their anonymity (Appendix A).   
  
41 
 
Meteorologists and Operational Success 
Operational success is grounded in ECCC meteorologists’ relationship with the weather. 
Understanding and mastering what the weather is telling meteorologists is a talent and 
skill they use as they navigate policy, the mental image publics have of them and the 
mental image they have of their publics. Their achievement of operational success is 
demonstrated by verbal expressions or facial gestures indicative of triumph or 
disappointment, as the examples below convey. 
Meteorological Mastery and Its Influence on Success 
The relationship meteorologists have with the weather helps in their mastery of 
understanding and telling its story. Despite the highly localized nature of scientific 
weather prediction processes across forecast offices and international borders (Daipha 
2015, Fine 2007), one general commonality found in this expert group is the unique 
relationship each has with the weather, one that often extends far beyond their official 
duties and requirements as forecasters. For many, work is not only about issuing forecasts 
on-time or watches and warnings in enough time, but instead is centred on carrying out 
an organizational-turned-deeply-personal mission for protecting life and property, a role 
similar to emergency first responders as evidenced by one severe weather meteorologist 
who said: “I feel like we’re firemen at a firestation -- waiting for a fire in the hole.” For 
these scientific experts, waiting for that fire in the hole is what weather prediction is all 
about. Often working 12-hour shifts and taking minimal breaks, many eat lunch at their 
desks, and many stay long after they are required when the weather calls for it. Members 
of this group describe the weather in human ways, noting a front’s beauty or a 
thunderstorm as appearing impressive. Such intimate characterizations are suggestive of 
meteorologists’ closeness with the weather and familiarity to it. Likewise, and similar to 
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Fine’s report (2007: 5), ECCC meteorologists consistently give agency and motivation to 
physical features of the atmosphere, such as when they say:  
ECCC Downsview Office 
Fieldnotes 
a. you can see it {the atmosphere} trying to improve 
b. the cold air spills in causing pressure to rise  
c. it {the weather} may still explode  
d. that big meso-convective cyclone just blew up  
e. the weather is a moisture robber  
f. the meso-convective cyclones are pulsing up  
g. the storm system is about to spank them {referring to location} again 
 
Once off-shift, meteorologists continue to refer with ease in conversation to dew points at 
the cabin, or water temperatures in degrees Fahrenheit at the lake, or the cumulus cloud 
cover and the little potential for thunderstorms during their recreational league baseball 
games. These examples demonstrate how weather transcends organizational boundaries 
into the meteorologists’ everyday life as private citizen. One could reasonably argue then 
that severe weather meteorologists have the tendency to work as well as live and breathe 
the weather, a notion supported by one meteorologist who commented: “it is in our 
heads”. With weather so deeply engrained in who they are as scientific experts and 
private citizens, it is unsurprising to consider how organizational notions of ‘severe’, 
‘non-severe’, and thus ‘risky’ and ‘non-risky’, respectively are further negotiated through 
their relational interactions and experiences. 
The Combined Role of Policy and Positive Social Impact on Success 
When it comes to ‘severe’ weather warning policy, meteorologists are considered 
organizationally successful if the notification they issue meets at least one of ECCC’s 
threshold criteria, outlined as ‘a set of defined weather or environmental parameters, and 
their associated values, related to a known hazard that are used as a level marker for the 
beginning of and ending of a weather or environmental instance of a hazard and was 
  
43 
 
issued with 30 minutes of lead time’. In these cases, the notification issued by the 
meteorologist verifies as a “hit” and it contributes to the organization’s overall 
performance standings. For ECCC meteorologists, as much as policy guides decision-
making behaviour in different weather situations, and they do desire for their notifications 
to verify organizationally, successful management of weather risk is less often about 
which official category the weather falls into and is more often about producing 
information that adds value by bringing about positive social impact. Positive social 
impact is defined here as offering advanced warning and users’ or audiences taking 
appropriate response measures to protect themselves from harm. In these ways, 
meteorologists are fueled by their dedication and commitment to the ECCC 
organizational mission and pursuit for operational success vis-à-vis the appropriate 
management of ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather risk. They demonstrate this as a ‘need 
to be correct’, which plays out in different ways depending on the weather scenario 
unfolding before them. Consider the three examples below captured during observations 
with ECCC meteorologists, the first referring back to the opening vignette in this paper: 
Example 1: “What should we do about the rain?” 
On June 15, 2015 and during my observations at ECCC’s Downsview office, I notice 
Elon and Elaine discussing rainfall as the major weather issue for the day, from Windsor 
to Sarnia and across to Hamilton. The day before, on June 14, 2015, 42mm of rain fell in 
Windsor. It came across from Detroit and intensified. From my fieldnotes (and expanding 
upon the opening vignette of this chapter) of this interaction, Elon begins: 
ECCC Downsview Office 
June 15, 2015 
 
1 Elon: Only Windsor and Sarnia have the risk for today.  
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2  {Should we go with} a Special Weather Statement or a Severe  
3  Thunderstorm Watch? 
4 Elaine: It won’t be the same as yesterday.  
5  It’s never the same. 
6 Elon: It might be rounds {of showers} with a block of nothing in between. 
7  Do we even have a chance of showers {in the forecast}? 
8 Elaine: Yeah -- we do.  
9  An air mass this moist is a pretty efficient rain producer. 
10 Elon: ((hands to face with a concerned look in eyes))  
11  What should we do about the rain, 
12 Elon: It’s always a fine line. 
13 Elaine: It’s just that the air is so moist. 
 
The exchange in Example 1 demonstrates how interaction between colleagues and the 
desire to be perceived as correct shapes severe weather meteorologists’ perceptions and 
management of weather risk, which contribute to their feelings of success.  For Elon, 
success hitches on two problems in this weather scenario: first, the initial band of 
precipitation tracking over southwest Michigan toward Windsor, Sarnia and across to 
Hamilton is supposed to roll through and then diminish before a second system comes 
through during the evening. Thus, the atmosphere is not presenting a clear and certain 
scenario of steady rainfall, with certain impacts; it is one of the blurry in-between events 
that fall in the grey middle, which make producing a warning that generates positive 
social impact uncertain.  
Second, and coupled with this uncertainty of impacts, is the constraint imposed by 
policy which makes ensuring the appropriate selection of a product tricky. In Line 2-3 of 
Example 1 we see evidence of this when Elon questions which alert would be more 
appropriate. Despite the rain likely meeting threshold criteria, Elon’s perception of 
‘severe’ risk is diminished since there looks to be a break between the two weather 
systems (Line 6) long enough for the fallen rain to dissipate and be absorbed by the 
ground/rivers/sewer systems, thus resulting in little or no social impact. In other words, 
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even if the conditions meet the 50mm threshold criteria, Elon is hesitant to issue a 
notification because his perception is that the rain will be absorbed resulting in minimal 
impact, and thus limited public utility of a risk message. Elon’s distress in Lines 10 and 
11 is noticeable when he asks: “what should we do about the rain?” On the morning of 
June 16, 2015, Elaine returned for the second of two day shifts and received a brief that 
detailed Windsor as only receiving minimal rain the evening before, Sarnia a little more, 
whereas Goderich received the most at 42mm. Goderich was not included in the 
geographic boundary of the Severe Thunderstorm Watch, and combined with the little 
rain that fell in the regions that were included in the Watch boundary, the notification did 
not verify as a “hit”. This news left Elaine visibly disappointed, her face overcome with 
an expression resembling more of a self-castigation.  
The face-to-face interaction documented in Example 1 reveals that Elon and 
Elaine’s pursuit of success emphasizes the organizational and personal value of their 
efforts. Put another way, during the exchange each is presenting themselves and assessing 
their performance of their occupational role based on their perceived value to operations. 
Elon’s ‘hands to face’ demonstrates the anguish and need to be correct, and that being 
correct is equivalent to adding good value. For Elaine, on the other hand, the 
disappointment she feels when she learns she was incorrect about the previous day’s 
weather situation exemplifies her perception that her efforts added little value. Schwalbe 
(2013: 82) highlights this self-efficacy dimension in his discussion on situations, 
structures and the making of selves. He points to the notion that the ideas we have about 
ourselves are formed through self-perception and the belief one holds regarding their 
ability to succeed. 
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Example 2: ECCC meteorologists at the MOC: “We told them it would rain” 
In another instance, on the afternoon of August 11, 2015 during the TO2015 Parapan 
American (PPA) Games, ECCC meteorologist Nash is embedded at the Main Operation 
Centre (MOC) and running a weather communication triage of sorts with the TO2015 
Sport Delegate and the tennis Sport Manager located at the tennis venue. The excerpt 
from my field notes and the description that follows highlights Nash’s interactive pursuit 
of operational success that day and the importance of being correct: 
ECCC-MOC 
August 11, 2015 
 
At 9:11am, Scarborough looks to be spared the rain, as per Nash to Sport 
Delegate both embedded at the MOC.  
 
At 9:47am, the Sport Delegate communicates this to the Sport Manager on site 
at Tennis. The tennis courts are then dried and swept in preparation for the 
medal matches, which are set to begin at 10:30am.  
 
At 10:07am, within one half-hour of the most recent communication between 
the Sport Delegate at the MOC to the Sport Manager at the tennis venue, Nash 
then tells the Sport Delegate “showers will now hit Scarborough in the next 
half hour”.  
 
The implications of this change from an all-clear at 9:11am to rain sometime 
around 10:45 is a delay in matches. After rainfall, the courts require additional 
time to dry (one hour for water to be removed) and they also require a second 
sweeping.  
 
The new start time for medal matches will be 1.5 hours later, or 12pm.  
At 10:50am- ECCC management and lead for PPA Games calls Nash at the 
MOC to see what happened. 
 
In my conversation with Nash about the weather situation unfolding at the tennis 
venue, he tells me: “It’s not raining there and that’s not a good thing. I told them it would 
rain”. He then added: “It’s hard, you don’t want to say the wrong thing.” Nash is 
concerned that ECCC management will perceive this morning as a ‘miss’. In this case, 
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Nash is balancing the desire to protect his image with his desire to be successful with the 
forecasting challenge brought on by highly convective weather patterns. Here, saying the 
wrong thing threatens the value Nash perceives himself to have, and impacts his 
credibility among end users as well as his peers and colleagues. Similar to Example 1, in 
Example 2 Nash’s self-efficacy is threatened by his change in the forecast. Much like 
Elon and Elaine in Example 1, by giving information the group of meteorologists are 
explicitly claiming their identity as experts. Borrowing from Schwalbe (2013: 87), doing 
so makes these experts accountable and subject to the demand to explain or justify their 
expressive behaviour. When accountability demands cannot be met, self-image becomes 
fractured. This was evident in the first example in so much as the notification issued was 
considered organizationally unnecessary, which is theoretically akin to Elon and Elaine 
trying to claim a self, or a position of valued meteorological expert, in a situation to 
which they were not entitled. Conversely, Nash in Example 2 did not give news of the 
rain early enough. This decision was questioned by ECCC management, a probe that 
conveys Nash failed to claim the similar self he was expected to have. The examples 
illustrate the importance of correctness to meteorologists’ social identity as valued expert 
and interconnectedness of identity with policy and operational success. 
Example 3: “Yay, it got to -1C in North Bay last night” 
From May 21 to September 21 each year, ECCC meteorologists have the added task of 
issuing frost warning or advisories when widespread frost formation is expected over an 
extensive area and/or when surface temperatures are expected to fall near freezing in the 
overnight period5. On May 22, 2015, Elon engages with me about the frost warning he 
                                               
5 https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/types-weather-forecasts-
use/public/criteria-alerts.html#frost 
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issued the night before, which happened to be the first one for the 2015 season. As we sit 
together in the early morning hours, Elon is looking at conditions over Region 12 or the 
near North and exclaims, “Yay, it got to -1C in North Bay last night!” When I ask if 
that’s a good thing, he responds to say: “Yeah, because I put out a frost warning at the 
last minute for people to cover their plants.”  
 Elon explains further that a frost warning was not originally put in the overnight 
forecast for North Bay because ECCC meteorologists on the day shift thought it would be 
cloudy that night, and more clouds means less chance of frost. But then a couple hours 
after Elon took over for the overnight shift, he looked at satellite imagery again and saw 
enough breaks in the cloud to warrant a frost warning. He issued the Frost Warning at 
9:20pm. His exclamation the following morning as he is sitting next to me that the 
temperature in North Bay reached -1C confirms that the frost warning was a “hit”. 
Looking back, however, Elon commented to say: “it should have gone out earlier, maybe 
in the afternoon so people can do something about it. If the frost warning gets out too 
late, it’s not like people will go out and cover their plants.”  
 This example highlights meteorologists’ desire for bringing about positive social 
impact during ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather. In combination with changes in the 
atmosphere, ECCC policy contributed to Elon’s management of the frost. It socially 
arranged the structure of work practices and governed the expressive actions Elon took 
during his encounter with the weather situation by both enabling and constraining his 
actions (Schwalbe 2013: 79), leading to success on the one hand and failure on the other, 
respectively. More pointedly, his last minute Frost Warning verified as a “hit”, however it 
also resulted in limited positive social impact. This opposition reveals the conflict 
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brought on by the pursuit of operational success, and the negotiation within the 
meteorologist wherein expert identity is reinforced by a “hit” but then also threatened 
when the meteorologist perceives their actions to have little value for the end-user. 
Overall, in Example 3 Elon demonstrates that more than adhering to policy, providing 
information that is meaningful to the public is critical for operational success. This means 
that issuing a notification, regardless of whether a “hit” or not, is sometimes less about 
policy’s thresholds and criteria and more about getting it right, or delivering risk 
information that can and will benefit the public, which in this case meant issuing with 
enough time for the public to act and protect their property from damage.  
The Role of the Meteorological Archetype 
The mental image meteorologists perceive publics have of them influences their need to 
be correct as they pursue operational success. Unlike other scientific disciplines, 
meteorology has undeservedly earned itself a lower degree of social recognition (Turner 
2009). Conscientious efforts in the mid-1950s to professionalize meteorology and secure 
the science it produces as a recognized public authority on weather have not always been 
successful (Turner 2009: 150). More contemporarily, meteorology and the work of 
meteorologists are sometimes questioned, joked about, and dismissed. In these ways, 
meteorologists have and continue to experience a degradation of their social identities, a 
reality documented in the Northeastern Brazilian context and discussed by Taddei (2012: 
255) as threats of physical violence, verbal abuse, and ridicule. The social degradation 
also manifests itself in the North American context where ideas about meteorological 
work evolve to become an archetype of sorts where widely shared representations are 
created, maintained, and perpetuated socially through the likes of popular media film (the 
WeatherMan) as well as through comedic portrayals on primetime Canadian television 
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(Rick Mercer’s 7 day forecast). That these comedic portrayals are generally recognized as 
representative of meteorological identity is indicative of the successful transfer or 
propagation of the archetype.  
While public individuals experience popular portrayals in unique ways, the 
meteorological archetype broadly functions to generate commonly held beliefs about the 
credibility of meteorological work and the scientist’s identity as meteorological expert 
(Stevens 2015: 44), for upon their issuing of a notification, he or she becomes 
accountable and is instantly available as the perfect victim for sacrificing in the public 
arena. They take on blame for risk that materializes, but also for risk that does not, and in 
this way often experience recurrent damage to their public image (Taddei 2012). This is 
related to Douglas’s discussion on risk and blame (1992) in so much as risk, especially in 
the context of meteorological prediction, functions to hold someone accountable, a 
position for which the meteorologist often finds themselves in despite their efforts at 
precision and accuracy. In addition, the meteorological archetype relates to Schwalbe’s 
(2013) discussion on accountability and his insight regarding the potential for the 
fracturing of one’s self-image when accountability demands cannot be met. Schwalbe’s 
contribution, in particular, reveals a type of double sacrifice in so much as when 
meteorologists experience failure they are at once suffering publicly and also internally 
with the damaged perception they have of themselves. 
The everyday work of ECCC meteorologists’ noted above illustrates the 
simultaneous power and preservation of the archetype through interaction. As Schwalbe 
(2013: 81) writes, the consistent signification of category membership is likely to elicit 
consistent attributions of character. In other words, through signifying acts, or the 
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repeated work of forecast and warning, and to the extent that meteorologists’ work is 
perceived by publics as inaccurate, the more likely publics will continue to impute the 
group with a degraded expert identity. With awareness of the meteorological archetype, 
meteorologists come to behave based upon how they perceive others are reacting to their 
behaviour. These reflected appraisals (Schwalbe 2013: 82) are noted as a primary 
motivator of expressive behaviour. Thus, in the context of managing ‘severe’ and ‘non-
severe’ weather, during the construction of risk information in their pursuit of operational 
success, meteorologists consider this archetype as a factor in their decision-making. This 
factor preserves, restores and sometimes challenges their self-image as meteorological 
expert as Examples 1-3 demonstrate. 
The Role of the Public User of Weather Information Archetype 
As much as the meteorological archetype influences the relational construction of risk on 
the forecast floor during ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather, ECCC meteorologists’ 
pursuit of operational success is also influenced by an equally powerful but opposite 
mental image each has of the audiences they serve. The images are often developed 
through indirect interaction with these groups in different media environments, such as by 
meteorologists reading comments made on social media platforms or those public 
response behaviours reported on news broadcasts during weather events. These are 
considered signifying acts made by the public, which impute versions of the public onto 
the meteorologist, and when repeated over time perpetuate conceptions and 
misconceptions meteorologists have of public groups. This notion of the public user of 
weather information archetype as influential in the management of weather risk is 
reinforced by research in the field of science and technology studies where scholars: 
make a case for the power of the public image in shaping motives for, and preferred 
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mechanisms of engagement (Barnett et al. 2012: 46); discuss how public communication 
serves to co-construct and re-inscribe their imaginations of who the public is (Davies 
2008: 427); and also show how the assembled imaginations experts have of their publics 
affects the framing of information (Maranta et al. 2003: 151) as well as the model that is 
chosen for communication (Gross 1994).  
In the context of meteorology, the shared social space in the new and traditional 
media environment mediates meteorologists’ experience with audiences. It assists in the 
creation of who meteorologists imagine their audiences to be, what they believe public 
groups know, and what they believe audiences need in terms of risk information. Similar 
to the influence of the meteorological archetype, the public archetype shapes 
meteorological work and the pursuit for operational success in the way that decisions 
made by meteorologists become swayed by these perceptions they have about others. 
This point was made in Example 3 above by Elon in his assumptions regarding the 
usefulness, or lack thereof, of the Frost Warning he issued late in the evening on May 21, 
2015. It is also confirmed by the presumption made by ECCC meteorologist Samuel 
when he reported in his survey response: “People do not understand our definition of 
severe thunderstorms,” a statement he followed up with by writing: “We need a way to 
teach the difference between a ‘non-severe’ thunderstorm and a ‘severe’ thunderstorm.” 
The comment made by Samuel highlights the existence of an official definition grounded 
in policy, and it conveys the mental image he has of publics that do not understand that 
‘severe’ thunderstorms include specific conditions that have met specific thresholds 
whereas ‘non-severe’ thunderstorms include the same conditions but fall just shy of 
thresholds.  
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To a certain extent, the mental image held by Samuel regarding what publics do 
and do not know is valid. It was shown to be true through an analysis of different 
conceptions of ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ thunderstorms. Generally, public participants in 
this study defined ‘severe’ thunderstorms as inclusive of one or all of the following: 
thunder, lightning, hail, rain and winds; and where those conditions are present with a 
certain intensity; and where they occur in close proximity to the participant, are long in 
duration, and result in negative social impacts. Conversely, public participants reported 
‘non-severe’ thunderstorms as characteristic of: “having fewer lightning flashes” 
(Rebecca); “a thunderstorm that  does not pose any danger” (Stephanie); gentle rain 
falling on you” (Cathy); and resulting in “no real damage” (Joseph).  
These varied public understandings highlight the differing cultural models 
meteorologists and members of the general public employ to make sense of ‘severe’ and 
‘non-severe’ weather. Drawing from anthropologist Claudia Strauss’s (2005: 206) 
discussion on analyzing discourse for cultural complexity, the inclusion of lightning in 
both ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ public definitions is considered here a cultural keyword 
that has the power to inscribe understandings, ideas, thoughts and expressions. This is 
because of lightning’s repeated use when talking with interviewees about what makes a 
thunderstorm a thunderstorm, what makes one ‘severe’ and how ‘severe’ differs from a 
‘non-severe’ one. The consistent mention of lightning conveys that this feature in a storm 
is invested with strong values for public participants. Furthermore, that a ‘non-severe’ 
thunderstorm was defined as having little to no impact reveals the assumption held by 
public participants that ‘non-severe’ thunderstorms are inconsequential. Perhaps these 
opposing viewpoints should be unsurprising since, as van Dijk (2014) might 
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acknowledge, meteorologists represent a particular epistemic group with specialized 
knowledge while members of the general public do not. In other words, these 
participants’ shared understanding represents the presence of a cultural model, however 
in their case it is not grounded upon expert knowledge, rather it is likely built upon 
reasoning and experience that was shown to be shared among the participants 
interviewed. Strauss (2005) comments on the realities of these models, reporting on the 
power of mental representations, and how deeply internalized they come to be, so much 
so that they often amount to taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. The 
assumptions become problematic for audiences, however, when ‘non-severe’ weather is 
approaching and they are not expecting conditions that fall just shy of threshold criteria.  
Managing ‘non-severe’ weather risk: Alternatives for Achieving Operational 
Success 
Elements that bring about feelings of operational success, such as the organizational “hit” 
and positive social impact, are meant to align. In some cases they do, such as when a 
‘severe’ thunderstorm warning verifies as both a “hit” and is perceived as helping 
residents in their decision to keep their car under cover to save it from hail damage. At 
times, however, the factors generating operational success for ECCC meteorologists do 
not align. These circumstances can include weather that does not meet ‘severe’ 
thresholds, but is still considered risky and potentially impactful by meteorologists. The 
following discussion on the management of ‘non-severe’ weather shows this divergence 
and the relational nature of risk perception and management. In cases of ‘non-severe’ 
weather, meteorologists construct alternative risk notifications that are intended to both 
amplify public perceptions of risk to be more on par with their assessment of the ‘non-
severe’ weather situation and inspire protective responses.  
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This construction of risk is a type of frame alignment (Benford 2013: 141), or a 
strategy for building a particular social reality for end-users. More than five decades ago, 
Goffman (1974: 21) pointed out how frames organize experience and guide action by 
enabling individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences and events. In 
other words, much like mental models, frames define conceptual boundaries of situations 
and events. Here, I am extending Benford’s more recent discussion on the topic of 
framing to weather risk and policy contexts. I consider the construction and use of 
alternative notifications as a social encounter framed interactionally and suggest that by 
constructing alternative notifications ECCC meteorologists are strategically attempting to 
create an illocutionary force with their words, beginning with congruence between their 
expert assessment of risk and their audiences’ perception.  
In this next section, I analyze the production and use of two alternative ECCC 
notifications during ‘non-severe’ weather, the Special Weather Statement (SWS) and a 
lightning prototype application utilized during the TO2015 Pan American and Parapan 
American Games, to further my discussion on operational success. I argue that the SWS 
is a type of frame amplification strategy (Benford 2013: 141) since it is used to persuade 
end-users, whereas the lightning prototype application is more of a frame extension 
(Benford 2013: 143) because it expanded the boundaries of the ECCC notification 
framework to encompass the expressed needs and interests that were identified as more 
salient to the end-user, in this case the TO2015 Sport Managers. Mental models, 
institutions and the concept of frame resonance (Benford 2013: 145) are explained as 
related factors in the uptake of and response to these alternative notifications, which has 
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implications for the illocutionary force of these ECCC products and the meteorologists’ 
ability to make a positive social impact.  
Alternative 1. The Special Weather Statement (SWS) 
  
ECCC Downsview Office 
May 16, 2018 
Hazel: Silence is what kills us.  
If we have an SWS out {issued} at least we’re saying something.       
 
The Special Weather Statement (SWS; Appendix B) is an ECCC product written as a 
narrative that allows for the expression of meteorological uncertainty and for explaining 
in more detail the scope and extent of approaching weather. It is technically one of the 
least urgent notification in the suite of products available to ECCC meteorologists and is 
utilized during a range of weather conditions. On the one end, it provides a ‘head’s up’ of 
weather that may or may not happen, and on the other, it is used to notify the publics of 
potentially harmful just-below-the-official-warning- criteria weather. They are especially 
sought out as an alternative during ‘non-severe’ weather scenarios when elements and 
features of thunderstorms aren’t believed to reach critical ‘severe’ thresholds. Unlike the 
STW, the SWS is composed entirely by the severe weather meteorologist; they are not 
written according to a specific policy, nor are they created with any measure of 
consistency from one person to the next, nor do they require verification6. Thus, each 
becomes a unique characterization of the atmosphere dependent upon who is forecasting 
severe weather on any given day.  
Once issued, the SWS is available to public users on a variety of traditional and 
new media platforms. There is no mandate for on-air broadcasters or meteorologists with 
                                               
6 As of the time of this writing (2019), ECCC are now beginning to verify SWS. Using Toronto as a 
testbed, this SWS pilot project attempts to capture if and when ECCC is over-estimating or under-
estimating impacts when issuing an SWS. 
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traditional media such as television networks or radio stations to re-communicate the 
SWS, unlike the official Watches and Warnings produced by ECCC. If an on-air 
presenter chooses to discuss the SWS, each does so by re-creating the message manually, 
which means selecting the content and context each deems important for their audience. 
One of Canada’s largest private weather company’s “The Weather Network” has a 
smartphone application where an alert notifies the app-user that a ‘Special Weather 
Statement’ has been issued. The red lightning bolt on the application can then be clicked 
on to expand the entire statement verbatim for those seeking more information.  
On the surface, the SWS is a useful tool for providing added detail during 
potentially harmful weather situations. Research confirms this benefit in the American 
meteorological context, showing that added context influences public comprehension 
when it comes to ensemble prediction, probability or frequency information, conveying 
uncertainty, as well as the impact of enhanced textual and graphical pieces in watch and 
warning products (see: Demeritt et al. 2010; Demuth et al. 2013; Joslyn and Savelli 
2010). The Canadian SWS, however, with all of its flexibility for framing and narrative 
style, may prove to be an exception since my data show the product does not always 
translate to increased compatibility or commensurate understanding.  
 For example, despite its use to convey risk during ‘non-severe’ but still 
potentially impactful weather, many public participants reported their general 
understanding of the SWS as something different. Public participant, Noah, perceived the 
SWS to be a product providing a climatological outlook, while Lucas, Rebecca, Gabriel 
and Brooklyn thought it to be a synopsis or an update of the forecast. And still, resident 
Ginny, believed the SWS provides her with information about weather that was out of the 
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ordinary. Rebecca added that she did not know the difference between a SWS and a 
Severe Thunderstorm Warning (STW; example in Appendix E). Theo, Nasir, Stephanie 
and Ingrid all referred to the SWS as a mechanism for alerting the public for the potential 
for bad weather, while Umberto and Donald reported that the SWS is used to give a 
head’s up for ‘severe’ weather.  
Analyzing and comparing the common ECCC decision for issuing the SWS 
against what the SWS label signified to the public participant group reveals a significant 
conceptual divide regarding its purpose, namely that it is largely understood by the public 
who participated as a synopsis, an outlook, or explanation of weather that “may happen” 
as pointed out by Theo, which does not align with ECCC use of the product during ‘non-
severe’ but still potentially highly impactful weather. These differing understandings 
highlight a lack of common ground or coherence between the two groups’ models of 
thinking. As van Dijk (2014: 250) notes, coherence in discourse relies on structures of 
similar models between participants where there is a common relation between the fact 
referred to and those subjective representations participants are using to make sense of 
the fact. Benford (2013: 145) would likely agree that this incoherence represents a lack of 
resonance and that the SWS frame employed by ECCC to construct ‘non-severe’ weather 
risk is not striking a chord with their intended audience. With a fractured conceptual 
relation such as this, positive social impact is difficult to accomplish with an SWS in any 
meteorological weather situation, which makes operational success upon issuing one 
during ‘non-severe’ conditions equally difficult to achieve.  
When ECCC meteorologists and public participants were asked about a particular 
SWS (Appendix B), conceptual divides continued to emerge with respect to the content 
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or terminology included in these alternative notification messages. For instance, one 
feature of the July 14, 2015 notification that escaped ECCC meteorologists but caught the 
attention of eight public participants was the mention of low risk in the SWS. This 
suggests that the mention of low risk in the July 14, 2015 SWS was interpreted by some 
public participants as an assessment of the weather risk situation, rather than what experts 
imagined would be the important takeaways: a description of conditions to pay attention 
to, such as the rain, how much, where, and when. In other words, though they included 
low risk, in this case ECCC did not intend for the SWS to be interpreted as an assessment 
of risk at all. When it came to low pressure system, nearly all public participants were 
unsure what the term meant. To that end, the primary responses given to my question 
“What does low pressure system mean to you?” were “I don’t know” or “I have no clue”. 
One resident of Toronto, Ingrid, commented to say: “I don’t know. I’m not a PhD in 
meteorology”, which suggests that this term is too specialized for individuals who are not 
trained in atmospheric science. By including terminology like low pressure system, 
ECCC meteorologists are presupposing that their audience understands. Much like the 
varied multiple perspectives regarding the purpose of the SWS, the data show that people 
have an even greater incoherence when it comes to understanding the term low pressure 
system.  
Public participants also varied from ECCC meteorologists in their definitions for 
certain features of rain (Figures 2, 3 and 4 below). Combining the scattered 
thunderstorms mentioned in the SWS with isolated cells and line of storms, I asked and 
compared participants’ responses for the three with ECCC meteorologists’:  
  
60 
 
 
Figure 2. Public Participants' Responses to 'Isolated' cells 
Figure 2 is compared with ECCC meteorologists’ definition for ‘Isolated Cells’, which is 
“very sparse distribution across space, more so than scattered. Typically a single shower.” 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Public Participants' Responses to ''Scattered' 
 
Figure 3 is compared with ECCC meteorologists’ definition for ‘Scattered 
Thunderstorms’, which is “sporadic distribution across space. When showers are on and 
off throughout the day.” 
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Figure 4. Public Participants' Responses to 'Line of Storms' 
Figure 4 is compared with ECCC meteorologists’ definition for ‘Line of Storms’, which 
is “solid distribution of showers across time and space.” 
 
The perspectives represented in the charts above show considerable differences with 
respect to how features of rain are understood between ECCC meteorologists and public 
participants in this study. ECCC grounds their definition in elements of intensity, space 
and time. Public participants, on the other hand, include measures of probability and 
impact, and they also conceive of ‘lines’ in multiple ways: as both one continuous line 
across geographic space as in a large swath and as continuity in a series where there are 
multiple lines, one after the other, moving across a more contained geographic space.  
These varied conceptions suggest different mental constructions are used to define 
these features between the two groups. While ECCC meteorologists’ representation of 
each term is singular and guided by their specialized knowledge as meteorological 
experts, the public participants rely on different models of reasoning, such as their 
experience with the term and whether or not they had heard it before, to make sense of 
what is meant by isolated cells, scattered thunderstorms, and line of storms. For the latter 
group, there is no shared assumption among them for how each term is defined. The 
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casualness in participants’ demeanour, their laughs while providing these responses, and 
their ability to move on in the interview with ease suggests that the model each is using to 
define the terminology works for them, even though it may be officially inaccurate.  
Sandstrom, Martin and Fine’s (2010) sociological perspective confirms that producing 
weather information to effectively inspire coherence and timely response is more than 
just about the attitude of “at least we’re saying something’. In their chapter on language 
and the creation of social reality, these scholars show how naming gives an object its 
classification and meaning and assists in the organization of perceptions around the 
object and subsequently stimulates behaviour towards it. Their stance suggests that in the 
context of constructing risk information it is the name given a product that transforms 
what the message stands for from something abstract into something more concrete. In 
this study, the SWS is a label that was conceived of by ECCC to create meaning for their 
audiences. In other words, the SWS category was generated by ECCC to assist in their 
efforts to construct a relationship between their audiences and their environment, one 
based on a shared collective meaning of the SWS and one that inspires a common mode 
of response when the product is issued (Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2010: 55). The 
variable and often contradictory understandings for what the SWS represented along with 
the incoherence of terminology found within the body of the risk message demonstrates 
that the label has not lead to collective understanding, nor a common mode of response, 
however. In Austin’s terms, public participants in this study have not understood the 
intentions of ECCC and because of this the illocutionary force, and thus the pragmatic 
effect of the SWS, was diminished. The multiple conceptions surrounding the purpose of 
the SWS and the content found within this risk message has implications for its 
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effectiveness in amplifying risk in ‘non-severe’ weather situations, which in turn impacts 
the ability for meteorologists to achieve operational success. The analysis highlights the 
interconnections between framing of risk information, mental and cultural models used to 
make sense, and the impact of these on the pragmatic effect of the SWS as an alternative 
warning strategy. In the next example, a second alternative is used by ECCC 
meteorologists, one with more clear framing and greater coherence, yet similarly 
deployed with limited pragmatic effect, despite an illocutionary force that should have 
been successful given the conditions in place between participants in interaction. 
Alternative 2: Lightning Prototype- when the next strike could be within striking distance 
Prior to the inception of TO2015 PA and PPA Games competition, ECCC and TO2015 
staff collaborated about what TO2015 Games staff weather information needs would be 
during the summer event. The understandings negotiated across the two groups during 
their discussions illustrate the stability of meaning created through interaction. Put 
another way, through these consultations an agreement was made for ECCC to frame risk 
by extending ECCC policy to better meet the needs of its users. In this way, a framing 
strategy was constructed, one that resembles a type of bridging rather than amplification 
since there was ideological congruence between ECCC, TO2015 Games’ staff and Sport 
Managers on the ground at each venue. The discussion highlighted the importance of 
lightning as a risky weather feature for this group of public users belonging to TO2015 
Games staff. As Sport Manager of Beach Volleyball, Brooklyn, commented during our 
interview: 
University of Toronto 
October 27, 2015 
 
Brooklyn: We would play through everything except lightning.  
If there was ever any sort of threat of lightning -- 
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that’s when we needed to make some decisions.  
Lightning is the only reason we’d stop. It’s the baseline.  
Lightning was the real factor. 
 
The Sport Managers for TO2015 followed the commonly supported 30/30 rule when it 
came to lightning as they managed their respective outdoor sporting events. This rule 
stipulates, more or less, that when lightning is observed, play stops and the time between 
the lightning and thunder is counted. When 30 seconds or fewer have been counted 
between lightning and thunder, the field of play is to be left and shelter is to be sought 
immediately. People are to remain sheltered for 30 minutes after the last peal (or sound) 
of thunder.  
While critical for TO2015 Games, lightning is not a criterion included in official 
ECCC ‘severe’ weather products; its presence falls under the ‘non-severe’ yet still 
potentially harmful weather category. Understanding that an alternative notification was 
warranted to best meet the needs of users, however, ECCC meteorologists utilized the 
lightning prototype (LP) as a tool to warn outdoor Sport Managers about the presence of 
lightning7. This alternative notification was issued to add value and offer positive social 
impact in the form of inspiring protection of athletes, volunteers, staff, and spectators 
during TO2015 outdoor events. The prototype was available for download during 
TO2015 Games as a smartphone application and alerted subscribers visually, audibly, and 
vibrationally when lightning was detected within 30 kilometres and also within 10 
kilometres. Nasir, former track and field Olympian and Sport Manager for canoe slalom 
at TO2015 described the alert as: “very loud, like you could hear BOOM! when the 
                                               
7 ECCC owns the lightning sensors purchased from Vaisala (which make up the Canadian Lightning 
Detection Network or CLDN), the raw data are sent from individual sensors to Vaisala to be processed and 
then sent to ECCC- personal communication with H. Yang of ECCC on May 30, 2018. 
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lightning hit on your app. It was a BOOM! BOOM BOOM BOOM BOOM BOOM! And 
it was just, and you could see and this lightning app we had it actually counted the 
number of hits.” This sentiment was echoed by Lucas, the Sport Manager for soccer, who 
when talking about alerts on the LP mentioned hearing “the crash of thunder and then 
your phone vibrates.” In fact, of the nine outdoor sport managers interviewed for this 
study all reported the LP as an extremely useful tool for notifying them about risk that 
was officially ‘non-severe’.  
Despite its perceived usefulness, the alternative notification strategy often failed 
operationally in the sense that even when notified of lightning as close as 10 kilometres 
away, TO2015 matches and venue operations continued. Consider the example below, an 
excerpt from my interview with Brooklyn where she recounts details during a lightning 
scare at the ‘purpose built stadium’ for the beach volleyball games: 
University of Toronto 
October 27, 2015 
 
Brooklyn: {Referencing the day of the scare} we could see it  
out over the lake.  
We couldn’t see lightning but we could see clouds.  
I was checking my lightning app constantly.  
And now that I’m looking at this app --  
it’s showing within 10km -- and that’s when I thought maybe 
we should seriously consider not starting the next match.  
We saw some pretty ominous clouds.  
I don’t think we saw any lightning ever.  
I can’t remember exactly.  
 
In the above comment, Brooklyn is pointing out the risk she perceived from a 
combination of environmental cues and the alert provided from the LP. If the risk 
conveyed on the LP is considered a measure of ECCC meteorological risk during this 
officially ‘non-severe’ weather scenario, one can reason that the LP frame extension was 
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at least partially successful in bridging expert assessment of risk with this user. Risk was 
further amplified for Brooklyn in this situation because she knew that with lightning so 
close-by and with only a purpose-built stadium to protect everyone, there was nowhere 
within close walking distance to move the upwards of 5000 spectators should it be 
deemed necessary for them to seek immediate protection from the elements.  
As the interview with Brooklyn progressed, however, she commented that even 
with the LP alerting of lightning within 10 kilometres, and despite official policy which 
dictated action upon the observance of lightning, the Technical Delegate decided against 
delaying or cancelling:  
University of Toronto 
October 27, 2015 
 
Brooklyn: {Referencing the name of the Technical Delegate} -- 
 the Technical Delegate has the most experience.  
He was comfortable to continue with the match.  
Those are the people that are the experts in the field --  
and know and have lived through some of this stuff before.  
He {the Technical Delegate} said -- you know --  
if we can’t see any lightning -- it may be out there -  
but if we can’t see it -- 
chances are probably pretty good that we’re going to be ok. 
 
This decision to carry on with the beach volleyball game without delay points to a glaring 
safety issue brought about by this choice. Meteorological experts understand that not 
seeing lightning on the ground does not mean risk is eliminated. For this group, when 
lightning is detected within 10 kilometres, as was the case during this beach volleyball 
event, meteorological training has taught these specialists that the phenomenon is within 
striking distance to cause harm. In fact, according to personal communication with ECCC 
research and development scientist on May 30, 2018, there is a type of lightning 
commonly known as “bolt from the blue” that can travel a great deal horizontally away 
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from the parent thunderstorm cloud. Many American sources claim this distance to be as 
great as 16 to 24 kilometres8,9. In addition, this example underscores the danger of 
waiting. Since the closest permanent building to the temporary structure was 
approximately a 10 minute walk away, waiting for visual confirmation placed spectators 
of this match at considerably higher risk. 
As much as Sport Managers perceived risk in a similar way to ECCC 
meteorologists, the example shows that their decisions were bound by the Technical 
Delegate, a person who is responsible for making the final call regarding game play. My 
data show this Technical Delegate did not perceive risk during this volleyball event in the 
same way. In fact, given the reference made by Brooklyn to words spoken by the 
Technical Delegate about the lightning: “if we can’t see it chances are probably pretty 
good that we’re going to be ok”, it follows that the ‘lightning observed’ clause in the 
30/30 rule is unofficially interpreted by this individual as visual on-the-ground 
confirmation, and not observation in the form of a lightning bolt on a smartphone 
application. Because lightning was not visible on the ground, risk was perceived as low.  
The Technical Delegate’s decision is explained here by his or her extensive 
history and experience with the sport, which contributed to an alternative mental model 
or way of thinking about lightning and risk. Contrary to the model employed by ECCC 
meteorologists, the Technical Delegate’s is not one centred on meteorological training 
but rather on his or her involvement in outdoor sport and the absence of harm caused by 
lightning over the years. In other words, the Technical Delegate’s model on risk is 
                                               
8 https://www.weather.gov/safety/lightning-myths 
9 https://lightninginjury.lab.uic.edu/LtnInjuries.pdf 
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aligned with what Whorf (1956) would argue are the Delegate’s habitual ways of 
thinking and acting, those that follow the patterns established by his experience of the 
word risk and what it has come to stand for over the years. The Technical Delegate’s 
understanding of the term risk, and his way of thinking about risk that has transpired as a 
result, have become deeply internalized over time and, in turn, has contributed to the 
development of informal rules and conventions. The Technical Delegate relies upon these 
informal rules when making risk-related decisions during these types of sporting events. 
Practically speaking, these informal policies and conventions materialized for the 
Technical Delegate as the visual absence of lightning as non-risky and the ‘eyeball test’ 
for assessing lightning risk, which is contrary to ECCC’s method for defining and 
assessing lightning threat.  
Recent empirical studies (Morss et al. 2015; Lazrus et al. 2016) explored mental 
models used by public groups in Boulder, Colorado and identified similar mismatches 
between expert and lay-groups’ understandings when it came to perceptions of threat and 
decision making. Within their research context of flash-flooding, these scholars suggest 
the misconceptions or imprecise beliefs held by lay-groups increase the difficulty of 
evaluating risk and taking action. Consequently, Morss, Lazrus and colleagues contend 
identifying gaps is a useful step for developing more effective risk information and 
enhancing shared conceptions for what constitutes threat. While this is true, the LP is an 
example of communication created specifically to address gaps in knowledge and in 
many respects it still did not generate appropriate protective actions. Put another way, its 
style, the mechanism and platform for transmitting the information, and the content that 
was shared was formulated based on the expressed needs of users and with the intention 
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of creating a shared conception of ‘non-severe’ weather risk, and still even with the 
understanding of intentionality behind the LP, the alternative’s illocutionary force was 
weak, and consequently, failed to inspire action because risk meant something different 
to the Technical Delegates.  
In keeping with risk perception scholars Kasperson and colleagues (1988) and 
Benford (2013), lightning risk was indeed amplified for Sport Managers with the LP, 
however, the explanation given for its limited use reveals that the Sport Manager’s shared 
conception and heightened assessment of risk was no match for the alternative model and 
the long-standing unconventional norms relied upon by the Technical Delegate to manage 
the risk situation. In other words, the LP did not resonate with the Technical Delegate. 
Benford (2013: 146) explains diminished resonance of framing strategies as a function of 
three factors, including: frame consistency, empirical credibility and the credibility of the 
framing agent or claimsmaker. The empirical results here suggest Benford’s explanation 
is true when it comes to Technical Delegates, however the contribution of scholars such 
as Whorf (1956), who challenged our views on the relationship among language, thought 
and behaviour, would encourage us to consider the lack of resonance as equally 
connected with the pragmatic force of ECCC’s alternative. Since the Technical 
Delegate’s habitual thought and the mental model he used diminished the effect of 
ECCC’s LP notification, it stands to reason that both framing strategies and routinized 
ways of thinking about lightning and risk contributed. Furthermore, that the Sport 
Manager did not challenge the Technical Delegate’s ‘eyeball test’ shows how at times, 
long-standing unofficial conventional norms that are used to guide risk management 
decisions propagate in social environments where power differentials exist, such as the 
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one between the Sport Manager and Technical Delegate, even if those unofficial 
conventional norms are scientifically incorrect. Thus, the case reveals that along with the 
impact of habitual thought on sense-making, mental models and behaviour, the 
mechanisms under which institutional norms manifest also perpetuate and limit the 
illocutionary force (Austin 1962) of the LP as an alternative notification during the 
management of ‘non-severe’ weather risk.  
Relatedly, the lightning example also reveals the implications for the presentation 
and acceptance of ECCC as expert agency in this situation. For example, the decision 
against halting activity reflects the Technical Delegate’s poor appraisal of ECCC’s expert 
analysis of the situation. The Technical Delegate did not agree with the expertise of 
ECCC and made a decision enabled through the particular social arrangement in place, 
specifically that the informal policies had been permitted to supersede that of 
meteorological expertise. Similar to Example 1 from earlier, where Elon and Elaine 
issued a Watch that didn’t verify, in this weather situation it could be argued that the 
Technical Delegate deemed ECCC as attempting to claim a self he or she perceived the 
Agency was not entitled to. Correspondingly, the decision against halting activity alludes 
to the diminished social value of ECCC as an agency for this Technical Delegate and also 
suggests a perception of diminished social value for ECCC by Brooklyn, especially since 
she reported that “those are the people that are the experts in the field and know and have 
lived through some of this stuff before.” Overall, the opposing risk assessment along with 
the decision to disregard the lightning notification has far-reaching implications. One 
example includes the degradation of meteorologists as expert and the preservation of the 
  
71 
 
meteorological archetype, even though ECCC met their accountability demands and 
provided an alternative to meet the apparent needs of their users.  
Conclusion 
The interaction among ECCC meteorologists as they are reading and responding to 
‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather is similar to Schwalbe’s (2013: 78) description of an 
activity system. Their interaction on the forecast floor is socially accomplished through a 
coordination of scripted and non-scripted or improvised behaviours as they negotiate 
policy and manage weather risk in ‘severe’ and ‘non-severe’ weather situations. To that 
end, during their everyday work practices each meteorologist attempts to construct a 
social reality for the public that is in alignment with organizational thresholds, the 
informal institutional conventions they use to guide their understanding, and also with the 
image they are presenting of themselves as meteorological expert. The study 
demonstrated how making the “right decision” is always a fine line, as Elaine suggests in 
the chapter’s opening vignette. Ultimately, official policy holds the power in controlling 
official risk knowledge and definitions that are interpreted by experts during the 
construction of risk information for their audiences. In weather situations officially 
considered ‘non-severe’ but still perceived as risky by meteorologists, these experts’ 
interaction is heightened as they navigate the situation in a way intended to inspire 
audiences’ beliefs in the risk and bring about some degree of positive social impact. 
This investigation revealed a unique architecture of risk construction and response 
between ECCC meteorologists and public participants as ECCC meteorologists pursued 
operational success. Relatedly, the investigation highlighted the mediating role of 
language in shaping social realities, both on the forecast floor and in public. The case 
demonstrated how ECCC meteorologists frame ‘non-severe’ weather risk by issuing 
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alternative notifications, which sometimes include the SWS and during TO2015 included 
a lightning prototype (LP) application. Analysis of public participants’ understandings of 
the SWS product revealed considerable conceptual variation in terms of the notification’s 
general purpose as well as the terminology used within the message. Moreover, the 
alternative notification often created to manage the murky, middle situations when the 
atmosphere is bringing about officially ‘non-severe’ just shy of threshold criteria weather, 
was shown to have questionable pragmatic effect on account of this variation. 
Meanwhile, Sport Managers’ experience with the LP highlighted the nuanced ways risk 
comes to be constructed, accepted and negated in spite of collaboration. For this 
alternative risk management strategy, the LP was shown to have questionable 
effectiveness not for lack of shared conceptual understanding but more so because of a 
lack of shared understanding between the right people. In other words, the illocutionary 
force of the LP was successful in creating a threatening social reality for Sport Managers, 
but not threatening enough for the individuals responsible for making game play 
decisions. Considered here as frame disputes (Benford 2013: 147), public interpretations 
and responses toward ECCC’s alternative management solutions illustrate the negotiated 
nature of meaning creation.  
This study went beyond the call made by Boholm (2015) for greater efforts to be 
put toward contextualizing risk and understanding how it is managed through policy. 
Specifically, I examined the conditions under which risk is operationalized by 
meteorologists according to policy during ‘severe’ weather and also how it is managed 
when weather falls short of officially ‘severe’ thresholds, in which case no policy or 
official rule to warn exists. I accomplished this by paying attention to the local, micro-
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scale nuanced actions and decisions that were carried out by ECCC meteorologists as 
well as audiences who use their information. The rich and detailed accounts generated as 
result of this effort revealed policy and risk as processual and highlighted the myriad 
interactions involved as policy and risk information travel across space to different sites. 
The analysis also revealed the work carried out by ECCC meteorologists as tied to their 
expert identity. For example, the policy and risk management solutions employed by this 
group of experts are influenced by their desire to present the best, most competent version 
of themselves. Achieving success reinforces a positive presentation of self and 
perpetuates their belief as valuable to operations. On the other hand, failure damages their 
presentation of self and propagates their desire to add more value in subsequent weather 
risk situations. Altogether, the approach and resultant findings underscore the relational 
nature of risk construction and the ways it comes to be assessed, communicated and 
managed interactionally during the policy implementation process. Furthermore, the 
findings confirm the usefulness of my anthropological endeavour for focusing a different 
lens on risk and policy and offering a window onto the processes by which risk and 
policy attempt, sometimes unsuccessfully, to organize people and their understandings. 
Finally, the results of this study shed light on the limitations of a threshold-based 
warning system, and conversely, confirm the potential usefulness of an impacts-based 
warning philosophy where outcomes and implications of weather become the categorical 
boundaries for warning creation. Also, based on the findings of this study it stands to 
reason that ECCC meteorologists will harness greater shared meaning of risk and 
appropriate response during ‘non-severe’ weather situations by generating notifications 
with labels that both triggers public interest and clearly distinguishes between different 
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weather risk scenarios. To that end, if using the SWS, it means labelling the notification 
(1) in a way that captures the attention of the public it aims to serve, (2) labels them 
differently from other less threatening ‘head’s up’ weather scenarios, and (3) includes 
terminology that is understood more broadly.  
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Chapter Three 
“I’m not 100% sure”:  
The confluence of policy, interaction and risk in managing ambiguous 
urban river flooding in Toronto, Ontario 
 
Introduction 
 
TRCA Office10 
October 28, 2015 
 
16 Ed: That’s the thing - I’m not 100% sure the DVP is going to flood.    
17  Right now we’re at 76.3 metres.  
18  We’re .4 metres away and it’s tapering off. 
19 Nancy: We don’t have any rules around it. 
 
On October 28, 2015, a typical fall rainstorm suspended itself over Toronto, Ontario. By 
7:30 that morning, flood forecasters at the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority 
(TRCA) determined urban river flooding was imminent, or that based on their 
calculations flooding was going to occur in parts of their jurisdiction. In these 
circumstances, TRCA policy dictates that a Flood Warning is issued.  The TRCA Flood 
Warning is a notification alerting the public that: “Flooding is imminent or already 
occurring in specific watercourses or municipalities. Municipalities and individuals 
should take action to deal with flood conditions. This may include road closures and 
evacuations.” Despite TRCA’s assessed flood risk meeting the official policy threshold, 
the Chief Flood Duty Officer (FDO) in charge that day, Ed, did not immediately issue a 
Warning. He was considerably uncertain as to the extent of flooding, what impact it 
might have and at what location, and he didn’t want to create unnecessary chaos since the 
Don River and DVP flood regularly in heavy rain.  
                                               
10 Line numbers in Chapter 3 are specific to Chapter 3. See Appendix C for a verbatim transcription of 
face-to-face interaction captured via audio-recording (B) and in field-notes (A, C, D). The Transcription 
Key located at the top of Appendix C is applicable for the entirety of the dissertation.  
  
83 
 
Implementing TRCA policy and issuing the Warning for Ed was much like 
Goffman’s (1967) version of the gamble in so much as there were four decision 
possibilities, two with negative outcomes: either Ed could issue a Warning with no 
impacts experienced, like a false alarm, or he could not issue the Warning when impacts 
are experienced. The problem lies in the fact that official TRCA flood warning policy 
does not address these conceptual gambles and contextual factors; there are no rules 
around these less than 100% certain cases as Nancy points out above, which makes the 
black and whiteness of flood warning policy murky for some flood forecasters. Because 
of this, Ed was left to navigate these uncertainties and weigh the odds. After a 
considerable amount of time, deliberation and much delay, Ed went ahead and issued a 
Flood Warning at 3:20pm, which ended up being only minimally useful for those who 
received it.  
Motivated by this event and the extent that uncertainties played a role for Ed in 
implementing official TRCA flood warning policy, in this chapter I examine interaction 
as a site for the confluence of uncertainty, risk and policy in the context of urban river 
flooding. In particular, I look at TRCA flood forecaster engagement and negotiation of 
flood warning policy as an examination of face in interaction and I also develop the 
notion that the relationship TRCA has with their key recipients is a type of interaction 
ritual chain. With respect to the latter, I suggest TRCA’s delayed Warning represents a 
weakening of the interaction ritual chain between themselves and their key recipients, and 
I explain this by sharing the perspectives of key recipients’ actions on October 28, 2015, 
which exposed this weakness and revealed unintended consequences when the rules of 
conduct are not followed. Specifically, I ‘study through’ (Reinhold 1994: 477-479) the 
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localized, small-scale decisions made and actions taken by TRCA’s key recipients in 
response to the 3:20pm TRCA Flood Warning to illustrate how members from this group 
took matters into their own hands that day rejecting the cultural capital, or flood risk 
expertise, provided to them by TRCA. Instead, I show how they relied upon a 
combination of institutions, the negotiated order internal to their organization, and 
individual agency to manage the flood risk situation.  
In this chapter, I argue that interaction plays a critical role in shaping policy-
related decision making within and across spaces by reinforcing and challenging people’s 
ideas, by expediting as well as delaying their actions, and by creating effects for others 
beyond those individuals involved in the immediate social encounter. Working my way 
out from the October 28, 2015 event and tracing actors’ interactions and actions, in the 
following pages, I challenge traditionally held notions of policy process as a neat, tidy, 
logical, orderly, rational set of flows and procedures that move systematically (Stone 
1988). Instead, I show the implementation of policy or policy work as multi-dimensional 
and contested, especially in ambiguous circumstances where little guidance exists. More 
specifically, by focusing on the subtleties of policy processes in uncertain risk events my 
objective is to expose policy implementation as relational in the way that the process 
shapes, and is shaped by, inter and intra-agency interaction; as social in the way that risk 
management in policy situations challenges and reinforces the social order or hierarchies 
and perceptions of expertise as evidenced through decision-making; and as contextual, 
and thus differently conceived of and treated depending on the flood situation and 
depending upon who is in charge.  
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Following a theoretical description of interaction, uncertainty and risk in policy 
work and a brief review of the methods employed in this study, I go on to discuss the 
history of urban river Flood Warning policy in Toronto. This sets up the analysis of the 
October 28, 2015 flood event and my investigation for how risk was assessed, how 
uncertainty was managed through face in interaction, and how key recipients responded 
to TRCA’s Flood Warning. Examining interaction’s role during the urban river flood 
event is a good way to understand the interconnected nature of policy and risk. On the 
one hand, the case shows policy’s influence on perceptions, assessments and management 
of risk during ambiguous flood situations. Reciprocally, the case highlights how 
perceptions of risk influence how policy is implemented. Relatedly, focusing on 
interaction reveals the unintended consequences that come about from situations 
perceived with uncertain risk, such as hesitations in decision making and limited utility of 
TRCA Warning products. The interactional approach I take here is productive in the way 
it exposes the nuances of social relationships between and across organizational groups as 
well as interaction’s instrumental role in influencing the ordering of people and expertise 
in policy and risk situations.  
The role of Interaction, Uncertainty and Risk in Policy work 
Policy has been identified as a course of action pursued by government and adopted for 
the sake of expediency, and where the process of its creation and its effects are deemed 
pragmatic, functional and techno-scientific (Martin 1997: 183; Però 2011: 225). On the 
surface of this rational approach to governance, policy and its related processes appear 
straightforward, simple, efficient and exercised without delay, much like what Deborah 
Stone purports in her book The Policy Paradox (1988). This is a point echoed by 
anthropology of policy scholars Wedel, Shore, Feldman and Lathrop (2005: 34) who 
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further contend that for many policy users external to government processes, on first sight 
policy resembles a tool uniting means, or a mechanical and one-dimensional instrument 
deployed to bridge gaps between goals and their execution (Wedel et al. 2005: 37).  
Scholars have also argued that processes of policy creation and implementation 
stabilize patterns of relations between groups, shape ideas of what government 
representatives ought to do and naturalize to a certain extent government presence in 
social landscapes. This gives heed to the origins of policy wherein the term carries with it 
historical meanings that continue to be deeply embedded in our everyday lives, including 
in our expectations to be policied and in our dependence upon policy as a guide for sense-
making and action. Evolving from these early conceptual beginnings of policy, the way it 
manifests over time in various facets of our daily life and through its repeated 
deployment, government presence becomes ‘encompassed’ in the social relations 
experienced between actors, or where government and its processes sit above, yet also 
within, its localities, regions and communities (Ferguson and Gupta 2002: 983; Painter 
2006: 755). In this way, policy is conceived of as a powerful tool that enables 
encompassment.  
Lefebvre’s (2009: 59) reference to the structuring that emerges from this 
dialectical interplay between policy ideas, people and the economic, social and political 
forces individuals are living with, explains the effects of encompassment. Together these 
notions of policy show how through policy government processes strengthen social 
relations between government and recipients of policy-based information. Such effects of 
policy work on social relationships have also been illustrated by Shore and Wright (1997) 
who, in their examination of policy, governance and society, contend that policy has the 
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power to craftily manufacture consent, consolidate legitimacy and authority, and engineer 
understanding so that agreement comes ‘naturally’ (Shore and Wright 1997: 18), 
Although their focus is on the audiences who take up government policy and the way it 
operates as a tool to steer public behaviors, my focus in this chapter is primarily on policy 
work in the organizational setting and how the official rules become unquestioned by 
government flood forecasters depending on the context of flooding, which is useful here 
to consider as I investigate the nature of the delay in the October 28, 2015 TRCA Flood 
Warning.  
Perceptions of risk and the worries that come about in risk situations influence 
policy-related decision making (Bradbury 1989: 391; Boholm and Corvellec 2011: 180). 
Mayer and colleagues (2017) make the reciprocal link between risk perception and policy 
attitudes, contending that perceptions shape motivations for policy making, while the 
establishment of policy helps to create ideas about what is and is not risky. This is useful 
because it speaks to the government perceptions, and thus ideals, that inform policy-
making activities, and it also identifies the way policy is used as a tool to bind perception 
of risk or contain within the permanent dimensions of official policy what kind of risks 
are paid attention to or count. As a form of risk governance, for example, if rain falls over 
the City of Toronto, official rules dictate that flood forecasters focus their attention on the 
potential for flooding near watercourses within their jurisdiction not away from them. 
This geographic boundedness of policy directs flood forecasters that flood risk away from 
the river is not part of their mandate or doesn’t count toward their risk assessments, 
whereas risk brought on by river flooding and adjacent to the rivers does. Moreover, as 
official policy directs interpretations and assessment of risk situations, in a mutually 
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reinforcing way, the assessed risk directs how and which parts of the official policy will 
be used to manage the risk situation. In other words, depending on if the flooding is 
assessed as possible or imminent, different policy notifications are optional. Thus, 
through government actors’ engagement with policy and risk, policy and its products 
begin to function as a cultural agent (Shore and Wright 2011: 20; Smith 2005: 120) with 
the ability to classify the spaces and subjects it seeks to govern, shifts action, guide 
perceptions and experiences (Shore and Wright 2011: 3), all the while operating to limit 
the range of ‘reasonable’ choices one can make (Wedel et al. 2005: 37-38).  
In addition to official policy as directing the interpretation and management of 
risk situations, policy and its related processes are also influenced by socially and 
culturally structured conceptions and evaluations of the world (Boholm 1998, 2003; 
Boholm and Corvellec 2011). These conceptions are grounded in symbols, histories, 
ideologies, and representative of unique ways of thinking, according to Douglas (1992: 
46) and Weinstein (1989), include various elements such as memory, education and value 
judgments (Douglas 1985: 29-40), and encapsulate one’s worldview (Flynn et al. 1994; 
Slovic and Peters 1998) and one’s political, aesthetic and moral values (Douglas 1992: 
31). Balanced with these individual factors is the influence of social context on risk 
perception, or more specifically institutions. Institutions are the informal rules and 
conventions ensuring social coordination during interaction (Douglas 1986: 46). Douglas 
(1992: 102) points specifically to the power of socially created institutions during 
individual risk analyses. She views these informal codes of conduct as the mobilizing 
force in risk interpretation and response behaviour (Douglas 1992: 78), which emerge 
through interactions and consultation between the risk-perceiver and others in their 
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community. According to Douglas (1992: 31), institutions are synonymous to a 
collectively constructed censor where each risk-perceiver sifts information, considers the 
bearing of risk on themselves, their community, and evaluates the extent the risk will 
affect the individual or the collective good (Ibid 1992: 46-47). From this description, 
individual factors, social context and organizational factors such as institutions, along 
with ideas for how the risk may affect others, all contribute to perceptions of risk during 
policy’s implementation process, over and above official policy or rules. This helps to 
explain the heterogeneity of perspectives included in the discussion that follows, or the 
reasons for how and why flood forecasters and public groups’ implemented policy and 
used the Flood Warning, respectively, in unique and unexpected ways.  
Uncertainty is a concept linked closely with risk and risk governance, or strategies 
that often manifest as a result of policy. It is a term frequently compared to risk and 
presented as an object that expresses qualities of risk (Samimian-Dariash and Rabinow 
2015: 3-4). Historically, uncertainty has been studied in terms of uncertainty management 
or how society attempts to create greater certainty. This is true of even anthropological 
scholars, such as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) and Douglas (1992) who, in their 
studies of risk, culture, blame and danger, focused their examinations of uncertainty on 
its identification and how people attempt to eliminate it. More recently, anthropology 
scholars have centred their attention on understanding more deeply the experience of 
uncertainty, how it emerges, and how different forms of uncertainty are met by a range of 
responses (Samimian-Darash and Rabinow 2015). Adriana Petryna’s (2015) chapter in 
Samimian-Darash and Rabinow’s edited collection, for example, centres her discussion 
of uncertainty in the context of gaps among knowledge, practice and inscrutable 
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circumstances related to environmental politics. In her work, Petryna describes the 
challenges of managing the interface between physical incoherence and human 
interference, and utilizes the concept of horizon to illuminate a space in which people 
engage in “continuous self-correction vis-à-vis changing baselines and knowable risk” 
and where incremental actions take place amid multidimensional uncertainties (Petryna 
2015: 155-156). The metaphor of the horizon is helpful because it conveys well the 
complexities involved in processes of policy implementation at TRCA, such as Flood 
Warning generation. More precisely, the metaphor illustrates the intermingling layers of 
the atmosphere, the hydrological environment, along with the oscillation of waning and 
expanding dangers that are perceived in times of heavy rain; layers that become 
especially critical in situations when decisions need to be made in a timely and efficient 
manner. Altogether, the inclusion of uncertainty in this theoretical framework is useful 
because research on the topic proposes ways for explaining the effects of ambiguity 
experienced by flood forecasters as they operationalized flood risk policy on October 28, 
2015.  
Nuances of policy and its implementation processes, the relational nature of risk 
perception and assessment, and the management of uncertainties brought on by ambiguity 
are constituted in, and also constitutive of, interaction. In other words, interaction is an 
overarching feature of meaning creation where meaning is both invoked during 
interaction as well as organized by it. In the context of implementing and appropriating 
TRCA urban river Flood Warning policy and the audiences receiving its related products, 
such as a Flood Warning, interaction enables the emergence of these nuances as well as 
frames the shape that these elements can take during engagement. Several scholars from a 
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variety of social science disciplines have contributed to the discussion on meaning 
creation through interaction (Bakhtin 1981; Gumperz 1977; Kristeva 1984; and Smith 
2005). Bakhtin’s insight regarding meaning creation as a socially-situated blending of 
one’s present with their past is useful in the way that his work helps to explain the 
influence of past utterances and texts and the layering effect of these interactional factors 
in TRCA flood forecasters’ sense-making and their subsequent creation of risk 
notifications.  
Likewise, sociologist Dorothy Smith’s approach to institutional ethnography is 
helpful for understanding text’s influence on flood forecasters’ interpretation and 
appropriation of urban river flood policy. In particular, Smith challenges us, similar to 
Sandstrom’s group (2010), to conceive of interaction with texts as generating 
standardization of comprehension and practice. Empirically, anthropologists studying 
weather and climate in North America and abroad have shown how meaning is created 
jointly across space and time and between participants in the interaction, based upon the 
relationship that is held between them (Roncoli et al. 2011; Pennesi 2011, 2013; Taddei 
2012). These scholarly contributions confirm the constitutive nature of interaction and the 
ability for interaction to influence meanings that emerge within and across organizational 
settings, such as that which occurs between flood forecasters and their audiences.  
Given my emphasis on meaning as jointly created through interaction, I ground 
this study in a Goffmanian approach, particularly in his perspectives on interaction ritual 
(IR) and order, face and rules of conduct during social encounters (Goffman 1967, 1981). 
I am motivated to do so because the face-to-face interaction captured among flood 
forecasters during the October 28, 2015 urban river flood event revealed a special 
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relationship between these experts in their organizational context as they negotiated and 
appropriated policy. More pointedly, their interaction had what Goffman refers to as 
‘shape and coherence’; it illustrated continual attempts to repair, reconstitute or maintain 
the social order within the hierarchy of the group, and it showed how the needs of the self 
or individual forecaster/participant in interaction were expressed and changed 
situationally. Building from this, the chapter draws on theoretical contributions made 
more recently by Randall Collins (1987; 2004) and the concept he developed to explain 
meaning creation during interaction, or the interaction ritual chain. According to Collins 
(1987: 198; 2004: 23), IRs are procedures between two or more people under conditions 
of co-presence that both generate and consume symbols representing group membership; 
comprise negotiations that represent moments of shared social reality; require 
cooperation and a mutual focus of attention; are dependent upon shared motivations and 
resources; and where the motivations and resources come from previous encounters, 
hence the IR as a chain. Collins (1987: 199) continues in his description of the IR chain 
to report resources that circulate during interaction and affect its outcomes, such as 
cultural capital, emotional energy and social reputation.  
Based on this definition, interaction among flood forecasters at TRCA as well as 
between flood forecasters at TRCA and their key recipients represent two types of IR 
chains. First, deliberations among flood forecasters as they negotiate policy and their 
subsequent construction of flood notifications during flood events constitute a specific 
type of interaction ritual. Engagement between these flood experts is an interplay of 
practices, conventions and procedural rules that functioned as a means of guiding and 
organizing their flow of talk (Goffman 1967: 34). This engagement combined with the 
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organizational setting in which flood forecaster interaction takes place, and also 
combined with the number of times policy has been negotiated among this group during 
past flood risk events, all coalesce to establish social membership and enact the ritual 
chain within their flood forecasting environment.  
Second, TRCA and each of its key recipients are members in a special 
relationship bound by its own rules of conduct, which has generated a patterning of 
behaviour between the groups. In Goffman’s (1967: 49) terms, the relationship between 
TRCA and these groups is a type of interaction ritual in so much as TRCA has an 
obligation to issue notifications to key recipients in accordance with policy, and users 
have an expectation that TRCA will fulfill its obligation and issue them flood 
notifications as dictated by its official flood warning policy. These notifications represent 
TRCA flood expertise and are considered here the cultural capital the agency holds and 
brings to the group. In other words, this knowledge is an asset that TRCA utilizes during 
encounters between members of this IR chain to follow through on their obligation. By 
virtue of their membership in the IR chain, this TRCA expertise is perceived by flood 
forecasters to be held in high regard by key recipients. Put another way, key recipients’ 
expressed desire for these notifications not only activates their membership in the IR 
chain but it also suggests they place a high value upon the information that TRCA sends 
to them.  
Flood events, both their possibility as well as their occurrence, are times when 
TRCA is prompted to meet its obligation and also when key recipients expectations for 
fulfillment are aroused. These encounters reinforce and stabilize the interaction ritual 
chain, including membership in the network as well the rules of conduct to be followed 
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by its members. In their research on social interaction and organizations, Fine and Hallett 
(2014) assert that the stability is not generated within the immediate encounter alone, but 
depends on social memory of past events as embedded in ongoing social relations, and 
from incorporating agreements developed from experience. In these sociologists’ opinion, 
successful past interaction through the established group order serves as a model for 
interactions in the present and thus the ability for groups to create and maintain 
orderliness (Fine and Hallett 2014: 1775). Though the interaction is rarely face-to-face 
between TRCA and its key recipients, and thus does not meet Collins’s (2004) condition 
of physical co-presence, the mutual interests among TRCA and its key recipient groups in 
flood and flood risk have contributed to their shared motivation to mitigate impacts 
against it. In this chapter I am less strict in my attention to the specific ritual pattern 
Goffman conceived of, and also less attached to his focus on interaction as solely 
executed to maintain or restore interactive equilibrium. Also, I have extended Goffman’s 
and Collins’s concepts beyond face-to-face interaction, and I admittedly do not attend to 
Collins’s central resource of emotional energy in the IR chain. Still, their concepts of 
interaction as ritual and a ritual chain are useful here in the way that they account for who 
is involved in forecast interaction, how participants in these deliberations conduct 
themselves as they work together to pursue specific organizational goals, and the rules 
and expectations of conduct that have developed over time between flood forecasters and 
recipients of TRCA flood warning information.  
Interactions that take place between flood forecasters during flood warning 
generation are replete with facework, or the verbal and non-verbal acts people use to 
express their view of the situation, and evaluate the scenario and its participants, 
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including the self (Goffman 1967: 5). Face is a notion derived from Goffman (1967: 5) 
concerning the image of a speaker in interaction and defined as the positive social value a 
person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a 
particular contact. As an example, a person has face, is said to be in face, or maintains 
face when the line he takes presents an image of him that is internally 
consistent/supported by judgments of other participants (Goffman 1967: 7). In Goffman’s 
view, face is a display of the self, of one’s character and their identity that is ratified 
during interaction by the hearer and/or listener. Thus according to Goffman, people 
present themselves as the kind of person others expect them to be and their engagement 
with others is about presenting self in a way that avoids threatening these expectations. 
Brown and Levinson (1987) expanded on Goffman’s work and are recognized as major 
contributors to this field of research for their development of a cognitive model of 
politeness, concepts of positive and negative face, and the use of face threatening acts as 
strategies in interaction to protect the positive or negative face wants of others. Their 
approach differs from Goffman’s in that, although exhibiting presentations of self 
through face, the motivations of face work in their view rest primarily on fulfilling the 
presumed face wants, or desires, of others. Despite their theoretical advancement on the 
topic, Brown and Levinson’s approach has been criticized for their position that face is an 
apriori attribute that stands to be threatened in interaction and their notion that 
expressions of speakers’ intentions are always motivated by their desire to mitigate face 
threats carried by certain face threatening acts towards hearers (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003; 
Haugh 2009; Spencer-Oatey 2009).  
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My analysis in this chapter blends these foundational concepts to explain aspects 
of face-to-face interaction at TRCA. Having said this, I place greater emphasis on the 
presentation of self and individual goals during interaction and situational factors that 
influence face in interaction than Brown and Levinson. To that end, I incorporate a self-
perspective on face much like Spencer-Oatey (2009) does in her examination of rapport 
management in Chinese-British business interaction and similar to how Sükriye Ruhi 
(2009) does in her exploration of the inter-relationship between face and self-presentation 
in naturally occurring discourse in a Turkish setting. In these scholarly works, Spencer-
Oatey and Ruhi both emphasize the emergence of a speaker’s own face concerns in 
interaction, and I do the same here. My objective in doing so is to show the strategic and 
relational nature of face, how different faces are expressed by the same individual during 
singular encounters, and how when speaking in organizational settings, flood forecasters 
are dynamic in their use of facework in so much as their efforts promote their own face as 
well as the face of the group. In my examination, I also pay close attention to the local or 
situational factors as well as the broader elements influencing face in interaction, and thus 
meaning creation. Therefore, similar to what Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini (2003) 
asserted more than a decade ago, I consider the systems of rules, conventions and 
expectations at TRCA. This approach responds to the call made by scholars in the field of 
pragmatics, Michael Haugh (2009) and Helen Spencer-Oatey (2009), who suggest more 
attention be paid to broader contextual elements in investigations of face and politeness.  
Following a brief description of methods, I trace the flood warning policy process 
as it moves across temporal and social scales and sites in non-linear ways, outlining what 
river flooding and risk means to flood forecasters, and showing how perceptions and 
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decision making during ambiguous river flood situations are interactional. Along the way, 
I make connections among uncertainty, risk and policy, and illustrate how the 
triangulation of these three factors influences the negotiations and struggles flood 
forecasters have in adhering to or resisting the official rules during policy 
implementation, and likewise, the struggle for successful uptake of urban river flood 
warning by its intended users. 
Methods 
A closer look at urban river flood warning policy in Toronto necessitated an alternative 
ethnographic approach, one more multi-sited across an entire ‘fieldspace’ (Shore and 
Wright 1997: 11). As Schwegler and Powell note (2008: 3), policy is never a discrete 
geographical phenomenon; it takes shape in a number of locations. Likewise, 
anthropology of policy scholars report the importance of recognizing policy as articulated 
through interaction and systems of governance across the social and political 
environments. As such, the endeavour to explore connections and relations in Toronto 
made possible by urban river flood warning policy among seemingly disparate groups 
required time spent with, and investigation of, multiple groups located in various offices 
across the city. To that end, I took Hugh Gusterson’s (1997) suggestion and ‘tilted the 
field’ so as to study flood warning policy in great detail as it moved across space, 
collecting the perspectives of a constellation of different actors representing multiple 
levels of government, private enterprise and public, all of whom had varying degrees of 
knowledge ranging from expert to laygroup. I collected data over a 17-month period 
between May 2015 and October 2016 and relied upon ‘studying through’ (Shore and 
Wright 1997: 14; Wedel et al. 2005: 40), a methodological approach that may focus on a 
singular topic but follows discussion on that topic as these topics range back and forth 
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and back again between individuals, and up and down and up again between a range of 
institutions (Wright and Reinhold 2011: 101). Participant observation, survey 
administration, and face-to-face interviews aided my efforts to trace these policy 
connections, as well as helped to illuminate how flood warning policy played out in 
different contexts, and how different organizational and everyday worlds are intertwined 
across time and space. The triangulated approach was useful for cross-validation as well, 
since it ensured greater reliability and accuracy of research results (Jick 1979), and 
allowed for a richer, more nuanced account of how groups make sense of flood warning 
policy and its connection with risk perceptions in the context of river flooding (Bernard 
2002).  
Participant observation, also referred to as one method of naturalistic inquiry 
(Sandstrom, Martin and Fine 2010: 21), focuses on people’s behaviour in natural social 
settings, where understandings are derived from, and grounded in, the spoken words and 
interactions of participants. In this case, I acted as a participant observer over 18 visits, 
one hour or more in length, at Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA) to 
attend meetings, participate in flood warning and response simulation exercises, or 
observe forecasters as they assessed the day’s flood risk between May 2015 and June 
2016. I also administered two surveys during this time (Appendices J and K for samples), 
one to TRCA flood forecasters (n=12) and a second during face-to-face one-on-one 
interviews with key recipients of TRCA flood information (n=15) as well as media, or 
weather and flood information communicators who are employed by major television 
networks (n=10). The surveys measured understandings of river flooding in urban areas 
as well as interpretations and responses toward an October 28, 2015 river flood warning 
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notification. Overall, interviews lasted anywhere between one-half to two hours and 
resulted in approximately 774 minutes of recorded talk, which was then transcribed, 
coded and analyzed using Atlas.ti, a qualitative software analysis program. I selected 
participants purposively since each represents groups directly involved in either 
producing, communicating or using river flood warning notifications and managing flood 
risk, and because TRCA identified many as key users of their flood notifications (see 
Appendix A for project participant list). The following comparison between TRCA and 
key recipients, including media, presents a diverse range of viewpoints regarding policy 
implementation and response on October 28, 2015. As such, it helps to show how risk-
related policy-inspired products work differently in situations of uncertainty and 
ambiguity. 
History of Urban River Flood Risk Management in Toronto, Ontario  
Urban river flood warning policy in Toronto is embedded within a decades long historical 
context of urban flood risk management practices that were formalized following the 
deadly impacts of October 15, 1954 Hurricane Hazel. In this tragic event, 81 people were 
killed in the City, thousands were left homeless and significant financial damages were 
incurred11. As a result of the loss of life and lack of preparation, local municipalities and 
the province developed a comprehensive plan for flood control and water conservation, 
which included the public acquisition of vulnerable land and restrictions on development 
in the City’s floodplains12. Current TRCA flood risk management practices are reflective 
of the many adjustments that have taken place since Hurricane Hazel, including those that 
occurred following the next major legacy flood event in Toronto during the summer of 
                                               
11 http://www.hurricanehazel.ca 
12 http://citiesintime.ca/toronto/story/hurricane-ha/ 
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July 2013. During the 2013 event, several city roads and underpasses were under water, 
motorists were forced to abandon their vehicles and transit authorities halted and delayed 
services, closed major transportation corridors, and cancelled flights. A major commuter 
train stalled on the tracks, which left thousands stranded and in need of rescue13. 
The 2013 flood disaster amounted to insured property damage close to the one 
billion dollar mark (Henstra and Thistelwaite 2017: 12), making it one of the most 
expensive in Ontario history. The significant social and economic impacts during this 
event put a spotlight on TRCA and management’s attention quickly turned toward 
making organizational improvements to the City’s flood risk management operations. 
One improvement focused on enhancing and streamlining TRCA’s generation and 
communication of early warning notifications; Major Event Operations were reviewed, 
communication and action flow charts were created and revised, labels and definitions for 
different flood phenomena were identified and agreed upon, flood forecaster roles were 
formalized, and modifications to training and operational procedures were made and 
practiced routinely, to name several. The enhancements show how urban river Flood 
Warning policy following the 2013 major flood event found a new expression; new social 
and semantic spaces opened up and sets of relations and webs of meaning were redefined 
(Shore and Wright 2011: 1). Specifically, they had the effect of socially re-organizing 
TRCA flood forecasters, re-constructing a sense of internal order among them, and were 
intended to impose a prescribed set of actions and particular kinds of conduct by and for 
recipients of flood warning information, both in terms of expectation as well as 
interpretation of the message. While the changes did much to generate clear instruction 
                                               
13 (https://www.ec.gc.ca/meteo-weather/default.asp?lang=En&n=5BA5EAFC-1&offset=2&toc=hide 
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for TRCA flood forecasters regarding when a Flood Warning should be issued and 
provided clear direction for whom and how the message should be communicated, the 
October 28, 2015 event analyzed here highlights the intricacies and unintended 
consequences that come about during the implementation and uptake of policy, despite 
years of well-meaning enhancements. 
At the time of this writing, multiple groups at multiple levels of government are 
involved in urban river flood warning prediction and notification in Toronto, but 
officially it is the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (MNRF) and the Toronto 
and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA) who are primarily responsible as per a 
provincial mandate document dated back to June 1984. MNRF is provincially-based and 
operates a Surface Water Monitoring Centre (SWMC) in Peterborough, Ontario that 
observes water levels on lakes, rivers and streams in the province to predict where and 
when flood risk may occur at the provincial level. Flood experts at SWMC will issue 
either a provincial flood watch, which provides information about the potential for 
flooding, or a provincial watershed conditions statement, which provides notices on 
general watershed conditions and outlooks for flooding as a result of spring melt or 
runoff14. These products are shared with any one of the 36 municipal Conservation 
Authorities in the province such as TRCA, and to other organizations, such as 
Environment and Climate Change Canada’s (ECCC) Downsview office in Toronto. 
While the province remains the lead, TRCA is a critical partner for the province and is 
responsible for the operation of a local monitoring network, interpretation of local 
                                               
14 https://www.ontario.ca/law-and-safety/flood-forecasting-and-warning-program 
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watershed conditions, and the creation of flood information for their jurisdiction as it 
relates to the overflowing of rivers, creeks and streams in, or onto, urban areas.15  
A group of water resource engineers comprise the flood forecast and warning 
team at TRCA where each, on a weekly rotational basis, provide their expertise and serve 
as either the on-call Flood Duty Officer (FDO) or the on-call Chief FDO. Borrowing 
from Summerson-Carr (2010: 18) expertise is defined as:  
both inherently interactional, involving the participation of objects, 
producers, and consumers of knowledge, and inescapably 
ideological, implicated in the evolving hierarchies of value that 
legitimate particular ways of knowing as “expert.” 
 
During ‘on’ weeks, the FDO expert is responsible for assessing daily flood risk, a task 
that accounts for approximately 10% of their daily workflow. They do this by accessing 
and reviewing any number of sources of information at the beginning of their day, 
whether weekday or weekend. These sources include SWMC’s assessment of provincial 
conditions, and ECCC’s current weather and forecasts, official Watches and Warnings 
that are in effect. Flood forecasters pay particular attention to POPs (Probability of 
Precipitation)16, or chance of rain, and the use of enhanced language such as 
‘thunderstorm’ in this information. These experts also engage with predictive models to 
enhance their situational awareness of flood risk, such the North American Mesoscale 
(NAM) numerical weather prediction Model, the Global Environmental Multiscale 
(GEM) Model, and Quantitative Precipitation Forecasts (QPF) to gain a sense of data-
generated rainfall prediction. Finally, this group pays special attention to levels of water 
                                               
15 January 19, 2016 FDO Meeting notes 
16 The probability of precipitation is a subjective estimate of the likelihood that a measurable amount of 
precipitation will fall sometime during the day at any given spot in the forecast area 
(https://ec.gc.ca/meteoaloeil-skywatchers/default.asp?lang=En&n=7884CDEA-
1&def=show1E9CAF366#E9CAF366) 
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in the jurisdiction’s watercourses and dams. Values from these sources are tabulated and 
inserted into algorithmic equations, which then produce the daily flood risk within 
TRCA’s nine watersheds. If there is no risk within TRCA jurisdiction, the FDO issues the 
daily flood email and puts weather aside and continues with their regular work duties, 
which account for 90% of their daily workflow. If there is potential for flooding, 
however, the FDO works in tandem with the Chief FDO and other flood forecasters to 
decide upon the degree of risk and the notification most appropriate for issue. Since the 
responsibility is carried out on a rotational basis, different sources of data are reviewed by 
different FDOs and thus decision and risk trajectories unfold differently during any given 
flood event. 
TRCA Official Urban River Flood Policy  
TRCA official urban river flood policy17 is to issue a Flood Watch when “flooding is 
possible in specific watercourses or municipalities”, and a Flood Warning when 
“flooding is imminent or already occurring” (See Figure 5).  
                                               
17 https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/understand/ 
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Figure 5. TRCA Flood Watch (depicted in orange on the severity scale) and Flood Warning (depicted here in red on 
the severity scale). https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/understand/ 
 
Policy dictates that flood messages will be posted in the Flood Forecasting & Warnings 
section of TRCA’s website and communicated (see Appendix D for October 28, 2015 
Flood Warning) via electronic transmission to designated key recipients (Figure 6; key 
recipients who utilize flood information to prepare in advance against flood impacts are 
highlighted in bold) within municipalities, local agencies, the school board, and the 
media, such as major television news networks, or via Twitter, a popular social media 
platform. New-age and traditional media platforms, along with the representatives 
employed by media networks in Toronto, such as CTV, CBC and CP24, serve as an 
important communication conduit for disseminating information about weather and river 
flood risk to the general public. However, their efforts are based on private network rules 
rather than public or governmental ones. This means that, unlike the Canadian Radio-
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television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) mandate imposed upon 
broadcasters for communicating ECCC weather watches and warnings, media are not 
required to follow the same directive when communicating notifications produced and 
issued by TRCA. As a result, media selectively choose when and what flood warning 
information to communicate to their viewers. This is similar to other key recipients of 
email notifications who, with varying degrees of flood knowledge and expertise, 
individually assess the severity and risk of the situation, and from this the value and 
relevance of re-communicating TRCA notifications to individuals and departments within 
their organizations or activating municipal emergency response procedures, which may or 
may not include taking actions to warn local residents18.  
                                               
18 https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/understand/ 
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Figure 6.Communication of TRCA Urban River Flood Notifications to ‘key recipients’ 
This historical overview and description of river flood risk management in Toronto, 
Ontario illustrates the process as involving interactions at federal, provincial and local 
levels across public and private divides, and among individuals with varying degrees of 
flood expertise and knowledge. On the surface, these relations appear straightforward and 
communication binary: either yes, recommunicate, or no, do not recommunicate the flood 
notification. In contrast, the following analysis and discussion of the October 28, 2015 
flood event reveals policy work as more nuanced, especially during cases of higher 
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uncertainty. Studying through interaction and perspectives surrounding the event 
illustrates the socialness of the urban river flood risk policy process, particularly 
uncovering the various ways official policy is relationally interpreted and experienced at 
the local level, according to differing perceptions of risk held by individuals, who are 
heterogeneously positioned within their own institutional environments.  
The October 28, 2015 Urban River Flood Event 19  
On October 28, 2015, Olivia and Ed found themselves two days into their weekly rotation 
as the ‘on-call’ Flood Duty Officer (FDO) and Chief FDO at TRCA, respectively. That 
morning, Olivia arrived to work earlier than is typical, at roughly 7am, and began her 
assessment of flood risk within TRCA’s watersheds. Olivia is new to TRCA and its flood 
forecast and warning program. In fact, October 28 is one of the first times her attention to 
flooding has extended beyond the daily morning assessment. Observed as typically quiet, 
I notice Olivia spent her time that morning asking questions of the Chief FDO and 
following protocol, for instance: checking and re-checking the predictive weather models 
as well as two specific rain gauges stationed along the Don River, one at Todmorden and 
another at Dundas St (Appendix F: Map of Study Area- Don Valley Flood Vulnerable 
Areas)20 for water level accumulations. Rainfall amounts equal to or greater than 25mm 
trigger a heightened awareness for FDOs since that value is nearing the threshold of 
impact to vulnerable locations with the Don River watershed. Water levels beyond a 
certain depth at the Don River at Todmorden signify flood likelihood to the Bayview 
extension, and have implications for the Local Private Business (LPB) and the Local 
                                               
19 This descriptive overview of the event is to be considered alongside Figure 7 
20 Preliminary, raw data reported from the Todmorden and Dundas gauges recorded water levels on to the 
TRCA real-time network 
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Private Transit Authority’s business operations. Likewise, water levels beyond a certain 
depth in the Don River at the Dundas St. gauge signify flood likelihood to the City’s Don 
Valley Parkway (DVP) and have implications for road operations staff with the 
Municipal Road Authority, East division (Appendix F). The LPB is a demonstration hub 
focused on environmental sustainability located on the Bayview Extension adjacent to the 
Don River. At this site, citizens, business people, and representatives from academia and 
government come together for collaboration. The LPB holds weekly farmer’s, artisan’s 
and garden markets, hosts day camps and a nature school, houses art exhibits, and 
operates as a meeting space for community events, such as weddings. The Local Private 
Transit Authority is a private rail company whose railway tracks are sandwiched between 
the Bayview Extension and the Don River.  
TRCA Risk Assessed  
Using the upper end of ECCC’s predicted rainfall range, by 7:30am Olivia calculated 
approximately 30mm of potential runoff, which would create flooding in parts of 
TRCA’s jurisdiction, particularly in areas adjacent to the Don River including Toronto’s 
Bayview Extension. Olivia communicated this runoff value to Ed, the week’s Chief FDO. 
At this point, Ed began focusing entirely on updates in predicted rainfall amounts and 
water level recordings, only looking away from the computer to respond to questions 
asked by Olivia, or those posed by others flood forecasters in the room, or by 
management. From my observations during TRCA meetings, Ed typically exhibits a 
studious character and a conscientious approach to flood management. I often observed 
him as a leader of the Flood Forecast and Warning group in the way that he heads 
discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the program, outlines the major event 
operations under different scenarios as well as creates protocol documents and 
  
109 
 
flowcharts. On this day, as the on-call Chief FDO, Ed was the official decision maker as 
it pertains to implementing urban river flood warning policy vis-à-vis a flood warning 
notification. Contrary to Olivia, Ed has several years of involvement as an FDO working 
floods of differing scales and severities, most notably the July 8, 2013 flood, which has 
prepared him to take on the role of Chief FDO. Yet, despite this, Ed has little experience 
being in this specific position as the one who makes the last and final call.  
Together, with knowledge of potential runoff and flooding of the Bayview 
Extension, Olivia and Ed’s perceptions of flood risk increased. These perceptions quickly 
amplified when the two realized the TRCA Director was to be spending the day in 
meetings at the flood vulnerable LPB, the TRCA-affiliated organization located on that 
exact section of the Extension adjacent to the Don River. Unsurprisingly, the situation 
quickly evolved to require an ‘all hands on deck’ approach by the TRCA flood 
management team. Thus, in addition to Olivia and Ed’s constant monitoring of weather 
radar and the real-time gauging network, other flood forecasters became involved, 
offering their assistance to Ed as he managed the urban river flood risk that day. This was 
particularly true of Stuart and Nancy. Stuart is newer to TRCA than Olivia but far more 
experienced in flood management. He was recently hired at the Toronto-based CA in a 
management/FDO role, no doubt for the inter-provincial knowledge he brings to the 
table, and for his ability to communicate and articulate clearly, both with staff during 
events as well as with media as the TRCA liaison. Aside from carrying out interviews 
with different media personnel on October 28, Stuart stuck close to Ed so he could keep 
current with the Chief FDO’s thinking. Nancy, on the other hand, is an extremely 
seasoned TRCA flood forecaster. She generally encourages a holistic and predictive 
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approach to flood risk management, emphasizing the importance of early rather than 
after-the-fact warning measures.   
Once Olivia determined flooding was expected within TRCA’s jurisdiction, I 
began focusing my in situ observations on capturing risk-related decisions made, as a first 
step in understanding this event from multiple perspectives. To that end, during my nine 
hours with TRCA forecasters, I recorded their voiced perspectives and made note of their 
interactions and actions, who they communicated with and at what time. I combined these 
data with perspectives offered by key recipients of the Flood Warning during interviews 
after the event. The purpose of this effort was to generate a multi-sited, temporal 
illustration combining TRCA’s policy negotiation process, specifically their process for 
Flood Warning generation, along with key recipients’ decisions, and overlaid with 
rainfall amounts, water level measurements at two key rain gauges located on the Don 
River, and with the time ECCC Rainfall Warnings were issued. The type of analysis 
presented in Figure 721 is the result of these efforts and provides a macroscopic overview 
of the flood event; it shows the time risk was assessed by different groups, the 
communication that took place between and across the groups, the key decisions that 
were made (as illustrated by decision points attached to text boxes), and even hints at 
features of the TRCA-key recipient interaction ritual chain. The following description of 
flood forecaster and TRCA action and interaction corresponds with details included in 
Figure 7. 
 
                                               
21 Credit to D. Webster, Director of the Digital Animation Center for the Department of Visual Arts in the 
College of Arts and Media at the University of Colorado at Denver, for transforming my fieldwork 
illustration to its current graphical format 
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Figure 7. Ensemble of inter-organizational interaction during Toronto river flood prediction on October 28, 2015 
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At 8:10am, Olivia placed a call to ECCC meteorologists for a morning update. 
Approximately 20 minutes later, she heeded Ed’s instruction and drafted a TRCA Flood 
Watch, and at roughly 8:45am she called key recipients, including Ron over at the Local 
Private Business (LPB) as well as members of local law enforcement, informing each 
organization of the flood potential. Five minutes later, at 8:50am, Ron issued his own 
Flood Watch alert for the LPB location, which indicated an internally recognized flood 
threat and ‘elevated’ flood risk at the LPB. By 9:50am Olivia noted 27mm of rainfall 
recorded at the Brickworks rain gauge and a .25 metre rise in water levels between 
9:30am and 10am at the Todmorden gauge, both adjacent to the LPB. At approximately 
10:15am, Olivia placed another call to Ron at the LPB notifying his group that the Don 
River was now expected to flood at their location. Approximately one hour later, at 
11:15am, TRCA issued their Flood Watch to recipients via email, and then also to the 
general public via Twitter, which officially indicated flooding was possible in parts of the 
jurisdiction, but was issued, according to Ed (Line 10 of the Transcript in Appendix C- 
TRCA Flood Forecaster Recorded Interaction), to cover the imminent flooding of the 
Bayview Extension.  The decision made by the LPB to issue a Flood Watch at 8:50am is 
worth noting because it signifies action taken in advance of TRCA’s 3:20pm Flood 
Warning. As the analysis continues, the decision made by Ron will become one of many 
made by key recipients prior to TRCA issuing the official Flood Warning notification. 
At the same time, Ron’s decision to issue his Flood Watch after telephone 
communication with Olivia reveals that policy is not just a matter of TRCA flood 
forecasters reading written rules, issuing written notifications and users responding or 
acting upon written words. Instead, the actions carried out by Olivia and Ron show that 
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policy negotiation and appropriation is as much about the behind the scenes interaction 
that takes place between TRCA and their recipients. To that end, it includes the talking on 
the phone, the verbal communication of TRCA assessments of risk and the informing 
user groups of their plans. The sequence of actions in the above description, particularly 
Olivia communicating imminent flooding with Ron at the LPB (10:15am) and then 
issuing the TRCA Flood Watch about an hour later (11:15am), demonstrates two 
important aspects of TRCA policy work, which challenge traditional notions of the policy 
process as automated, linear and uncontested. First, since TRCA policy dictates that 
imminent flooding calls for a Flood Warning to be issued, TRCA issuing a Flood Watch 
at 11:15am subsequent to recognizing flooding was forthcoming seems out of order. It 
shows how the implementation of policy sometimes unfolds in ways that run counter to 
the official rules. Second, that TRCA communicated a Flood Warning over the phone to 
Ron at the LPB, yet issued a Flood Watch for others, suggests that recipients of TRCA 
Flood Warning policy are not all considered equal. In fact, it implies that TRCA’s 
recipients of Flood Warnings are placed along a gradient of risk whereby those perceived 
as being at higher risk are placed higher on the gradient and will, therefore, receive 
different information from others who are perceived as being at lower risk. Contrary to 
official policy, which is structured in a such a way that all recipients fall under the same 
risk assessment and thus receive the same notification type, the example illustrates policy 
negotiation as an artful navigation that unfolds in nuanced ways, especially during the 
management of risk that falls outside of official TRCA guidelines. 
TRCA Risk Expands Southward: Bayview Extension and the Don Valley Parkway  
While attention throughout the first part of the morning concentrated mostly on the 
heightened flood risk for the Bayview Extension and potential impacts to Ron’s group at 
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the LPB next to the river, by 11:00am the water depth recorded at Dundas St. gauge, 
located slightly south of Todmorden, was found to be steadily increasing from its normal 
level. An hour and a half later, at 12:30pm, with water levels at the Dundas St. gauge 
continuing to rise, TRCA perception of flood risk to the Don Valley Parkway rose as well 
(Appendix F: Map of Study Area- Don Valley Flood Vulnerable Areas). As a result, at 
12:50pm Olivia drafted a Flood Warning. At 1pm, 37.7mm of rain registered at the 
Brickworks rain gauge near to the LPB and both the Todmorden and Dundas St. water 
levels in the Don River peaked at 79.35m and 76.34m, respectively. Continuing to 
monitor conditions, at 1:49pm reports of flooding of the Bayview extension were noted 
by Ed and other TRCA flood forecasters. Soon thereafter, at 2:02pm, the LPB closed 
their site due to river water approaching their grounds and the Private Transit group 
decided to cancel and/or re-route their commuter trains along the Richmond Hill Line. An 
hour and eighteen minutes afterward, at 3:20pm, TRCA issued their Flood Warning 
(Appendix D) and Ed subsequently placed phone calls to several key recipients to notify 
each of the alert for potential flooding to the Don Valley Parkway, although water levels 
at the Dundas St. gauge had been receding for nearly two and a half hours by that time. 
At 4:32pm, ECCC ended their Rainfall Warning for the City of Toronto, and by 5:30pm 
email correspondence by Ron to his staff at the LPB noted the event as a near hit: “the 
river level is high; only a close call. No flooding”. 
The above description of time spent by TRCA and a few of their key recipients 
shows how policy implementation, or the processes of issuing and responding to flood 
information, takes shape at different locations, and sometimes counter to official rules. It 
highlights how identifying flooding as risky involves a symbolic process of 
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representation, one that emerges through communicative and social interaction (Boholm 
2015: 162). Moreover, it illustrates the myriad social connections that policy requires, for 
example between TRCA and ECCC, who TRCA are calling upon to receive weather 
expertise as well as those groups to whom TRCA is providing their flood expertise. By 
charting these connections, we see an intertwining of actors across both horizontal and 
vertical social scales: federally-based meteorologists, provincially mandated but locally 
embedded flood forecasters, municipally located public and private groups, all of whom 
are working toward managing the risks associated with the rain and flooding. In the next 
section, I take a closer look at the role of language and interaction in explaining TRCA’s 
delay in policy-related decision-making, which I attribute to Ed’s feelings of uncertainty 
and wavering perceptions of risk.  
TRCA: Urban River Flood Risk and Policy-Related Decision Making  
By the afternoon on October 28, and specifically within the four-hour window of time the 
Flood Watch and Flood Warning were issued, inter-agency interaction waned and was 
replaced with extensive intra-agency deliberations among Ed, Olivia, Stuart and Nancy 
surrounding the evolving flood threat to the DVP. During these deliberations, the 
foursome act out a particular line, or pattern of verbal and non-verbal acts by which they 
express their views of the situation (Goffman 1967: 5) as they pursue their organizational 
goal of making a timely and efficient decision. In the next section, I examine a small 
number of these deliberations (see A-D in Figure 7; Appendix C for a transcript of TRCA 
flood forecaster interaction), or those face-to-face interactions within the entire social 
encounter that resemble Goffman’s interaction ritual, to illustrate how: (1) certain 
features of language used by Ed are evidence of his uncertainty; (2) certain features of 
language reveal the causes of Ed’s uncertainty and its role in influencing his perceptions 
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of risk, which at times differed from his colleagues; and finally, (3) linguistic strategies 
deployed by the foursome intended to inch the policy-related decision making forward. 
Though the interaction was meant to manage uncertainty and assist with making a timely 
and efficient decision, forecaster engagement during the afternoon of October 28, 2015 
revealed multiple interactional goals within the exchange and therefore exemplifies well 
how meaning is negotiated during the process of interaction. 
Expressions of Uncertainty  
Just before 2pm, the Bayview extension begins to flood and the water is approximately 
10cm from the edge of the Don Valley Parkway. Sitting next to the group and observing 
their conversation, Ed’s uncertainty is unmistakable. In addition to the non-verbal 
worried look he gives, Ed verbally demonstrates his uneasiness during the exchange by 
being in the wrong face. According to Goffman (1967: 8), a speaker is in the wrong face 
if the information he is presenting cannot be integrated into the line that is being 
sustained for him. For instance, in Line 4, Ed says, “I’m thinking we’re going wait,” and 
in Line 11 he comments, “I’m thinking with the Warning.” Combining this with “I’m not 
100% sure,” (Line 16) and “My hesitation about the Warning” (Line 65) altogether 
suggests Ed is not wishing to take full responsibility for the line of his group as Chief and 
lead decision maker. He attempts to offset the potential backlash he fears will come his 
way should he address this policy decision incorrectly by using vague language. In other 
words, the consistent use of “I’m thinking” and his explicit statements of being unsure 
indicates Ed is reluctant to take a stance. Put another way, Ed is not firm in the line he 
should be taking and his comments convey insecurity. In this situation, Stuart, Nancy and 
Olivia are holding onto the impression of Ed as chief and leader, and Ed’s evasion of 
commitment is a risky move. By being out of face, Ed is not behaving in the line that is 
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desirable or expected of him. In other words, by waffling and expressing uncertainty, Ed 
is not exhibiting the appropriate demeanour (Goffman 1967: 77; Hallett 2007: 149) of a 
leader. This has operational implications in so much as it impacts the expediency of 
making a timely and efficient decision.  
Attempting to save face, Ed engages in corrective processes during the encounter. 
Goffman (1967: 19) defines corrective processes as the measures taken to correct the 
effects of failing to maintain the face of oneself or others. According to Goffman, these 
strategies are employed to restore equilibrium in the interaction. Ed was noticed to 
engage in corrective work when in Line 13 he said, “You know what I mean?” in 
reference to a Warning as unnecessary since the water level is receding, and in Lines 66-
67, “this is the biggest u::m the most u::m -- I guess -- highest level Warning that we have 
right?” The raised intonation at the end of these sentences along with Ed’s inclusion of 
the word RIGHT, are considered here as offerings made by Ed to explain his face or why 
he is not in line with his colleagues, and in so doing, are attempts made by him to remedy 
the impression of the situation. These examples of face in interaction supported by 
comments made by Ed, Stewart and Nancy underscore the relational nature of meaning 
creation in the way that it highlights the influence of spoken words on others’ 
understandings and subsequent responses.  
Causes for Uncertainty  
As the day continues, the struggle Ed has with implementing river Flood Warning policy 
by way of issuing a Flood Warning is noticeable: “Issuing is a big deal -- it’s not just 
getting wet. I am not liberal at issuing these kinds of messages,” he admits in Lines 208-
209. Through analysis of recorded interaction, Ed’s causes for uncertainty and thus his 
perceptions of risk are revealed, namely factors associated with the extent and impact of 
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flood threat, along with his perception of blame and the presumptions he makes regarding 
the power of TRCA notifications. Also revealed during interaction is Ed’s second goal, or 
his desire to make a decision that will be perceived as correct. 
Extent and Impact of Flood Threat 
One element contributing to Ed’s perceptions of risk is the uncertainty he feels 
surrounding the extent and potential impact of the flood threat. According to TRCA 
policy, a flood22 is defined as “an overflow or inundation that comes from a river or 
other body of water and causes or threatens damage”, yet this definition does not specify 
the extent of water, which leaves the flood forecasters in a position to individually 
evaluate how much water qualifies as threatening. Is it overflow or inundation? Does 
‘overflow’ mean covering the edge of the roadway, one lane of traffic, or more? How do 
‘overflow’ and ‘inundation’ differ and is one scenario more threatening than the other? 
Likewise, what is meant by ‘causes or threatens damage’ in the official definition? The 
ambiguity related to damage similarly creates confusion for flood forecasters. Official 
policy says nothing of what kind of damage, where or to whom; it simply offers a vague 
description of impact upon which each flood forecaster must, again, individually assess 
as either worthy of a Flood Warning or not. Stuart makes his own interpretation when he 
says in Line 18, “We’re at .4m away and it’s tapering off”, which is indicative of his 
definition of flooding, or that reaching the edge of the roadway is equivalent to flood 
status.  
Contrary to Stuart, Ed says later in the conversation (in Line 81): “It’s like u::h I 
see the Warning being more -- August or -- July 8th right?” This expression is Ed’s 
                                               
22 https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/ 
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attempt to defend his position that the uncertain extent and impact of the current flood 
event warrants additional consideration for issuing the Flood Warning. The reference Ed 
makes to July 8 links him to his involvement as a flood forecaster during that event in 
2013. In this sense, much like linguistic anthropologist Jan Blommaert (2005) describes 
of facework in interaction as occurring in real-time but simultaneously encapsulated in 
several layers of history, Ed’s uncertainty is revealed here to be embedded within a 
specific historical context. On July 8, flooding resulted in waist-high water on the City’s 
major transportation corridors. This type of indexicality, or a pointing to one’s past, is 
implicit in any consideration of face, according to Haugh (2009). Ed’s reaction exposes 
the impact of historical events on uncertainty and decision-making during flood-risk 
events. It also signals that for Ed complete inundation qualifies as a flood to him, not 
simply water reaching the edge of the road. Thus, while reaching the edge of the roadway 
is sufficient to issue a Flood Warning for Stuart, the conditions on October 28, 2015 are 
not physically threatening enough for Ed. 
Ed is also unconvinced the amount of water is threatening enough, or will 
generate substantial damage, which similarly plays into his policy-related decision 
making. He points out in Line 16, “I’m not 100% sure the DVP is going to flood.” This 
speaks to the importance for Ed of actualized damage when issuing a Flood Warning, but 
also conveys that the location of the damage is critical for Ed in this process. This is 
confirmed in Lines 66-67 when Ed accounts for his delay by explaining his belief that the 
Flood Warning is associated with flooding on the DVP: “My hesitation about the 
Warning is -- I’m so associated with the DVP that this is the biggest u:mm he most u:mm 
-- I guess -- highest highest level of Warning we have…”.  That Ed regards the Warning 
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as more appropriate for events with large extent of flooding in a particular location, and 
since it is not certain that either are the circumstance TRCA is dealing with that day, 
these moments of hedging are evidence of an alternative line Ed is taking during this 
interaction. In other words, in addition to the group goal of making a timely and efficient 
decision, Ed has a second goal of making the right decision. Though these comments 
threaten the face wants of the group, when considering this alternative line, Ed’s 
comments are an effort to maintain his own face. 
In an effort to cooperate and promote the line Ed is taking, Nancy acknowledges 
the importance of location for TRCA when she points out in Line 20: “The challenge has 
always been the flood location”. The interaction between Ed and Nancy hint toward the 
tendency of TRCA to further narrow the geographic boundary imposed by their 
jurisdictional boundary from the entire Don River watershed to one specific watercourse, 
the Don River, at one specific location: the Don Valley Parkway (DVP). This is a notion 
confirmed later in the conversation when Ed says to Stuart (Line 169-171): “You know 
what -- let’s issue the message. And I’ll talk to XX {Nancy} and confirm things because 
of the -- Previous -- the the you know the frame of mind that we were always in.” This 
impression was further confirmed when, in Lines 188-191, Nancy circles back to say: 
“{to Stuart} you need to have conversation with XX and XX {upper management} about 
flood warning. Not issued very often and usually only when our key areas - our key 
vulnerabilities are at risk.”  
Alternative to Ed and his belief that a Flood Warning is more appropriate for large 
scale events in critical locations, for Stuart there is no narrowing; flooding in any location 
within TRCA jurisdiction would suffice a Warning to be issued. This is a position he 
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makes clear early on in the encounter (Lines 25-27) when he comments: “Are their tracks 
flooded? Use Bayview extension flooding -- tracks flooded -- and potential for DVP as 
rationale.” Here, Stuart is attempting to save the face of the group, or trying to have the 
foursome return to the line of making a timely and efficient decision. As a newer member 
to the TRCA team, his inexperience with both organizational dynamics that have evolved 
in the years since the big 2013 flood and the prominence of relying upon an informal 
convention during the policy implementation process (even though the official rule 
dictates otherwise) make it easier for him to do so.  
Perceptions of Blame and Presumptions of Power 
Perceptions of blame and presumptions about others were also found to contribute to Ed’s 
uncertainty and policy-related decision making. Between 2-3pm (see B and C in 
Appendix C; see B and C in Figure 7), Ed makes comments that suggest he is concerned 
about issuing a Warning unnecessarily. For example, in Lines 197-198 he says, “My 
feeling is that we are going to be creating chaos for the DVP or at the DVP if we issue.” 
He follows this a short time later to say, “Don at Dundas is at 76.2 and it’s receding. Send 
it {the Flood Warning} out and nothing and create chaos” (Lines 204-205). These 
contemplations are expressions once again of the alternative line Ed has taken from the 
group. As much as he wants to make a timely and efficient decision in keeping with the 
group’s line, Ed is more focused on promoting his own face. It also reveals that Ed’s 
alternative line is not simply about making the decision he perceives as correct, but also 
about making the decision that will be perceived as correct by others. In other words, Ed 
is concerned for his own face wants, the presumed face wants of others beyond the 
immediate situation, as well as the face wants of the group. These are the types of 
interactions, according to Spencer-Oatey (2009: 148), that capture the dynamic face 
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concerns that people have in different contexts. Moreover, the sensitivities expressed 
above by Ed through face highlight the emotional nature of policy work and 
simultaneously illustrate how multiple faces are managed during the same face-to-face 
encounter. 
As Ed is conceptually organizing the flood danger, assessing the risk and the need 
for issuing a Warning that afternoon, Nancy responds to Ed’s contemplation moments 
later to say (Lines 210-213):  
TRCA Office 
October 28, 2015 
 
210 Nancy: This is predicated based on the assumption that as soon as you issue  
211  the Warning they are going to close the road? 
212  I seriously don’t think they are going to do anything  
213  directly based on your message.  
 
Nancy’s face threatening act highlights Ed’s presumption that recipients will make 
decisions as a direct result of receiving the Flood Warning. The presumption is reflective 
of Ed’s belief that the Flood Warning steers key recipients’ behaviour. Nancy’s addition 
of, “I seriously don’t think they are going to do anything directly based on your 
message,” is her way of questioning the pragmatic effect of the Warning. It signifies her 
belief that the Warning is a state of knowledge whereas it oppositely demonstrates Ed’s 
belief that the Warning will inspire immediate and automatic action of the groups 
receiving it. This represents a misalignment in the IR chain between Ed at TRCA and key 
recipients since the rules of conduct are that key recipients expect the Flood Warning, not 
that they will accept or use it. In this way, the IR chain is analogous to the rituals that 
exist in principal-teacher relations Hallett (2007) describes in his study on interaction 
ritual and power in education institutions. More pointedly, TRCA has the power to make 
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the decision whether or not to warn, however, they do not have control over the meanings 
key recipients attach to the Warning, neither of the overall situation, nor how key 
recipients will respond. 
Strategies Deployed to Manage Uncertainty and Risk  
Although the decision to warn or not is Ed’s, efforts are made by the foursome during the 
afternoon to reassure Ed that he was not alone. This was accomplished through their 
expressions of considerateness (Goffman 1967: 10). For example, in Line 4 Ed says, “I’m 
thinking we are going to wait”, Nancy further comments in Line 8, “we could speak to 
what is flooding”, and also in Line 1 Olivia asks, “So we’re not issuing the Warning right 
now?” Here, use of the inclusive we is stressing common membership in their group. It is 
an attempt to reinforce institutional solidarity amongst the flood forecasters, to 
underscore the group’s mutual wants and goals, and to provide verbal support to Ed along 
the lines of: ‘we’re all in this warning quagmire together’. In other words, the group is 
doing what they can to maintain group face. Still, no matter the amount of solidarity and 
support, Ed knows it is his name that will appear at the bottom of the Flood Warning, if 
and when he issues the notification.  
At the same time, while Nancy and Olivia’s comments in Line 8 and Line 1, 
respectively, maintain group face, they threaten Ed’s face. Stuart, in line with Nancy and 
Olivia, comments in Line 9 to say: “you could also say Flood Warning based on,” which 
confirms that, unlike Ed, these three individuals don’t necessarily see the need for 
Warning delay. Nancy further threatens Ed’s face when she negatively evaluates Ed’s 
indecision, “Kind of wishy-washy. We either issue or don’t issue” (Lines 14-15). 
Suspecting that Ed has taken an alternative line centred on making the right decision, for 
time’s sake, Nancy shifts face in interaction. She does this in Line 21 when she says, 
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“since July 8th -- issuing covers off any questions that may occur,” and then again in 
Lines 182-183 when she comments, “When you’re in the flood warning situation -- 
you’re already in it -- you’re not wrong.” Contrary to the accusation of being wishy-
washy in Lines 14-15, Nancy’s comments in Line 21 and 182-183 are attempts at positive 
politeness, or strategies used by Nancy to appeal to Ed’s desire for correctness and to 
assure him that were he to issue a Flood Warning it would be correct.  
As time goes on and the opportunity for making a timely and efficient decision 
dwindles, Nancy and Stuart make additional attempts to maintain group face, but do so in 
a way that also maintains Ed’s. For example, in Line 70  Stuart says to Ed, “I defer to 
you”, and then again in Line 72-73 he points out: “Again -- you’re the decision maker 
today so -- and not that one is more right than the other”. Nancy’s attempt, on the other 
hand, comes closer to the close of the interaction when she says, “The arguments for 
doing it are just as valid as arguments against” (Line 207). These explicit and implicit 
acts of deference attend to the wants of the group by encouraging a decision one way or 
the other, as well as to the asymmetrical social order in place among members of the 
group. In other words, since Ed is the Chief, the two are raising Ed’s face wants as 
superior and conveying that he is socially superior in the decision-making hierarchy and 
simultaneously encouraging him to exhibit a more appropriate demeanour.   
Analysis of the interaction that took place among Ed and his three colleagues 
during the afternoon of October 28, as illustrated through an analysis of face and face 
work, explain expressions of uncertainty for implementing urban river Flood Warning 
policy, the causes to which these uncertainties are attributed, and also how Ed and his 
colleagues managed this uncertainty. Interaction demonstrated several features of 
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Goffman’s approach to face in interaction, such as signaling the group’s social 
relationship and the subtle boundaries that existed between Ed as the decision-maker and 
his colleagues. Furthermore, their face-to-face engagement demonstrated the influence of 
deference and demeanour in the context of risk-related decision-making and the balance 
between individual face wants and the face wants of the group. Relatedly, the analysis of 
the described features of the overall forecaster encounter represented the attitudes of 
speakers and the elements of the event that were important to the group. Moreover, the 
interaction highlighted how face concerns emerge dynamically, yet also how participants 
in an exchange are always committed to some kind of interpretation for what is going on.  
On the other hand, the presence of an unofficial risk gradient for Warning, the 
identified institutional norms for narrowing the geographic scope for issuing a Warning, 
along with the individual variables contributing to uncertainty and thus risk assessment, 
as well as the presence of multiple opposing goals as evidenced by face, illustrate 
TRCA’s IR chain as very different from the kind theorized by Goffman and Collins. 
Interaction on the forecast floor that afternoon revealed differences in social values, non-
conformity toward the group’s objectives at times, and differences in motivations. This 
shows how social reality is a product of interactional processes and suggests that in cases 
of risk-related policy work, the interaction ritual chain is much more malleable than 
originally conceived. In the end, the wants of the group were not met since the decision 
was neither timely nor effective. Ed’s face wants were met, however, since the Warning 
was perceived to be the correct decision based on the approval given by management. 
Key Recipients including Media: Response and Use of TRCA Warning  
TRCA and key recipients of their Flood Warnings have established a social relationship 
wherein TRCA is accountable for issuing notifications to them when Flood Warning 
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policy conditions are met. In other words, these groups are members in specialized 
interaction ritual chains based upon key recipients’ expressed desire to receive the flood 
notifications TRCA issues. In this next section I reason that TRCA’s late Warning on 
October 28, 2015 was TRCA not fulfilling their obligation to Warn. I further suggest the 
delayed Warning resembles a weakening in the interaction chain, and one that was made 
noticeable by the perspectives of key recipients and their varied uptake of the 
notification. The description of key recipient actions and explanations for how the day 
unfolded in their respective organizational settings shows these groups rejected the 
capital upon which the IR chain had been established and instead used a different form to 
take matters into their own hands and manage the evolving flood risk situation. The 
perspectives show variable uptake by these public groups, which supports the notion that 
much of the conflict Ed experienced surrounding if and when to warn was potentially 
unnecessary. 
At 3:20pm, the approximately 250-word Flood Warning was issued (Appendix D) 
to recipients and media, concealing in its email transmission TRCA’s internal 
contradictions and the lengthy interaction between the four flood forecasters. Put another 
way, the presentation of the Warning made invisible to recipients’ eyes TRCA’s 
subjective assessments of risk and their negotiations for how risky the situation was and 
if the risk warranted a Flood Warning. Despite the written message being the same for all 
readers, it was taken up into different institutional contexts where recipients’ 
interpretations and responses were shown to be influenced by differing time needs and 
individual assessments of risk. 
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How Time Influenced Flood Warning Utility  
Timing of the Warning was shown to be critical for key recipients of TRCA flood 
notifications. On October 28, 2015, most participants from these key groups remained 
formally unaware of the 1:49pm reports of flooding along the Bayview extension nor 
were they privy to TRCA’s thinking regarding the evolution of flood threat as the 
afternoon wore on. In other words, for many, the 3:20pm Flood Warning was the next 
notice given after the 11:15am Flood Watch. While each key recipient’s time needs 
varied, most reported 3:20pm as too late to receive the Warning that day. For example, 
the representatives from the Water and Hydro Authority commented that, had the 
Warning been received earlier, the two might have adjusted staffing of their operational 
ground crew, but couldn’t because it was too late. Moreover, the representative from the 
Water Authority commented that TRCA Flood Warnings are a key piece of information 
to help solidify their operational decisions, however, receiving one during the “3-6pm 
timeframe is the worst” since day shift ground crews would already be enroute home and 
the evening shift crews would have not yet arrived. 
Additionally, several recipients noted that each had already activated their 
respective flood management operations by the time the Warning was issued. Ron, for 
example, at the LPB explained that by 3:20pm their group was already in Stage 3 of their 
organization’s flood escalation and communication framework, which included flood-
proofing their site by raising flood-gates and removing items from low-lying areas to 
name a couple. Likewise, given the amount of rainfall that day, representatives with the 
Municipal Road Authority mentioned placing crews on the ground at lunch-time to check 
low-lying areas for obstructed catch basins and drains on roadways. For these individuals, 
along with an Emergency Manager who was either wrapping up at work or already on 
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their way home, the 3:20pm Warning came too late, and was therefore not used to a great 
extent. From the perspective of a Private Transit Authority representative, given that it 
takes 5-7 minutes for a train to travel from the central station to the portion of the track 
running adjacent to the Bayview extension (Appendix F: Map of Study Area- Don Valley 
Flood Vulnerable Areas), and given that flooding at the Bayview extension was reported 
at 1:49pm, and given that almost immediately thereafter the Private Transit Authority 
decided to reroute trains, one can safely surmise the 3:20pm Flood Warning played a 
negligible role in their decision-making that day. 
Similarly, media who are looking to the TRCA Flood Warning to highlight the 
location of reported flooding, and/or locations expected to flood, in order to communicate 
preparation and safety strategies with their audiences, were limited in this way. As a 
media representative employed with a local television network pointed out, by 3:20pm 
most of their evening show is compiled, vetted and ready for broadcast, which 
complicates the inclusion of TRCA’s 3:20pm Flood Warning. Connor, an on-air 
broadcaster with one of the major television networks in Toronto, who routinely 
recommunicates details included in TRCA flood information during his broadcasts 
conveyed the implications brought on by a late Warning such as the one issued on 
October 28, 2015. He speculated that his reiteration of the Warning would be something 
like: “looks like the Bayview extension will be a problem for travel and {referencing the 
Private Transit Authority} through the Don Valley stretch: you may be facing delays”, 
which he commented would be old and irrelevant news, especially since the Private 
Transit Authority’s trains along that corridor had been re-routed approximately 80 
minutes earlier (Figure 7).  
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Juxtaposing the time needs expressed by key recipients with TRCA perceptions 
suggests the two are misaligned. Consider the following exchange between Stuart and Ed 
between Lines 110-117 of the excerpt: 
TRCA Office 
October 28, 2015 
 
110  Stuart:  My concern is that it’s 2 o’clock right? 
111 Ed:  Exactly -- we’re in rush [hour]. 
112 Stuart:    [we’re in] 
113  Like at four -- it’s going to be so much harder for them to go in at 4:30 -- 
114 Ed: Yeah. 
115 Stuart: And close it {the DVP} than it is to tell people at [3:45] 
116 Ed:        [Stay off the roads] 
117 Stuart:  don’t take the DVP home right, 
 
At 2pm, though Stuart and Ed acknowledge the already dubious position they are in, the 
conversation suggests their understanding of recipients’ operational decision making to 
occur later in the day. For example, Stuart’s comment, “Like at four, it’s going to be so 
much harder for them to go in and close it”, implies the Municipal Road Authority, while 
not ideal, could wait until that time to receive the official Flood Warning. Moreover, 
Stuart’s comparison with 3:45pm, or that it is “much harder for them to go in at 4:30” 
“than it is to tell people at 3:45 -- don’t take the DVP home” indicates the presumption 
that 3:45pm would somehow better meet the Municipal Road Authority’s time needs. 
Perspectives shared by this key recipient group, however, confirmed that decisions are 
made much earlier in the day. Put another way, not only did the Municipal Road 
Authority send ground crews out at lunch time, their self-assessment of risk was made at 
approximately 12pm, or over three hours prior to the Flood Warning, as was shown in 
Figure 7.  
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Alternatively, if by saying tell people Stuart was expressing concern for the 
general public driving on the potentially flooded DVP, the presumption remains that 
notice by 3:45pm would have been sufficient notice for the public to take an alternative 
route. Knowing the general public receives TRCA flood information (see Figure 6) from 
the TRCA general website, Twitter or media outlets, and knowing that traditional media 
was reported by members of the general public as the most popular way to access flood 
information, and knowing that media’s broadcasts are already vetted by 3:20pm, Stuart’s 
presumption that a 3:45pm Warning would lend itself to more effective decision making 
than a 4pm or 4:30pm Warning is likewise erroneous. The 3:20pm Warning issued by 
TRCA was more attentive to the presumed time needs of key recipients than a Warning 
later in the day, yet the results confirm it was still issued too late for it to be useful. The 
perspectives of the three key recipients groups regarding their use of the Flood Warning 
in this case, and its limited utility for groups in general based upon the time it was 
received, calls into question where the best pragmatic force for TRCA expertise resides. 
In other words, responses beg further consideration regarding which notification would 
generate greater utility: the Flood Warning, or the Flood Watch. While the latter is a risk 
message to convey possibility, it is often issued with much more time for recipients to 
interpret and respond. 
Recipients Assessing Risk: The Desire and Ability to Watch on Their Own  
In addition to time needs as a factor influencing the utility of TRCA’s Flood Warning, 
uses of the notification were also shown to vary because key recipients, particularly those 
who require flood information to prepare in advance of potential threat, reported 
watching on their own and paying attention to information other than TRCA notifications 
when assessing their organization’s risk for flooding. In the words of a representative 
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from the local Private Transit Authority regarding TRCA: “They’re {referring to TRCA} 
not really providing us with too much. We do get the emails. They {referencing the 
emails} are very generic, so it’s not really of any value.” Instead, this recipient confirms 
gaining situational awareness through traffic cameras and TRCA rain gauge data that day, 
along with water level graphs. This signifies that while the Flood Warning itself was not 
specifically valuable for this individual and their organization, other TRCA information 
was relied upon so that their group could make their own risk assessment.  
Josh over at the Municipal Road Authority- East Division was one of a few key 
recipients who engaged in his own assessment of flood risk on October 28th on behalf of 
his team. Over the noon-hour, two representatives at his location carried out a statistical 
regression analysis with TRCA rain gauge data which predicted a 1pm peak of 76.81m in 
the Don River at Dundas St. followed by a decline in the water level until finally 
plateauing at 3pm. In other words, these values suggested to members of the Municipal 
Road Authority- East Division that little to no flood risk to the Don Valley Parkway was 
expected (Figure 7). While their operations remained elevated throughout the afternoon 
and into the evening commute as a precaution, their decision to do so was based on their 
own internal flood risk assessment. Similar to the Private Transit Authority group, Josh 
and his group did not wait on TRCA flood expertise or their issuance of a flood 
notification that day. Instead, these Municipal Road Authority-East Division and the 
Local Private Transit Authority relied on the statistical data TRCA produces and manages 
for public groups to make their respective decisions. This example hints that on October 
28, 2015, in the absence of flood expertise, this key recipient found data to be a greater 
asset than the flood risk interpretation made by TRCA flood forecasters.  
  
132 
 
In another example, the Local Private Business (LPB) with their own flood 
operations policy, inclusive of institutional definitions for weather watch, flood watch 
and flood warning, critical thresholds for each along with different scenarios, as well as 
who is responsible for what in each of those scenarios, typically make their own flood 
judgment calls. On October 28th, Ron’s assessment of flood risk to the LPB was made 
early in the day (8:50am) and the site was closed within minutes of seeing firsthand the 
flooding of the Bayview extension (1:49pm). Ron’s desire to assess the risk was 
confirmed when he said, “quite often we’ll make our own judgement calls before we read 
too much into the TRCA messages”. His comment, “the TRCA Warning validates what 
we do,” not only confirms Nancy’s comment from before that questioned the pragmatic 
effect of the Warning (Lines 210-213), but also highlights that Ron is making risk 
assessments and decisions for the well-being of the LPB irrespective of TRCA. Ron’s 
desire to watch on his own alludes to his enhanced perception of skill as flood risk expert. 
This was well illustrated by Ron at the LPB when he said, “when there’s a lot of rain in 
the forecast we’re looking at the weather and the river and we will make a decision with 
TRCA as to where things are at. We’re working with the same data, so I mean yeah, we 
just help each other out”. The use of with and the comment of helping each other out 
indicates the parity Ron perceives in relation to TRCA in terms of flood risk assessment 
expertise. At the same time that Ron boosts up his own flood risk assessment skills, 
however, his words are suggestive of the diminished value he places upon TRCA flood 
expertise, since he feels competent to carry out such a task himself. His views are similar 
to the sentiment shared by the Local Private Transit Authority recipient above, which 
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coupled with a reliance on TRCA data, suggest that data is a far more critical form of 
capital than flood expertise.  
Discussion  
On October 28, 2015, TRCA urban river Flood Warning policy shaped interaction, social 
relations and risk-based decision making among TRCA flood forecasters and also for key 
recipients of their information, although it did so differently across the groups.  
As uncertainty ramped up for the Chief FDO, Ed, space opened for greater intra-agency 
interaction at TRCA. An analysis of face work during TRCA interaction revealed that 
flood risk and the pragmatic effect of TRCA notifications were perceived differently 
among flood forecasters as well as key recipients. The endeavor also showed how 
strategies of face influence the accomplishment of interactional goals and how 
complicated this process becomes when interactional goals are different among members 
of the encounter. Moreover, the flood risk assessments and decisions made by flood 
forecasters exemplify the relational social construction of risk-related policy through 
face. This adds nuance to Boholm’s (2015: 106) understanding of risk as relational and 
situated. Specifically, the use of face in the relational production of risk assessment and 
management in this case illustrates how constructions are embedded within multiple 
social and cultural worlds, one for every member participating in the encounter. In other 
words, face work in interaction demonstrated the relational nature of the policy 
implementation and appropriation process. 
Once issued, the late Warning was indicative of a weakened IR chain between 
TRCA and its key recipients on account of TRCA failing to meet their obligation in the 
established rules for group conduct. The time needs of key recipients suggest this failure 
had an impact since communicators noted they would have communicated and Water and 
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Hydro authorities mentioned they could have made different decisions had they been 
notified. The perspectives of the Local Private Transit Authority, the Municipal Roads 
Authority and the Local Private Business, and the perception of diminished value they 
place upon TRCA flood expertise, a resource upon which the IR chain was originally 
established, suggests the weakening of the IR chain goes beyond this case. The data show 
that for these groups in particular the social structure enabled by the IR chain is not 
functioning well. According to the data, a different form of TRCA cultural capital, data, 
is sought out as these key recipient groups employ individual agency to overcome the 
void. An empirical study carried out by Lewis (2013) that investigated interaction rituals 
in Christchurch, New Zealand after earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 demonstrated how 
established social structures shift in times of disaster and especially in situations 
characterized by uncertainty. If we consider the potential for urban river flooding as a 
pressure-filled situation along the same disaster continuum, admittedly not as severe as an 
earthquake, yet certainly one wrought with uncertainty, the response by these three key 
recipients to take matters into their own hands is understandable. Rather than be passive 
recipients of TRCA flood expertise vis-à-vis the Flood Warning, these members opted to 
be active participants in their assessment of flood risk.  
The different perspectives of key recipients confirm Collins’s (1987) assertion 
that the way in which micro-events and the behaviour of individuals in situations unfold 
is determined by where they are located in the larger network of encounters around them 
in time and space. Though he refers to individuals who share the same physical space, the 
idea helps to illustrate how members in TRCA-key recipient IR chains are themselves 
located in different settings across space and are part of multiple networks of encounters, 
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and are thus making sense of flood risk from their respective institutional viewpoints. 
This speaks to the influence of an organization’s context in these pressure-filled, 
uncertain situations, or what social and behavioural scientist Anselm Strauss (1993: 249) 
refers to as the negotiated order during interaction. Negotiated order is the rules and 
policies, agreements, understandings, pacts and other work arrangements for which key 
recipients must also contend, over and above their IR chain membership. Here, there are 
multiple negotiated orders, people and policies interacting and being attended to. Notable 
for his contributions to the concept, Strauss’s conceptual approach to negotiated order, 
interaction and social organization helps to explain how key recipients’ actions on 
October 28, 2015 cannot be understood independently of the organizational context in 
which they exist (Strauss ([1959] 1969). To that end, key recipients’ assessments of risk 
and subsequent actions that day, or their ‘take matters into their own hands’ approach, is 
more accurately characterized as them ‘taking matters into their organization’s hands’ to 
make decisions that are in the best interests of their individual organizations. This 
underscores the relative nature of risk (Joffe 2003; Kasperson et al. 1988; Slovic 1999). 
Particularly, it shows that people give meaning and make sense of the TRCA Flood 
Warning, and by extension their perceived risk to flooding, from the institutional context 
and environment in which they are immersed.  
Conclusion 
Uncertainty is an inescapable component of flooding, emerging in the anticipations and 
interpretations of weather as well as in hydrological responses resulting from that 
weather; one cannot predict with complete accuracy how a watershed will respond to 
fallen rain. Uncertainty with respect to Flood Warning policy is no different it seems. 
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Grounded in Ed’s comment, “I’m not 100% sure”, the results of this analysis show how 
uncertainty contributed to risk assessments associated with policy-related decision-
making. Tracing policy-related decisions in this risk context illustrated how the policy 
implementation process works. Specifically, the uncertainties that Ed contended with 
created a space for improvisation of policy. This occurred when Ed issued a Flood Watch 
or a notification alerting for “the possibility of flooding” in the jurisdiction, to cover the 
actual flooding of the Bayview Extension that afternoon. Choosing a Watch when the 
circumstances officially called for a Warning is an example of a creative policy solution 
spearheaded by Ed to manage the risk situation according to his interactional goal of 
making the decision that would be perceived as correct. Similarly, Ed’s uncertainty 
afforded recipients an extra degree of reflexive latitude, arguably forcing them to tap 
more firmly into their local, negotiated order, for creating solutions irrespective of TRCA 
Flood Warning policy.  
This ethnographic study highlights the human dimensions of the Flood Warning 
policy implementation process. TRCA perceptions of risk influenced by uncertainties and 
embedded within these organizational and individual belief systems informed the 
meanings flood forecasters associated with Flood Warning policy and influenced the 
group’s accomplishment of interactional goals. The analysis reveals a Flood Warning 
policy that allows for different levels of warning, depending upon where people or groups 
are situated along the TRCA flood forecasters’ risk gradient or continuum: those who 
represent key areas of vulnerability are placed high on the continuum versus those who 
represent areas within the jurisdiction but are not recognized by TRCA as vulnerable. 
That key recipients did not have similar senses of perceived flood risk that day, and 
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especially upon receiving the TRCA Flood Warning, signifies that the semantic 
association made between flood threat and risk by TRCA was not shared nor established 
effectively with their intended users.  
Goffman’s notion of the interaction ritual and Collins’s notion of the IR chain 
helped to explain the special relationship TRCA has with its key recipients and how each 
group is expected to conduct themselves during flood encounters. The results revealed 
that Warning interaction failed for some key recipients to cement perceptions of TRCA 
flood expertise, and by extension the agreed upon cultural capital or resource circulating 
in the respective IR chains. As such, this case demonstrates that while TRCA may be the 
official handler of urban river flood warning policy in the area and the authoritative 
source of river flood warning notifications for key recipients, their expert knowledge has 
not been legitimized across the board, and this is especially so for groups who need and 
use flood information prior to the onset of potential or real impacts. Therefore, the 
findings here call for greater attention to be placed on what TRCA risk-based Flood 
Warning policy is, who it is for, how it works, and what it achieves, especially in 
uncertain urban river flood risk circumstances. TRCA flood forecasters were similarly 
curious about the intention of official Flood Warning, as noted by Stuart when he said in 
Lines 184-187:  
TRCA Office 
October 28, 2015 
 
184 Stuart: Maybe what we’re saying in the Flood Warning 
185  is we want people to be aware that precipitation continues to fall 
186  will still come 
187  and that we’re not out of the woods yet. 
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This curiosity also existed for recipients, but with respect to who the policy is intended 
for. As Ron from the LPB noted: “When TRCA is sending out advisories like this 
{pointing to the October 28, 2015 Flood Warning}, it is not targeted to a specific 
organization; it’s targeted to the community at large”.  
The anthropological approach is valuable here for the light it brings to the human 
dimensions of policy implementation and use, its interconnections with uncertainty and 
risk. The methodology of being there and focusing on the interactional nature of policy 
and risk in ambiguous river flood situations magnified contextual nuances associated with 
policy to offer a more broadened understanding for how policy is understood and 
experienced at the local level, how it works and how it is worked into operational 
decision-making. These results expose useful evidence-based considerations should 
TRCA policy-makers look toward diminishing the uncertainties their flood forecasters 
face during flood events. One consideration is to establish rules surrounding the 
contextual features of policy, such as the extent and impact of water, to diminish the 
conceptual gambles flood forecasters take during flood situations that are less than 100% 
certain. Second, greater efforts could be made toward enhancing inter-agency 
coordination and understanding of recipient groups’ time needs and uses for information. 
Doing so builds more synergistic relationships with recipient groups and would enhance 
the utility of the services TRCA provides. 
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Chapter Four 
Policied versus unpolicied urban flood risk: The social 
construction of early warning (un)acceptability in Toronto, 
Ontario 
 
Introduction: The Non-River Flood Disaster at 501 Alliance Ave. 
  
 
August 8, 2018 
 
“The water was just approaching our necks,” XX {referencing the 
name of one of the men rescued} said. To say that there was about 
a foot of height left until we reached the ceiling would be pretty 
accurate”.23 
 
The opening vignette hints at the harrowing experience of two men who narrowly 
escaped drowning at 501 Alliance Ave. in Toronto, Ontario during the evening of August 
8, 2018 when a fast-moving storm dumped 72.3mm of rain between 9 and 11pm in the 
city. Largely unaware of the magnitude of the storm and the associated flood risk it 
generated, at 10:40pm these two industrial designers decided to take the elevator to the 
underground parking lot when suddenly it stalled, trapping the two; waters rose steadily, 
leaving them in dire need of emergency assistance. The police arrived to the scene with 
approximately one foot of airspace between the water and the ceiling24, and because of 
their efforts, the rescued men live to tell the tale of the night their decision to stay late at 
work took an unexpected turn. 
The flash flood disaster during the evening of August 8, 2018 was urban pluvial 
in nature, or the non-river flood type, which represents a newly emerging risk in Toronto. 
Non-river flood risk is not formally warned for in the City because early warning policy 
                                               
23 https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2018/08/08/two-men-rescued-from-flooded-elevator-during-torontos-
heavy-rain-tuesday.html 
24 (https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.4777111) 
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does not exist for any single organization to issue advanced notifications to the public. 
Policy does exist, however, for the more well-established river flooding in Toronto, or the 
type resulting from overflowing watercourses. Inspired by the differing ways these flood 
risks are managed in Toronto, in the following pages I investigate how discourses of 
flood risk in Toronto have evolved to allow for different policy possibilities. Specifically, 
river flood risk discourse has enabled the construction and maintenance of early warning 
policy whereas the emergence of a non-river flood risk discourse has opened up 
possibilities for ad-hoc warning practices, short-term response strategies, and long-term 
mitigation solutions.  
Using the August 8, 2018 non-river flood disaster as the backdrop for this 
investigation of policied and unpolicied urban flood risk, I argue that current non-river 
flood risk management in Toronto, coupled with the incoherence surrounding non-river 
flood risk, leaves the general public on their own to prepare and protect themselves 
against the sudden onset of flooding in Toronto, a threat for which they are neither 
experts in meteorology nor hydrology. I do this first by presenting river flooding as a 
policied risk, one representative of a dominant risk discourse. I then describe the 
emergence of non-river flooding in Toronto as a new(er) social threat, which has 
contributed to the emergence of a non-river flood risk discourse in the City. Physical 
challenges, such as difficulties in urban non-river flood forecasting, urbanization and a 
changing climate, are then discussed to illuminate their influence on the discursive 
construction of meteorological impossibility when it comes to non-river early flood 
warning generation. I show how the theme of impossibility creates space in the discourse 
for alternative risk management possibilities other than early warning while 
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simultaneously constructs social acceptability of this practice as existing beyond the 
sphere of public accountability. I situate this investigation of policy and risk in discourse 
theory to explain the reciprocating feature of discourse with mental models and 
knowledge in society. The endeavour is productive in so much as it opens up 
anthropology of risk and policy studies to new domains and shows how risk and policies 
related to their associated management and creation work at the level of discourse.  
Discourses, Risk and Policy  
Risk and its management through policy have become a common type of organizational 
governance (Power 2007: 9). Policy is defined here as a course of action pursued by 
government, enacted through social interaction, embedded within particular social and 
cultural worlds (Shore and Wright 2011: 1; Wedel et al. 2005: 40), and entrenched within 
varying institutional frameworks and observer viewpoints (Power 2007: 111). Power’s 
contribution to the Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory and Organization 
Studies speaks to the growing desire to tame uncertainty in risk situations, which has led 
to the establishment of specific roles in society, such as risk manager, and a broader, 
embedded discourse on risk and the need to control or manage it. Thus, risk management 
has become a powerful organizing category (Power 2014: 370) and related policy has 
evolved as the traditional mechanism of choice, or the logical decision and approach to 
account for the increased range of perceived threats publics experience (Henstra 2011: 
418). This rationally-based governance mechanism and structure stems from the 
advancement of the welfare state, also referred to as the regulatory state, in the latter half 
of the 20th century (Rothstein et al. 2006), where one of government’s primary objectives 
was to protect and promote the well-being of its citizens.  
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This process and eventual structure of governance was aided by the evolution of 
the concept of the social in society as explained by social theorist Nikolas Rose. In his 
interrogation of the concept in the context of government and governance, Rose asserts 
that the social is a type of social simulation characterized by social relations with material 
effects. Upon its embrace, the social “set the terms for the way in which human 
intellectual, political and moral authorities in certain places and contexts, thought about 
and acted upon their collective experience” (Rose 1996: 329). His discussion reveals how 
the idea of the social become stabilized, so much so that demands come to be made and 
actions come to be taken in the name of the social, or grounded in the established social 
relations between people and their government. In a similar way, sociologist Stephen 
Crook (1999: 175) talks of the ordering of risk and how the ordering of risk 
identification, risk assessment and management practices feeds back into and amplifies 
the efficacy and legitimacy of these practices. Rose’s contribution is helpful in so much 
as it assists in our understanding of how and why government rationalities, mechanisms 
for governance and risk management have evolved over time, while Crook’s highlights 
how risk and its ordering also creates stability in the management of risk as well as in the 
relationship of people and the government.  
Given such stabilization it is unsurprising that there has been an associated 
expansion of risk management discourses to include the public and their desire to hold 
their government accountable for protection. This desire has been noted by Power in the 
way that he discusses the presence of an augmented public expectation with respect to the 
government decidability and management of danger (Power 2007: 5). While recently 
there has been a move away from government regulation, disaster risk management is 
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one area where disaster scholars still advocate for government involvement (Henstra and 
McBean 2004). Especially in the realm of flood risk, proposals for management centre on 
shared responsibility, as political scientists Thistlewaite, Henstra and others describe 
government involvement in their analysis of relational aspects of flood experience, risk 
management, and public expectation (Henstra and Thistlewaite 2017a/b; Henstra et al. 
2018; Thistlewaite et al. 2017). Thistlewaite and Henstra (2017), in particular, describe 
the interest in developing policies that distribute the responsibility for flood risk reduction 
and the burden of costs with other levels of government and non-governmental actors in 
Canada, primarily through advancing development of floodplain mapping. Greg 
Feldman’s (2005) examination of the Estonian nation-state, security and the discursive 
construction of Russian speakers is useful here despite its different context. In this work, 
Feldman shows how ideas are constructed as problems and then how these problematic 
ideas become legitimized within dominant discourses. His discussion resembles the 
evolution of risk management structures discussed above, and in particular it 
approximates the development of urban river flood risk discourse in Toronto that is 
discussed below. The way Feldman situates policy in its enabling discourses is useful 
since I endeavour to do the same with respect to policy and risk on the topic of urban 
flooding.  
In this chapter, I consider risk as a danger to someone or to something that bears 
value. Risk in flood contexts has been assessed by physical scientists as an ontological 
reality or as an object of discrete materiality. Risk analysis expert Henry Rothstein and 
colleagues (2006) provided a discursive take on the concept when they reported risk as an 
instrument to organize decision making. Despite its use as a key concept for regulating 
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behaviour in society, social science research has been helpful for reminding us that risk is 
a socially and relationally constructed concept wherein experience is woven together with 
notions of uncertainty, value, and context (Boholm 2015). In particular, social scientists 
have theorized risk as a learned phenomenon based in culturally structured evaluations of 
the world (Boholm 1998, 2003; Boholm and Corvellec 2011; Rappaport 1996); and 
grounded in values, symbols, histories, and ideologies, and representative of unique ways 
of thinking (Douglas 1992: 46; Weinstein 1989). Douglas’s cultural theory on risk points 
toward social context as key in shaping individual cognitive and affective assessments of 
risk (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Thus, in accordance with the social scientists noted 
above, I similarly contend that evaluation of the physical environment is done through 
social systems or made sense of socially. In other words, when floods happen social 
elements give meaning to their occurrence, and from this arises highly individualized 
social experiences and constructions of personal threat from it. It follows from this 
description that predating the ability for risk to regulate and organize as Rothstein 
suggests, it must first be socially constructed as a problematic requiring management. 
These constructions shape broader discourses on risk and contribute to the development 
of political rationalities surrounding flood risk and its management.  
Here, I investigate the discourses surrounding urban flood risk and policy in 
Toronto, Ontario. I draw primarily on aspects of van Dijk’s (2014) conceptual approach 
to discourse, particularly his theoretical description of the triangulated relationship among 
discourse, mental models and knowledge in society by way of coherence. Discourse, 
according to van Dijk (2014: 12), is a form of social interaction in society; it is 
simultaneously an expression as well as a reproduction of social cognition, which 
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represents shared beliefs, norms and values. This points to the dialectical nature of 
discourse, or that local and global structures condition discourse but also that discourse 
makes it possible for the local and global structures to emerge in everyday life as social 
representations of broadly shared knowledge. Van Dijk further contends that mental 
models account for these local and global structures of discourse and are the building 
blocks for the reliable construction and representation of these overarching structures as 
well as our everyday experiences (van Dijk 2014: 25). Mental models accomplish this, 
van Dijk argues (2014: 52), by functioning as the starting point for all semantic 
understanding by, for instance, enabling causal and temporal relations between events. 
Van Dijk’s perspective on mental models as a mechanism for meaning creation is in 
keeping with Stevens and Gentner (1983) who postulate mental models are cognitive 
frameworks that guide reasoning, organize thoughts and emotions, and Craik (1943) who 
viewed mental models as the overarching structure enabling people to construct versions 
of reality. Altogether, scholarly research has converged to reflect the power of mental 
models in shaping perceptions, showing that they have significant predictive power in 
helping people to understand and make qualitative inferences about their physical 
environment (Norman 1983).  
The differing mental models held by groups has to do with how words and ideas 
are arranged in our minds. This process of arranging and its influence on the structuring 
of reality harkens back to the seminal writings of Benjamin Whorf (1956), as noted in 
chapter two (p. 43). Whorf’s perspective on the philosophy of language confirmed the 
inter-connections between language, thought and behavior, and in this way demonstrates 
the influence of these elements on the construction of mental models. Furthermore, the 
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insight he offered in this early example is useful for my explanation on the 
conceptualized differences regarding risk and urban presented in this chapter, and the 
influence and impacts of these habitual understandings on behaviours related to urban 
non-river flood risk management.  
Habitual thought and meaning has guided the development of mental models and 
discourse, and reciprocally, discourse and mental models produce meaning by providing 
a mutually constitutive framework for understanding, unpacking and creating 
understanding. Understanding and meaning are considered here as a type of knowledge 
and its acquisition is defined here in two ways: first as general knowledge, or the tacit, 
socially shared, justified and generally accepted social beliefs and their discursive 
reproduction in cultural communities and society at large (van Dijk 2014); and second, as 
specialized knowledge, or a type of knowing particular to epistemic groups whose 
members share in a specific activity, goal, attitude or ideology (van Dijk 2014). These 
different knowledge systems are intimately related to how people mentally construe and 
represent events as well as to broader discourses or patterns of thought surrounding ideas. 
Complementing van Dijk’s explanation of epistemic groups, in the following pages I 
draw on Quinn’s (2005) understanding of cultural models, described by her as the shared 
understanding of the world that has been learned and internalized by a group of people, to 
explain the shared connections between epistemic groups. Combining van Dijk and 
Quinn’s insight, linkages are made between cultural models, the specialized knowledge 
guiding them, and the context of interpretation and action that enables mutual 
understanding, interaction and engagement for members of epistemic groups in different 
risk situations.  
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Critical to this triangulated relationship are the mechanisms enabling these 
conceptual links, or the knowledge devices used to shape comprehension. An example of 
a knowledge device is coherence, paraphrased here to mean the logic and reasoning 
developed through indirect relations between the facts referred to in the discourse and 
those represented subjectively in the mental model (van Dijk 2014). Coherence connects 
and shapes the inter-related concepts of discourse, models and knowledge by establishing 
sequences of understanding, such as helping to frame: what we know, how we know or 
came to know, how well we know, along with what needs to be done now based on our 
knowing (van Dijk 2014). Further facilitating our understanding of the how behind urban 
flood risk discourse and the differing strategies and solutions that have evolved over time, 
I tie van Dijk’s concept of coherence to others who have studied anthropology or 
discourse in policy and other contexts. Macgilchrist’s (2016) insight on breakdown and 
dissonance in discourse, for example, is helpful for understanding circumstances of 
incoherence, or the possibilities that come about from fissures or breakdowns of 
understanding. Linguist Paul Chilton (2004) for instance, in his efforts to show the 
function of language in how people constitute their everyday worlds, describes features of 
discourse that help generate coherence during communication such as interaction, spatial 
cognition, metaphorical reasoning and connections between the emotional centres of the 
brain. Chilton’s efforts are worth acknowledging here to remind us that the models we 
use to make sense of and represent events, or more generally to develop coherence, are 
interactive. His point of view harks back to Norman (1983: 7) and to Strauss and Quinn 
(1997: 3) who all emphasize interaction as an essential mediating force in meaning 
creation as well.  
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The way that van Dijk and others weave together discourse, mental models and 
knowledge is useful because it provides suitable theoretical grounding as I follow the 
emergence of urban flood risk discourse in Toronto and trace its connections to the way 
people make sense of flooding and risk in their everyday life as well as the rationalities 
exercised toward differing governing strategies. This background is helpful in so much as 
it assists our understanding of policy ideals, policy behaviour, as well as perceptions of 
risk and responsibility in the urban flood context. 
Methods 
In this paper, I make policy the object of analysis (Wedel et al. 2005; Wright 2006) and 
use it as a window to understand how discourses shape, and are shaped by, mental 
models, and how these reciprocating features of discourse, belief and situated interests 
generate knowledge and different policy solutions when it comes to river and non-river 
flooding in Toronto. I take a coherentist approach (van Dijk 2014: 28) to discourse in the 
way that I look at discourse as the source of knowledge produced by reasoning and as a 
basis for inferences that are collectively produced and shared in a community. To that 
end, the premise for my paper is not experiments or analysis of talk, text or language used 
during interaction, but instead the coherence and incoherence that develops over time 
through knowledge acquisition through discursive practices, and those represented by 
interview and survey responses with public groups.  
These insights were made possible from data I collected during fieldwork 
observations, as well as survey administration and face-to-face and telephone, one-on-one 
interviews (Bernard 2002). Specifically, I spent time with flood forecasters at the Toronto 
and Region Conservation Authority (TRCA) who comprise an epistemic group of 
bureaucratic actors and experts, or individuals with the qualifications and credentials to 
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validate their mastery of forecast and warning as it relates to watersheds (Schwegler and 
Powell 2008: 4). This included 18 visits, one hour or more in length, to attend meetings, 
participate in river flood warning and response simulation exercises, or observe 
forecasters as they assessed the day’s river flood risk. In addition to the insight gleaned 
from TRCA flood forecasters (n=12), I collected viewpoints from (key recipients of 
TRCA flood warning information, referred to here as) institutional representatives 
(n=15), on-air communicators (n=10) and members of the general public (n=10) over a 
17-month period between May 2015 and October 2016 where I measured their variable 
understandings of, perceptions of risk toward, and decision-making behaviours during 
flooding in urban areas.  
Institutional representatives occupy formal positions within the City’s flood 
response network and are considered key recipients of TRCA urban river early flood 
warning policy. These individuals were reported by TRCA as using TRCA flood 
information in their operational role as decision-makers and are employed in either 
private business or municipal departments in the City, such as emergency managers, and 
representatives from the water authority, hydro, roads, and the public school board. On-
air broadcasters have education ranging from journalism to meteorology. Each has 
reached anywhere from undergraduate to graduate levels of completion and are employed 
by either private weather organizations or major television networks to present weather 
and flood information to the general public. Institutional representatives and on-air 
communicators represent multiple epistemic groups each with their own cultural model 
guiding their interpretations. The 10 members of the general public, or the intended 
recipients of communicated flood information, reside in various locations in Toronto and 
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hold a range of employment and/or life positions, including teacher, parent, manager with 
corporate company, foreman in construction, student, and retiree.  
All participants in this study were selected purposively since they represent 
groups directly involved in either producing, communicating or using flood information, 
and they offer a diverse range of viewpoints on the topic given their varying geographic 
locations, employment positions, and perceptions of risk and behavior toward ‘urban’ 
flooding. In particular, the perspectives of TRCA flood forecasters, institutional 
representatives and on-air communicators demonstrate my efforts to study up, as Nader 
called for years ago (1974), and illustrate the multiple spaces risk-related flood policy 
discourses take shape. For institutional representatives, interviews were all held in 
participants’ offices, whereas with on-air communicators and the general public, 
interviews were held in coffee shops and even at picnic tables in the park. For individuals 
who preferred, a survey was administered, completed and then returned via email or 
retrieved in person. Overall, interviews lasted anywhere between one-half to two hours 
and resulted in approximately 854 minutes of recorded talk, which was then coded and 
analyzed using Atlas.ti, a qualitative software analysis program.  
TRCA Urban River Flood Policy  
The development of Toronto and Region Conservation Authority’s (TRCA) urban River 
Flood policy for the City of Toronto is an example of a rational approach to risk 
management motivated by social experience emerging from and couched within a 
broader urban river flood risk discourse. This preparedness strategy intended to mitigate 
the risk to life and property was formalized on the heels of October 15, 1954 Hurricane 
Hazel, an event where 81 people were killed, thousands were left homeless and 
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significant financial damages were incurred25. In response to the loss of life and lack of 
preparation, Toronto, other municipalities and the province of Ontario developed a 
comprehensive plan for flood control and water conservation, which included the public 
acquisition of vulnerable land and restrictions on development in the City’s west-end 
floodplains near the Humber River, as well as the development of the organization’s river 
Flood Forecast and Warning Service. The next major enhancements to TRCA urban river 
flood policy arose following the more recent and similarly historical July 8, 2013 flood in 
Toronto. At this time a relatively organized thunder storm suspended itself over Toronto, 
dropped over 90 mm of rain in two hours and caused extensive non-river flooding (Figure 
8), social disruption, and power outages across the city. Developed for municipalities and 
residents within TRCA jurisdiction, this service for dealing with flood contingency 
planning in the City is a shared responsibility by municipalities, conservation authorities 
and the Ministry of Natural Resources, on behalf of the Province (TRCA 2013: 308).  
The creation of TRCA urban river flood risk-related policy in 1954 was a 
classificatory act that made river flooding an officially identified risk in the region and a 
problem amenable to authoritative action (Rose 1996: 331). The establishment of policy 
was a discursive tactic that reduced intra-group variability for TRCA in so much as the 
strategy served as a suitable framing mechanism wherein dangers became organized in 
flood forecasters’ minds (Douglas 1992). Echoing Douglas, and in agreement with 
Sandstrom, Martin and Fine’s (2010: 55) perspective on organizational theory, the 
process of policying river flood risk assisted in the organization of flood forecasters’ 
perceptions around the flood risk concept, transformed ideas about the concept from 
                                               
25 http://www.hurricanehazel.ca 
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something abstract into a social object, promoted a shared collective meaning and 
inspired a common mode of response. Experts in frame analysis would similarly contend 
that the classification initiated sense-making for flood forecasters and their interactions as 
bureaucratic experts (Entman 1953: 52; Goffman 1974).  
By instituting early warning river flood policy, risk was not only defined for this 
expert epistemic group, but defined in specific ways. The configuration of ideas 
surrounding TRCA river flood policy introduced mandates for the type of flooding 
TRCA flood forecasters were responsible for managing and also the types for which they 
were not. As urban river flood policy stipulates, TRCA must address flooding that occurs 
along watercourses or river flooding, yet they have no responsibility for the variety that 
arises away from the rivers or non-river flooding, colloquially referred to as ‘urban 
flooding’. Thus, this policy move provoked flood forecasting experts to locate and 
respond to risk based on where it exists geographically within the watershed. In this way 
policy shaped the cultural models of flood forecasters by giving institutional authority to 
urban river flood risk as critical to manage while simultaneously closing off urban non-
river flooding as unworthy of official attention (Shore and Wright 1997: 14).  
On the forecast floor, the classification prompted different conversations and 
different engagement among flood experts. It stimulated the organization of meetings 
wherein flood forecasters discussed river flood risk levels and appropriate action 
depending on the situation. It initiated a shift in work tasks to include daily assessment of 
river flood risk. Over time and through policy-based interactions, TRCA flood forecasters 
developed informal conventions, or institutional ways of thinking and acting, which 
further guided their understandings of the official classification and designation of urban 
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river flood risk (Douglas 1986: 46). In keeping with anthropologist Mary Douglas who 
saw thinking as dependent upon institutions, flood forecasters’ informal rules and 
conduct acted alongside policy on the flood forecasting floor and helped to stabilize the 
risk as problematic, shape their organizational activity (Fine and Hallet 2014), and thus 
reinforce appropriate patterns of policy deployment. This was instrumental for TRCA as 
an epistemic group in the way that it guided forecasters’ specialized knowledge and the 
cultural models they employed in their common endeavor of governing in accordance 
with the official flood policy (van Dijk 2014). In addition to shaping perception and the 
mental models employed to make sense of urban river flood risk, discourse surrounding 
policy produced and reproduced the everyday practices of flood forecasters, particularly 
by enacting new ways of acting and inculcating new ways of being, as linguist Norman 
Fairclough (2016: 89) suggests is an expected effect of policy-related discourse. 
Urban river Flood Warning policy at TRCA is a classic ordering of risk in terms 
of Crook’s (1999) definition of the phrase and operates as an agreement government has 
made with public groups to be accountable to citizens for flood risk as it relates to 
overflowing watercourses. Launching the policy not only set up the terms of important 
reference related to risk but also legitimized how the risk was to be managed for the 
protection of publics. In Toronto, urban river flood risk is managed through the 
deployment of policy, which involves issuing early notifications such as a Flood Watch 
when “flooding is possible in specific watercourses or municipalities” and a Flood 
Warning when “flooding is imminent or already occurring in specific watercourses or 
municipalities.” 26 Deploying policy is akin to putting the discourse into practice and 
                                               
26 https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/understand/ 
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delivering the policied risk message to TRCA’s targeted audiences. As per TRCA urban 
river Flood Warning policy, early warning risk messages are delivered via electronic 
transmission to key recipients within municipalities, local agencies, school boards, and 
the media (comprised of on-air communicators with major television news networks), or 
via Twitter, a popular social media platform. Recipients are then responsible for relaying 
the message to appropriate individuals and departments within their organizations and 
activating municipal emergency response procedures, which may or may not include 
taking actions to warn local residents27. The reception of the risk message constructs for 
individuals what qualifies as risk, establishes for recipients the objects and subjects at 
risk, and also gives those individuals reading the risk messages a sense for who to expect 
this information from. Thus it shows, borrowing from political discourse analyst Arthur 
Borriello (2017), how policy operates to rhetorically construct a common sense in publics 
surrounding urban flood risk. It does so by shaping their mental models and producing 
shared general knowledge. In this way, mental schemas generate, and are generated by, 
policy-informed interactional practices to create a shared sense of understanding. This is 
similar to the point made by sociologist Dorothy Smith (2005) in her conceptualization of 
texts as coordinators of activities. Considering her insight here as it relates to the creation 
of policy, its negotiation as well as its interpretation upon issue, in this chapter I show 
how policy ideals exist in the local settings of people’s everyday worlds and also in those 
settings occupied by the ruling relations, such as government bureaucrats. It coordinates 
by inspiring that common ground in the public and also by regulating work of flood 
forecasters and their accountability to the public. 
                                               
27 https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/understand/ 
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Once the river flood notification has been issued by flood forecasters, or once 
TRCA policy has been implemented and the risk message is enroute to its targeted 
destination, it travels across space to environments where institutional representatives, 
on-air communicators and members of the general public choose to review, make their 
own interpretations, and their own decisions to re-communicate the message or use it as a 
guide in their protective responses to the risk situation. These public user groups are 
socially organized in terms of their own official rules, informal conventions and cultural 
or mental models, which challenges the automatic uptake of the singular understanding 
put forth by TRCA in their risk notification. Put another way, as the risk message travels 
across space it encounters institutional representatives and communicators, who belong to 
different epistemic groups belonging to different negotiated orders. Each of these groups 
have their own organizational purposes, goals and modes of communication, and as result 
a collision of ideals, understandings and action may occur. Thus, while episodic river 
flood experiences and TRCA’s issuing of flood notifications attempts to bridge inferences 
and generate a degree of coherence among multiple social groups, the organizational 
demarcations between the agency and its user groups highlights the varying models of 
thought that exist. This explanation lends to our understanding of factors involved in the 
variable nature of social cognition, or those elements that have the ability to impede the 
penetration of dominant flood risk discourse. 
TRCA urban river Flood Warning policy is an instrument for governance that 
assists in the propagation of discourse by conjuring across spaces: it focuses bureaucratic 
decision-making, triggers publics’ sense-making and response behaviours, and operates 
to reinforce political rationalities. The notion that policy ‘conjures’ is an expression of its 
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ability to do things, a position on which most anthropology of policy scholars would 
agree. In fact, scholars in this field tend to imbue policy with many agentive qualities, 
such as the ability for it to shape social life, or to organize, classify, appropriate, stabilize 
and legitimize ideas (Shore and Wright 1997, 2011). In other words, sentiment exists 
toward policy as having the capacity to shift action as an actant (Akrich and Latour 1992: 
259), and trigger belief, decision making, identity creation, or the perpetuation of the 
ideals upon which policy is based. At the same time, Shore and Wright (2011: 20) remind 
us of the relational nature of policy, reporting that it is only as policy enters into relations 
with actors, objects and institutions in different domains that its acting as an actant is 
made possible. To that end, policy may initiate a relation, but the interaction with the 
actor, object or institution is the catalyst needed to bring policy to life, or to make it 
possible for policy to achieve social effects.  
Altogether, the deployment and uptake of TRCA urban river Flood Warning 
policy points to the interactive features of discourse, or how social relations operate in 
and through discourse. The interactions that have evolved over the years between TRCA 
flood forecasters and the official rules, those that have occurred amongst this group who 
negotiate the policy and implement it, as well as the interactions between this group and 
their key recipients, highlights the reciprocal, mutually reinforcing nature between policy 
and perception. Similar to what Fairclough (2016: 88) describes as the dialectical 
relationship of discourse between semiotic and social elements, policy helped to establish 
understanding, which influenced social practices, which then mediated the relationship 
between overarching knowledge structures and events. The repetition of this process 
strengthens intra and inter-organizational institutions surrounding river flood risk and 
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perpetuates the ideals and logics groups draw upon as they negotiate TRCA’s risk-based 
policy in everyday practice. In this way, policy perpetuates and strengthens the urban 
river flood risk discourse more broadly across multiple social spaces. Reciprocally, this 
process worked, and continues to work, to legitimize the policy that has been established 
for urban river flood risk management and generate social acceptability surrounding these 
measures, although acceptability is not without its challenges as the discussion above 
(and Chapter 3) conveys. The socially motivated nature behind the creation of TRCA’s 
urban river flood policy and its subsequent changes demonstrates how policy does not 
always originate with political actors conversing in bureaucratic settings. Instead, 
political rationalities for policy were shown to be inspired by experiences with the 
historic Hurricane Hazel flood event. This event contributed to the construction of an 
ideal that river flood risk was important, which assisted in the creation of a discourse on 
urban flood risk, which then informed the political ideal surrounding the risk, and 
following this, the establishment of its appropriate management through early warning 
notification. 
Non-River Flood Risk in Toronto  
Non-river flood events are occurring in Toronto with greater frequency and, as a result, 
are constructing broadly held notions that non-river flooding is threatening. This is 
challenging the prominence and attention that has been historically given to river 
flooding. The emergence of non-river flooding as a social threat coupled with the 
physical challenges in managing this type of risk has contributed to the construction of an 
alternative flood risk discourse, this time a non-river flood risk variety, except that it is 
emerging differently than urban river flood risk discourse in so much as it is eclipsing 
certain policy possibilities. In other words, while river flood risk has been socially 
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identified, organized through policy, and delivered to publics for many years vis-à-vis 
risk messages constructed by flood forecasters at TRCA, the emergent beliefs and models 
of thought surrounding non-river flood risk management have centred mostly on short-
term response strategies and long-term mitigation solutions. The social acceptability of 
these risk management initiatives have contributed to the construction of a discourse 
whereby early warning exists beyond the realm of public accountability; it has 
contributed to keeping this risk unpolicied in the way that it has neither been formally 
classified nor delivered through a formal policy mechanism. This has been enabled by 
what Rothstein (2003: 87) would characterize as the ‘institutional attenuation 
phenomenon’ whereby processes in place serve to diminish perceptions or awareness of 
risk, and/or diminish perceptions of policy importance of associated regulations. The 
result is a type of ‘organized irresponsibility’ or regulatory neglect when it comes to non-
river flood risk early warning, according to German sociologist Ulrich Beck (2015: 76), 
where government agencies and organizations are not made liable for providing advanced 
notice of non-river flood risk to those affected.  
Urban Non-River Flooding: A New(er) Social Threat  
The non-river flood near-disaster at 501 Alliance Ave. referred to in the opening vignette 
is an example of this newly emerging risk. However, urban non-river flooding is more 
than just about two men who nearly drowned in an elevator. Fieldwork observations and 
interview data identified that now more than ever before during short or long duration, 
heavy bouts of intense rain people are accustomed to seeing the overflowing of manholes 
on downtown roadways, or the inundation of city streets and underground subway 
stations. In these circumstances, people increasingly experience wading their vehicles 
through flooded low-lying roads, underpasses and even major transportation corridors. 
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Many experience the adjustments to transit scheduling and commute times. For some 
residents when heavy rain falls it is becoming more common to take the stairs in their 
downtown condominium because the building’s electrical panel, and thus the elevator’s 
function, has been compromised. Echoing Beck’s discussion (2015: 83) on the effects of 
living in a world with a changing climate, non-river flood experiences are creating for 
Torontonians new ways of being, looking, hearing and acting in the world. In other 
words, the emergence of urban non-river flood hazard in Toronto is shifting the local 
experience of risk for publics, what they are witness to, and what their ideas for ‘normal’ 
impacts might be during rainy weather. When it comes to river flooding, residents in 
Toronto have long been familiar with the vulnerable lower Don River that ‘always 
floods’, however other urban non-river areas in the City are increasingly gaining their 
own reputation of vulnerability such as Lower Simcoe underpass, which floods with as 
little as 20mm of rainfall (Figure 8). The more frequent experience of urban non-river 
flooding in the City is helping to transform the everyday conversation about flooding 
along with the rationalities conceived of for managing it. 
Urban Non-River Flood Forecasting  
Along with the social changes brought on by urban non-river flooding in Toronto, 
physical challenges associated with forecasting for this type of risk have influenced the 
discourse surrounding its management. Urban non-river flooding is incredibly 
challenging to forecast effectively and with useful lead time (Doswell et al. 1996; 
Herman and Schumacher 2018). Characterized by their rapid occurrence, urban non-river 
floods in Toronto take similar shape to flash floods, which “come on like crazy” as 
Joseph, a longtime downtown Toronto resident said. Such a swiftness broadly highlights 
the complexities surrounding the possibility of providing early warning to public groups. 
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More specifically, however, urban non-river flood forecasting is considerably difficult 
because forecast and warning information depends to a large extent on accurate rainfall 
predictions (Collier 2007: 3; Doswell et al. 1996; Hapuarachchi et al. 2011: 2771; 
Herman and Schumacher 2018). In Ontario, ECCC meteorologists make rainfall 
predictions by interpreting variables like high resolution precipitation models and 
weather radar reflectivity that shows the intensity, speed and direction of a rain-producing 
storm. Despite advancements in science and computer-based models, the information 
produced is inherently predictive in nature, and as such, amounts remain extrapolated 
estimates.  
The technological limitations associated with rainfall prediction for non-river 
flooding emerges in the everyday talk of ECCC meteorologists. For example, on the 
forecast floor, meteorologists are consistently trying to understand how to forecast more 
accurate precipitation amounts. If this could be done, the belief is that meteorologists 
could add value to their weather products that warn for heavy rain and the potential for 
non-river flooding, as noted by one manager at ECCC: 
ECCC Downsview 
May 8, 2015 
 
Benny: If we can figure out a way on precipitation  
then we can give better direction on where and how  
we should be spending our time 
 
Together, with the rapid onset of these style events, the technological limitation 
materializes in the discourse as a position of meteorological impossibility, or the inability 
to forewarn accurately and effectively, which lends to the unpolicied nature of this risk 
and the concomitant social acceptability of organized irresponsibility surrounding the 
lack of attention given to early warning as a management strategy.   
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Urbanization and Changing Climate  
Adding further physical challenges to urban non-river forecasting are the uncertainties 
brought on by the impacts of rain in urbanized environments, or the interaction of 
meteorology, or what’s happening in the atmosphere, with the hydrological situation, or 
what’s happening on the ground. The natural topography and antecedent conditions such 
as the ground’s ability to absorb more moisture play a role in this interaction, as do 
changes in land use patterns, particularly those associated with urbanization, which 
dramatically affect the impacts of rain.  In Toronto, the process of urbanization accounts 
for the proliferation of new builds in the downtown core, where for example in a space 
roughly equivalent to one square kilometer, seven high rise condominiums and counting 
have been constructed in the last 15 years (Appendix H: Map of Study Area- Lower 
Simcoe St.). Following from Beck (1992: 21), who reports the predominant dangers or 
risks we experience today are largely techno-scientific developments resulting from 
modernization, and also in keeping with Giddens (1998: 25), who sees risk as a type of 
manufactured uncertainty characteristic of modernity, the current rate of urbanization in 
Toronto is exacerbating the non-river flood risk threats.  
Offering a physical science perspective, Yang and colleagues (2013: 1793) report 
that urbanization is often associated with an increase in impervious surfaces, which can 
lead to the modification of regional climate, including increased rainfall amounts over 
these urbanized areas. If added volume of rain does fall there is no predicting how much, 
thus adding greater uncertainty to the already uncertain estimates. In addition, 
urbanization has been reported to intensify flooding by increasing the rate and volume of 
run-off (Collier 2007: 3). Together, this adds strain to storm water infrastructure and 
drainage systems, those which are sometimes aged and in need of repair in older Toronto 
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neighborhoods, or for those that may not have been constructed with the long-term 
growth in mind that the City has undergone in recent decades, such as the newly popular 
Lower Simcoe non-river flood area. The process of urbanizing imposes further 
limitations on the accuracy of run-off and discharge estimates that are used to assess the 
likelihood of flash flooding, and as such creates another layer of complexity in forecast 
and warning ability. Unsurprisingly, urbanization impacts the social experience of non-
river flood risk and the limitation of accuracy these changes impose contributes to the 
perception of impossibility in non-river flood risk discourse surrounding early warning as 
a reliable management possibility.  
Forecast and warning for flash-style urban flooding is also made more challenging 
by uncertain changes surrounding our changing climate (Collier 2007; Hapuarachchi et 
al. 2011). Storms are more frequent and projections indicate an increase in the intensity 
of rainfall in the future, which may lead to more flash flooding (United States Global 
Change Research Program 2018; Hapuarachchi et al. 2011: 2771; TRCA website28). 
While the case of August 8, 2018 is exceptional, the near-drowning elevator experience is 
an example of an increasingly common phenomena in an urban area such as Toronto 
where the coupling of unpredictable and extreme atmospheric conditions, along with 
exponential urban development, make the City a unique flood ‘hazardscape’ (Elliott and 
Frickel 2013). This ‘hazardscape’ increases the potential for urban non-river flooding and 
creates unequal exposure and disproportional risk for people working, living and 
                                               
28 “Climate change has increased the likelihood of more severe and frequent storms, which in turn raises the 
risk of flooding. TRCA Flood Risk Management plays a key role in providing municipalities with the 
information they need to respond to flooding.” 
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recreating in the City (Hapuarachchi et al. 2011: 2780), as the urban non-river flooding in 
several locations in Toronto during the July 8, 2013 flood confirms (Figure 8).  
 
 
Figure 8. Locations of urban non-river flooding during the July 8, 2013 flood event 
 
At the same time, my inclusion of a discussion on the changing climate illustrates 
my overlapping of one discourse with another. I am merging these discourses, just as 
scholars and industry partners like TRCA do, which underscores the embeddedness of 
discourses within discourses, the pervasiveness of such an overlap and the penetration of 
other discourses in their dialectical, relational construction. While Fairclough (2016: 89) 
theorizes that such merging is typically a strategic recontextualization where social agents 
purposely incorporate one discourse into another to achieve certain outcomes, I am doing 
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so as a way to show another factor that generated or contributed to how and why certain 
policy options were pursued while others were not. To that end, incorporating climate 
change discourse is helpful for showing how its interaction with non-river flood risk 
reinforces the presence and acceptance of the threat as risky. Furthermore, the notion of 
unpredictability in the climate change discourse, I would argue, helps to strengthen the 
perception of meteorological impossibility surrounding early non-river flood warning 
generation. Altogether, the physical challenges associated with non-river flooding have 
contributed to the mental models utilized by individuals when making sense of this risk. 
They have, as Borriello (2017) would say, reduced other ways of thinking about 
managing this risk to the point where rationalities converge in the discourse on the 
impossibility of providing publics with advanced notice of non-river flood threat in 
Toronto.  
Non-River Flood Management in Toronto  
Perceptions of meteorological impossibility and the unpolicied nature of early warnings 
for non-river flood risk in Toronto have contributed to its lack of an official risk ordering 
regime (Crook 1999). What has evolved instead is an ad-hoc fragmentary early warning 
practice, short term response strategies and long-term mitigation solutions, which I argue 
construct social acceptability in the discourse against formalizing early warning policy. 
The development and advancement of these practices, strategies and solutions illustrate 
how risk and its management have become a lens through which a certain kind of rational 
organizational design can be envisioned (Power 2007), and also shows how discourses 
are formed and legitimized within a complex chain of networks linked together (van Dijk 
2014).  
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Urban Non-River Flood Warnings: An Ad-Hoc, Fragmentary Practice  
There is an ad-hoc, informal system in place that attempts to provide advanced notice 
when urban non-river flooding is imminent. If an ECCC meteorologist deems there is 
non-river flood potential associated with a system of heavy rain moving through Toronto, 
he or she may choose to provide the public with advanced notice of risk in their Severe 
Thunderstorm Warning (STW) by including the phrase: “Heavy downpours can cause 
flash floods and water pooling on roads” (Appendix E), providing the weather conditions 
also meet severe thunderstorm threshold criteria.  
The conscious efforts made by meteorologists to include non-river flood related 
language in the STW, despite official rules against it, demonstrates how these experts 
navigate policy struggles. It reveals their attempts to communicate information about the 
non-river flood risk even though it hasn’t been officially classified as such, as well as 
their establish some semblance of ordering despite the lack of official structure. This 
move operates to facilitate coherence by publics and is an attempt to develop shared 
conceptions of non-river flooding as risky. It is setting out to equalize the knowledge 
differential between meteorological experts and public groups by activating or tapping 
into people’s mental models and to help establish for them what they know about the 
situation and what they need to do now with that knowledge. In keeping with van Dijk 
(2014: 227), the STW is a knowledge device utilized by ECCC meteorologists to 
generate common ground. The inclusion of non-river flood risk information is also like a 
type of ‘shape-shifting’, to borrow from Shore (2011: 127), where meteorologists 
oscillate at their discretion between adhering to policy by not mentioning the word 
‘flood’, and by including details related to non-river flooding brought on by heavy rain. 
Their manipulation of the formal rules in this way reveals the influence of something 
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other than official policy at play during decision making, perhaps personal ethics, 
principles and beliefs, or the prominence given to moral values over and above policy, as 
Shore and Wright suggest (1997: 16). Though ECCC meteorologists cannot escape the 
system within which they work, through the STW they utilize strategies in the space 
afforded to them to express alternative ideas and opinions. These actions show that policy 
can be a site of contestation, and expose official rules as not always universally and 
collectively agreed upon (Shore 2011: 128). Moreover, the actions demonstrate how 
social practices shape discourse by mediating the relationship between events on the 
ground with the overarching structure and rationalities governing their management. 
Once ECCC issues their STW, on-air broadcasters will re-produce it as per 
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) mandate, 
which means that in their weather segments TV meteorologists will notify the public of 
the STW in effect. The nuanced details such as ‘heavy rain’, ‘torrential downpours’ and 
to ‘avoid driving through water on roads’ may or may not be included since this is a 
decision made by each on-air presenter and depends upon many factors including the 
timing or other weather stories that may be perceived as more important. The STW is 
reproduced verbatim on smartphone applications such as the one available from the 
Weather Network, which allows for individuals to have the STW pushed to their phone, 
nuanced details and all, providing the location services on the phone have been enabled. 
Short-Term Response Strategies  
The short-term strategies employed for non-river flood risk are reactionary in nature. 
TRCA website indicates for people to “please contact your local municipality for more 
information” in times of non-river flooding in Toronto. Bobby, a TRCA flood duty 
officer confirmed their organization as unconcerned with non-river flooding when she 
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said, “People keep calling us about street flooding and we are the wrong people to call.” 
This sentiment was seconded by Stuart when he responded with “that’s not us” after 
being notified of flooding along the 401 on October 28, 2015 in an area away from the 
nearest water source, Cook’s Creek. Interviews with two institutional representatives 
from the City highlighted their operational measures during flood risk as similarly 
response-driven. Oakley, the representative from the Water Authority, for example, 
commented that a common strategy during flooding is for residents to “put a claim 
against the City and then we {the City} have an insurance company that investigates the 
claim and then they {the insurance adjustors} work with operations {from the City}.” 
Any advanced preparation for Oakley was focused on preparing for consequences, such 
as those arising from “extreme weather which could be power outages and 
communication failures” and making sure that they have robustness in their critical 
infrastructure to handle the contingencies that arise. This was likewise the case for 
Sawyer at the Hydro Authority, who reported: “For us it’s, unfortunately, it’s a response 
element, so there’s not much we can do short term to prepare.”  
TRCA’s position and those of the City representatives indexes their particular 
ways of thinking about non-river flood risk management. First, TRCA’s official stance 
actively constructs City departments as the groups responsible for handling non-river 
flooding in Toronto, while flood forecasters actively construct their group as not 
responsible. In the same way that Chilton (2004: 199) reports language indicates 
viewpoints, social position and group identity, TRCA is expressing distance from early 
warning and response when it comes to non-river flood risk as a way of identifying both 
their position as river flood risk managers and their lack of accountability for addressing 
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non-river flood risk. These are what Borriello (2017: 243) refers to as instituting 
moments for TRCA, or that through their expressed stance on non-river flood risk the 
group is establishing the social space and configuring boundaries of responsibility. The 
City representatives’ perspectives, on the other hand, discursively add to the theme of 
impossibility in the non-river flood risk discourse. In other words, where meteorological 
impossibility regarding early warning for non-river flood risk was shown to have 
contributed to non-river flood management initiatives, operational impossibility for these 
City groups explains their attention to preparing against consequences, not preparing in 
advance to eliminate potential impacts. Moreover, the City is expressing distance from 
early warning, not to identify their position of unaccountability, but to identify that early 
warning strategy would not be useful given their position or operational role.  
Long-Term Mitigation Solutions  
In Ontario, rather than focusing on non-river early warning flood policy there is a 
growing emphasis on diminishing vulnerability by developing enhanced resistance, 
recovery, resilience to non-river flooding through long-term mitigation. Non-profit 
groups taking the lead on this are Partners for Action29, an applied research network 
advancing flood resiliency in Canada in the face of a changing climate and extreme 
weather, and the Ontario Urban Flooding Collaborative, which involves interdisciplinary 
teams assembling to carry out collaborative flood action plans. Together, these groups are 
working towards the development of public knowledge creation and promotion of 
personal action in response to flooding and in-between flood events. This is similar to 
private insurance groups who encourage policy holders to protect themselves against 
                                               
29 https://uwaterloo.ca/partners-for-action/what-partners-action-p4a 
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financial losses resulting from basement flooding and sewer back-ups by purchasing 
additional non-river flood coverage as part of their home policy. Likewise, scholars in 
academia are part of the discourse surrounding long-term mitigation solutions, however 
they tend to focus their attention on insurance or policy instruments centred on resilience 
and property level flood protection (Morrison et al. 2018; Thistlewaite et al. 2017).  
The efforts made by non-profits, the solutions encouraged by private insurance 
groups, and the attention given by academics to property level flood protection comprise 
critical elements in non-river flood mitigation and risk management. These approaches 
pay special credence to important facets of flood risk management, however they give 
unequal priority to long-term mitigation by concentrating on the protection of physical 
spaces such as underground infrastructure or homes. Somehow, within the cracks of non-
river flood risk discourse, the needs of people moving dynamically across and within the 
urban landscape from one location to the next, or those occupying and traversing these 
physical spaces, or how they might be affected, as a non-river flood event unfolds, have 
gone unnoticed. Put another way, it seems as though the emergence of the social threat 
and its related physical challenges have permitted some transformation in the way 
individuals and groups construe non-river flooding as threatening, but have done so in an 
incomplete way because the changes in thinking are limited to mostly homeowners. Since 
van Dijk (2014: 25) reports people are developing their understandings of a discourse 
relative to the mental models they have about the situation or topic, one could reasonably 
argue that the long-term mitigation solutions are generating incomplete models and thus 
an incomplete discourse because the efforts have related the discourse only partially to 
what it is about and only partially to what it represents.  
  
175 
 
The carrying out of these non-profit initiatives and the managing of non-river 
flood risk in short-term and long-term ways enables the inattention given to early 
warning, and in so doing, assists in the construction of social acceptability of government 
irresponsibility when it comes to non-river flooding as an unpolicied risk. These 
examples show how social practices help in the configuration of discourse, the mental 
models that inform and are informed by discourse, as well as the knowledge that emerges 
from the combining of discourse with mental models. In particular, these triangulated 
elements, mediated by physical challenges, short-term response and long-term mitigation, 
worked together to depoliticize urban non-river early flood warnings and allow it, still 
currently, to reside beyond the domain of government.   
Non-River Flood Risk Discourse: Evidence of Incoherence  
Up to now the discussion has centred on river flood risk discourse and its associated 
policy and on non-river flood risk discourse and the factors contributing to early warning 
as unpolicied. While the social experience of non-river flooding has generated a broadly 
shared general knowledge of non-river flooding as threatening, differing social 
perceptions of participants demonstrate incoherence of the discourse. In other words, the 
perspectives offered by institutional representatives, on-air communicators and members 
of the general public illustrated incommensurability regarding what urban non-river 
flooding is, its causes and impacts, and also who these groups imagine is responsible for 
managing the risk. The incoherence is reflective of what discourse and policy expert 
Felicitas Macgilchrist (2016) calls a fissure and is explained by the varying underlying 
mental and cultural models of participants.  
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‘Urban Flooding’: All Definitions are Not Equal  
TRCA defines ‘urban flooding as “street flooding, basement flooding, and flooding of 
other low lying urban areas.” In his discussion on the epistemic structures of text and talk, 
van Dijk (2014: 293) reports that this official definition presupposes public groups such 
as institutional representatives, on-air communicators and the general public know the 
category and understand the description. Yet, the results of this study indicate public 
groups do not always define ‘urban’ in the same way as TRCA. TRCA’s cultural 
understanding of ‘urban’ flood is predicated upon flood origination and location whereas 
for institutional representatives, communicators and members of the general public 
‘urban’ flood was based more upon impacts and their ideas for what constituted ‘urban’. 
The mis-matched understandings highlight the different models relied upon, and thus a 
critical aspect of incoherence regarding the emerging non-river flood risk discourse.  
With every face-to-face interview or survey administered I asked participants the 
same question: “When I say urban flooding, what comes to mind? What do you think 
of?” Despite public participants thinking my question strange and perhaps one with an 
obvious definition, each graciously responded. Answers varied across institutional 
representatives, communicators, and members of the general public, yet a pattern began 
to emerge whereby the definition for ‘urban’ flooding was shown to encompass all of the 
following: flooding or ponding of creeks, rivers, low-lying areas, basements, 
underground parking, backyards, roads, streets and buildings all within a city or suburb. 
For the majority of participants, ‘urban’ flooding translated to flooding anywhere within 
an urban setting, whether that be along the river or on a downtown street or in a 
basement. In fact, institutional representatives overwhelmingly reported their belief that 
‘urban’ flooding occurs when a river overflows its banks. This is directly opposite to 
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TRCA’s official definition and is interesting because as key recipients of TRCA flood 
information it demonstrates that institutional representatives are no closer to seeing it the 
TRCA way and no closer to a shared understanding of ‘urban’ flooding than the general 
public, despite institutional representatives’ having an established relationship with 
TRCA. 
Data also confirm that geographic distinctions were not made in the same way by 
participants as they are by TRCA, and as Kevin the CBC weather broadcaster reported, 
“it was tricky” to know what geographic distinction TRCA was referring to sometimes. 
As Kevin reported during our interview on July 12, 2016: 
Telephone Interview 
July 12, 2016 
 
Kevin: They {referencing TRCA} are more concerned with river flooding.   
They are looking at -- you know -- flow rate and -- you know -- 
how high the water is in relation to the banks --  
and things like that in terms of the different tributaries that make up the 
watershed.   
So if the watershed has a flooding event -- you know --  
like that's along the river -- that's going to be more TRCA.  
I would think when it comes to urban {referring to non-river} flooding -- 
that's not really the same -- it's not really (…)  
That's really tricky because the watersheds do encompass the urban area.   
 
Leonard, a young master’s graduate who recently returned to his native Toronto, 
characterized urban flooding as storm drains becoming overwhelmed, exploding fire 
hydrants, and pools of water at the edge of the sidewalks and city streets. Noah, a resident 
living in Toronto’s east neighbourhood of Leslieville, expanded on his definition of 
‘urban’ flooding to say: “Ah, probably waterways being washed out. Um, and again, 
maybe it’s that visual from a couple of years ago of the DVP flooding.” The event he is 
referring to is the July 8, 2013 flood in Toronto, which was indeed ‘urban’ in nature but 
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the impacts Noah referred to were related to and caused by an overflowing Don River. 
Another member of the general public, Ingrid, talked about people who may be at risk of 
‘urban’ flooding, commenting that “places like Tattle Creek, it goes under University of 
Toronto”, which much like Noah, connected a watercourse with the definition of ‘urban’ 
flood. When Beatrice, a journalist with CBC hears ‘urban’ flood she’s thinking about “the 
Don River and how close it is to the DVP and maybe a wash-out there”. Likewise, Tim, a 
City Roads representative, said: “if the river can affect urban areas, then it would be 
‘urban’ flooding”. Similarly, a private transit authority representative defined ‘urban’ 
flooding as river flooding, pond flooding and basement flooding. These examples 
illustrate how participants associated ‘urban’ flooding with broader geographical 
boundaries inclusive of rivers and creeks in a city setting, which is in direct opposition to 
TRCA’s definition. 
The different experiences of participants in the public groups also contributed to 
varied understandings for what constituted ‘urban’ flood. For example, as the quote 
above from general public member Noah confirms, he grounds his definition of ‘urban’ 
flood in his experience of Toronto’s July 2013 flood event, which was largely a river 
flood. Similarly, CBC journalist Beatrice’s definition arose from having seen images of 
the overflowing Don River creating washouts on the Don Valley Parkway. As if to be 
sitting in a historical placeholder until called upon, these examples speak to how 
understanding is linked with specific cognitive and emotional appraisals of threat (Lerner 
and Keltner 2001: 155) and also how sense-making is connected with past experiences 
(Wertsch 2001: 225). Bakhtin (1981) reinforces the notion of meaning construction as a 
back and forth and as a fusion between past experiences with present circumstances, 
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which helps explain that instead of a selection, combination and transmission of isolated 
ideas, or a result of one’s situated interests and organizational goals, definitions of 
‘urban’ flooding or non-river flooding in urban areas for public groups is more heavily 
informed by the relation of their past experience with the current situation. Bakhtin, 
Lerner, Keltner and Wertsch’s insight supports van Dijk’s (2014: 50) notions for how 
models are both constructed and structured; meaning that events and actions are 
perceived, construed, represented and memorized in our mental thinking as long 
sequences of meaningful activities that are segmented in variable length and range in 
complexity.  
These varying definitions for ‘urban flooding’ demonstrate that TRCA’s official 
definition has not effectively inspired public allegiance nor singular understanding. This 
is because TRCA and public risk-perceivers are negotiating their respective 
understandings of the terminology based on their own unique mental or cultural models 
and their own habitual understandings for what constitutes ‘urban’. In much the same 
way mental models generate shared general knowledge, cultural models employed by 
epistemic groups operate during this negotiation and work to generate specialized 
knowledge by framing interpretations of ‘urban’ flood, the models held and employed by 
participants didn’t allow for the successful transfer of knowledge or for inferences to be 
made (Quinn and Holland 1987: 6). This is possibly due to the varied intentions between 
TRCA and public groups. For example, much like the distance expressed by TRCA in 
their short-term response strategy during non-river flood risk, the intent of their ‘urban’ 
definition is a way to rationalize their position of unaccountability. As the examples 
above show, however, public groups do not share the same intent as TRCA, nor do they 
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have a particular goal in mind when defining ‘urban’ other than to describe where it 
happens. In keeping with Whorf (1956), these alternative conceptions of ‘urban’ flood 
illustrate the power of habitual thought in shaping understandings of flood phenomena, 
and subsequently, descriptions of it and reactions toward it. In other words, the differing 
understandings with respect to ‘urban’ flood highlight how words constitute different 
things for different people using different mental schemas. Altogether, these different 
ways of conceiving the TRCA definition contributes to the incoherence in non-river flood 
risk discourse, which means there is a fracturing in the relations between official 
understandings and those subjectively held understandings of participants. While 
Macgilchrist (2016) points to these fractures as spaces that can be utilized to experiment 
with ways of developing coherence, I would argue the logics utilized for sustaining 
current management strategies and solutions, and thus the inattention to early warning 
non-river flood risk policy, have benefitted thus far from this incoherence in the 
discourse.  
Perceived Causes for Non-River Flooding  
TRCA has a singular stance regarding the causes of ‘urban’ or non-river flooding in 
urban areas. According to their website30, ‘urban flooding’ is caused by the limited 
capacity of existing storm water infrastructure or drainage systems. Again, TRCA’s 
cultural model situates their interests and homogenizes their beliefs surrounding causes as 
physical and primarily infrastructure-related. Contrary to the official position of TRCA, 
public groups who participated in this study identified three main causes for non-river 
flooding in Toronto, including: heavy rain, blocked sewers or improper drainage, and the 
                                               
30 https://trca.ca/conservation/flood-risk-management/understand/ 
  
181 
 
increase of impermeable surfaces in the City, which suggests an alternative model is 
relied upon by public groups interpreting causes. More specifically, the data reveal 
publics’ understanding built upon clear connections each made between three interacting 
factors of meteorology, infrastructure, and hydrological impact, regardless of the category 
assigned to the participant. These findings illustrate how publics’ understanding of causes 
is multi-faceted, linked with atmospheric condition and with notions of urbanization, and 
at times where causes and impacts perceived by some as one in the same. Participants 
elaborated on the three main causes identified above by adding that tree roots penetrating 
and blocking pipes contributed to their ideas about poor drainage, as did ideas about the 
inadequacies of an aged underground system in Toronto. Institutional representatives and 
communicators extended their beliefs to include poor land-use planning. For example, 
communicator Kevin from the CBC demonstrated the link he makes between 
development or land-use planning and flooding when he said:   
 
Telephone Interview 
July 12, 2016 
 
Kevin: When I walk around downtown Toronto now and I see a condo building go up --  
I think wow (.)  there's an entire city block flipped up on its side -- 
and they didn't add any more storm drains below it -- you know.   
And I just look at that and I go -- oh. 
I don't care how green the roof is.    
It's just a nightmare for urban {referring to non-river} flooding. 
 
To which he followed up with: 
 
Kevin: It's just even when I have like a non-severe thunderstorm  
that is producing less than 50 mm of rain in 24 hours --  
or less than 50 mm of rain in an hour --  
you can still totally get under passes in this city that get washed out.  
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One of the underpasses Kevin referred to is at Lower Simcoe St., the newly emerging 
flood vulnerable area right in the heart of the City’s downtown/sports entertainment 
district referred to earlier (Figure 8). It runs below the train tracks, is adjacent to Union 
Station and within a few hundred metres of the CN Tower, the Roger’s Centre, the 
Scotiabank Arena, and Riley’s Aquarium, to name several nearby popular tourist 
attractions. Connor, another communicator but with a different major television network, 
also commented on the effects of urban planning and growth in Toronto, or as he called 
it: the ‘vertical city’ at this highly travelled underpass. “It {referring to the Lower Simcoe 
underpass} doesn’t manage water well and it doesn’t look that deep. But every single 
time there’s a flood event, there’s like a car that gets lost ((he chuckles)) in the Simcoe 
underpass.”   
Perceptions of Responsibility for Urban Non-River Flood Warning  
Along with differing social perceptions for ‘urban flooding’, its causes and impacts, 
responses given by institutional representatives, on-air communicators and members of 
the general public regarding the question of ‘who might be responsible’ were numerous 
and found to be linked with perceived causes and impacts. In total, all but two individuals 
from the public groups responded to identify a group or organization they imagined 
accountable for such service. That most participants identified an agency as responsible 
hints at the lasting effects of the welfare state’s risk management approach described 
earlier. The acknowledgement of responsibility does suggest that policy engagement, 
both current river flood policy in Toronto as well as past policies publics have 
encountered, has likely provided a template and benchmark for what these individuals 
imagine to be possible when it comes to non-river early flood warning. Thus, while 
TRCA relied upon a cultural model structured by no expectation and was likely invoked 
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to rationalize their organization’s behavior against warning, public groups’ ideas 
surrounding responsibility were cognitively structured and guided by the belief that 
someone would be providing that information. Most notably, many of the institutional 
representatives and communicators who participated in this study mentioned TRCA as 
sharing in warning responsibility or having the responsibility entirely, which is counter to 
the official mandate of this conservation authority. 
Reported below are the multiple and varied connections made by public groups 
between causes, impacts and responsibility. These linkages illustrate the inter-relatedness 
behind the decision concerning who audiences expect to provide a head’s up was being 
given as well as demonstrates the interactive nature their cognitive reasoning is built 
upon. To begin, individuals who reported heavy rain as a cause tended to perceive ECCC 
as responsible, and those who considered poor drainage or impermeability as causes 
tended to perceive municipal departments as responsible. Two general public 
participants, Joseph and Leonard, who perceived the combination of rain, poor drainage, 
and impermeability as causes, imagined ECCC and municipal departments as jointly 
responsible for providing them with advanced warning. Leonard indicated a third group, 
media, as having a role, while Joseph similarly indicated a third group, the Ministry of 
Transportation, where each would be responsible for working with ECCC and municipal 
departments to notify public of urban non-river flooding. In two cases, rain was 
considered the sole cause and ECCC was imagined to be the group responsible for 
providing advanced notice together with municipal departments as well as either the 
police or media, as cited by Maggie and Donald, respectively. Another general public 
participant, Kate, reported heavy rain, poor drainage and impermeability as causes but did 
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not include ECCC as responsible; instead, this construction worker imagined municipal 
departments and media as the two groups who she expected to notify her in the event a 
flood was to take place.  
Noah, who indicated poor drainage and impermeability as the causes of non-river 
urban flooding indicated municipal departments as solely accountable, yet interestingly 
he highlighted the ease with which such a responsibility could fall through the cracks. 
Rather than it being the job of some random and anonymous government employee or 
department that might play the “oh it’s not my area card”, Noah said, he imagined a City 
Councillor “designated to my area, who I am familiar with, someone I voted in” as the 
municipal representative who should give him the head’s up. He followed this with, “If I 
got an email from her {referring to the City Councillor} and it was directed to my area of 
Toronto, I’d listen.” Ingrid and Heather, two women with grown children living in the 
suburbs of Toronto, reported poor drainage as the main cause, however, contrary to most 
general public participants who imagined one or more groups as responsible, the women 
imagined no one to be responsible. Instead, the two perceived that “people have to be 
sensible. A large part of society is more interested in blaming other and not taking 
responsibility”, as noted by Ingrid during the group interview, and Heather agreed, which 
speaks to their perception that individuals themselves are accountable for knowing when 
urban non-river floods are materializing.  
 Institutional representatives were less consistent in the overlap than the general 
public group. For example, where rain and poor drainage were perceived as causes and 
ECCC and municipal departments were often both deemed responsible by the general 
public group, institutional representatives who highlighted these same causes tended to 
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report ECCC and another group altogether as responsible, such as TRCA, media, or the 
Office of Emergency Management, or a combination of these three. On the other hand, 
one representative from a local private transit authority who indicated rain and either poor 
drainage or impermeability as causes, commented that ECCC alone was the group 
responsible. In a similar way, a representative from the Office of Emergency 
Management who reported rain as a cause indicated their office as the sole group 
responsible for offering advanced notice of flooding. In the only two other instances of 
self-accountability, Oakley, the representative from the Water Authority imagined the 
City’s Strategic Communications Department as the wise choice for offering advanced 
warning. In his words, “they {referring to Strategic Communications group} would be 
interpreting Environment Canada and other flood-related information and then in a 
perfect world, ideally they would then be assessing the threat and then parlaying a 
message to all of the different groups.” Likewise, Tim, the representative from the 
municipal Roads Department indicated the City as accountable, yet for this employee 
warning communication depended on where the problem, or flooding, existed. For 
example, if flooding was anticipated on surface roads then the City’s Road Maintenance 
department should be involved, according to Tim. To this he added, if flooding was 
anticipated in the subway system then Toronto’s Transit Commission would play a role. 
Stanley, a manager and more senior colleague to Tim over at the Roads Department 
indicated poor drainage and impermeability as causes for urban non-river flooding yet 
reported TRCA as the sole group responsible for providing advanced warning.  
Similar to the general public group, communicators often associated the causes of 
rain and poor drainage or impermeability with ECCC and municipal departments as 
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mutually responsible for providing a warning. Kevin, one of the communicators at CBC 
also imagined the Office of Emergency Management as sharing the responsibility with 
ECCC and municipalities, however. Conversely, ECCC’s Public Weather Communicator 
perceived rain as the cause and perceived municipalities as accountable but not ECCC.  
This communicator who represents the national meteorological agency imagined “a 
combination of local municipal officials and local conservation authority” as jointly 
accountable for giving a head’s up to the public, not the group of federally-based 
meteorologists he belongs to, nor someone in his role as public weather communicator. 
Beatrice, the CBC journalist interviewed, also perceived rain as the cause of urban non-
river flooding yet mentioned municipal departments as responsible for warning. In her 
words: 
Second Cup Coffee Company 
July 16, 2016 
 
Beatrice: I think naturally -- 
when I hear Environment Canada warning for all of this rain -- 
and TRCA is warning about the Don River.  
That's when I go to the city (.) like what's happening to the roads -- 
I feel like I don't need Environment Canada to tell me what it's going to do 
to the infrastructure. 
  
Thus, according to this participant, ECCC gives the rain warning, TRCA provides the 
warning for river flooding, and infrastructure representatives would give the urban non-
river flood warning. The communicator representing CTV highlighted the combination of 
rain and poor drainage as causes, yet neither ECCC nor municipal departments were 
perceived accountable; instead, for this participant TRCA was described as being the 
single group responsible for providing the public with advanced notice. Likewise, a 
briefing meteorologist at the Weather Network who cited poor drainage as the main cause 
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for non-river flooding labelled TRCA as the group she would be looking to for the head’s 
up.  
The discussion on responsibility shows that participants’ beliefs were often linked 
to causes yet at times, they also were linked with impacts and where the impacts were 
being experienced. This is important because it shows the blurriness of urban non-river 
flooding as a hydro-meteorological risk and the tendency to merge the processes of cause 
and effect together when imagining who might be responsible for pre-flood warning. 
Second, participants reported any number of combinations regarding responsibility: 
ECCC as the singular agency, TRCA as the singular agency, ECCC and TRCA together 
or in conjunction with a third, municipalities as solely responsible, and in the rare cases- 
no agency as responsible, which lends insight into the complexities surrounding risk and 
perception. Of particular interest was the lack of self-accountability alongside 
declarations made for other groups deemed responsible, save for the two women 
mentioned. For example, the institutional representatives, a few of whom are City 
employees, and on-air communicators rarely perceived themselves as accountable for 
providing urban non-river flood warnings; only three of the 15 institutional 
representatives interviewed and zero of the communicators perceived themselves to have 
a role in giving the general public advanced warning. Ironically, media (a group in which 
the communicators interviewed for this study belong) was often cited by general public 
participants as the group they’d be looking to tell them about urban non-river flooding 
before it happens. This shows that these hydro-meteorological risks present as much 
dynamism as do the ideas regarding who participants perceive would be accountable to 
them or their organization for giving a head’s up.  
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Conclusion  
For over six decades, the discourse surrounding flood risk in Toronto has centred 
primarily on urban river flooding. Since Hurricane Hazel in 1954 public groups in the 
City have benefitted from TRCA’s well-established urban river Flood Warning policy 
and formalized early warning practices. Launching early warning river flood policy 
accomplished several things on the ground and at the level of discourse: it was a 
classificatory act that officially identified urban river flood risk as problematic, which 
made it amenable to authoritative action; it assisted in creating specialized knowledge for 
TRCA flood forecasters by shaping their perceptions and everyday patterns of behavior; 
and this contributed to unique cultural model for this epistemic group which gave 
institutional authority to river flood risk as critical to manage through early warning. 
Once the policy was deployed and the discourse was put into practice, the agreement 
government made with publics to manage river flood risk and the repeated issuing of 
early warnings set up the terms of important reference and the relationship between 
government and its citizens, legitimized how river flood risk was to be managed, and also 
by whom. In keeping with Shore and Wright (2011: 1), urban river Flood Warning policy 
and the related implementation processes created new social and semantic spaces, new 
relations and new webs of meaning for TRCA flood forecasters and the various public 
groups they serve. Van Dijk (2014: 165) reminds us that this now historical system of 
practice enabled by early warning policy, or the myriad of micro-level actions among and 
across social groups in Toronto that take place in times of river flooding, was structured 
and continues to be structured by discourse at the macro-level, and accomplished through 
interaction. The mingling of discourse, models and knowledge, as mediated by social 
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practices related to policy, generated and continues to generate an ordering of people and 
of risk and the relationship between these two and government.  
The near-disaster at 501 Alliance St. is one of the latest in a growing number of 
urban non-river flood events in Toronto, and the headlines regarding this event last 
August represent a shift in the broader flood risk conversation in the City. Despite the 
comparable social and financial consequences resulting from non-river flooding in recent 
years, the emergence of non-river flood risk and its related discourse on management has 
not enabled similar early warning policy possibilities as river flooding did in 1954. 
Currently, no formal early warning policy exists to account for non-river flood risk 
situations in Toronto, and as such, public groups are left on their own to protect 
themselves against the sudden onset of flooding, a threat for which they are neither 
experts in meteorology nor hydrology. Inspired by the way these comparable risks have 
generated discourses that allow for different early warning policy possibilities, in this 
paper I initiated a discussion focusing on how and why particular norms, imperatives, 
values and objectives related to past and current policy decisions came to be. In other 
words, this effort examined policy at the level of discourse. Particularly by emphasizing 
coherence as a mechanism for general and specialized social cognition, I examined how 
discourse makes possible different structures and rationalities to emerge, and the various 
ways they re-emerge, in everyday life as social representations of broadly shared 
knowledge.  
As the discussion showed, the non-river flood risk discourse in Toronto includes 
physical challenges that discursively create the perception of meteorological 
impossibility. The theme of impossibility has created space in the discourse for 
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alternative policy possibilities, including ad-hoc early warning practices, short-term 
response strategies and long-term mitigation solutions. These alternatives and the 
overwhelming concentration on this trajectory of non-river flood risk management 
demonstrates a degree of social acceptability, however, which has contributed to a type of 
‘organized irresponsibility’ and of regulatory neglect, one that has permitted early 
warning to exist beyond the realm of public accountability. Removing non-river flood 
early warnings from the government domain has negative implications because it renders 
public groups alone to prepare and manage a risk that has neither been formally identified 
nor communicated. Echoing van Dijk (2014), in the City of Toronto, publics are expected 
to know what non-river flood risk is, know that the risk is coming, and know how to 
prepare in the moment against potential impacts brought on by the risk, without having 
the knowledge available to them for generating understanding about the risk. The near-
drowning of the two men in the elevator on August 8, 2018 exemplifies the repercussions 
of removing early warning for non-river flood risk from the domain of government and 
the devastating consequences that can arise from this approach to non-river flood risk 
management.  
As much as the increased frequency in non-river flooding has contributed to an 
emerging non-river flood risk discourse and one not focused on early warning policy, the 
multiple social perceptions regarding ‘urban flooding’, the unique linkages made by 
participants between its causes and impacts, and their differing beliefs about 
accountability revealed considerable incoherence in the broader conversation. In other 
words, the results illuminated that there is no coherent way for describing non-river 
flooding, no common understanding regarding its causes and impacts, no consistent 
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understanding that this risk remains unpolicied, and rather an overwhelming belief that 
early warning would be given by some agency. These differences were accounted for by 
the differing cultural and mental models utilized by people to unpack meaning, which 
demonstrates the interconnectedness between knowledge and mental models, or ways of 
thinking. I borrowed from Macgilchrist’s (2016) post-foundational critique of discourse 
studies to represent this incoherence as a fissure in the non-river flood discourse, one that 
I summarize here to exacerbate the challenges brought on by government irresponsibility, 
or lack of early warning, and amplify the risk for public groups when faced with non-
river flood threat.  
The fissure that was uncovered in this study is a reality experienced on the ground 
by everyday publics living and working in Toronto, more commonly now than ever 
before, and especially for those two men who were trapped in the elevator. The fracturing 
is a reality made possible by the structural features of discourse and the rationalities that 
contribute to its production and reproduction in society. This anthropological 
investigation justifies a closer look at the fracturing to see how meanings can be used to 
build more broadly shared knowledge and give rise to new policy practices.  
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation examines the interactional relationship between policy and risk in 
different weather and flood contexts. Each chapter focuses on unique policy situations 
and risk dilemmas. In Chapter Two, I investigated how meteorologists on the forecast 
floor navigate and manage weather risk when atmospheric conditions fall below ECCC 
policy’s official ‘severe’ threshold criteria. In Chapter Three, I looked closely at TRCA 
flood forecaster negotiation of Flood Warning policy during an ambiguous river flood 
situation that did meet TRCA’s official Flood Warning threshold criteria. Finally, in 
Chapter 4, I examined the broader discursive construction of urban river and non-river 
flood risk and how those threats have evolved over time in the discourse to produce and 
permit different early warning, or risk management, possibilities. Through a multi-sited, 
mixed-methodological approach I traced connections and gathered multiple, diverse 
perspectives from a number of actors involved in implementing, communicating, and 
using weather and flood information, or the manifestations of policy. These viewpoints 
were analyzed through the theoretical lenses of interaction and facework, mental models 
and discourse. What resulted from these micro and macro-scale analyses was a thick 
description of how and why, through the policy negotiation and appropriation process, 
meteorologists, TRCA flood forecasters and public groups perceive, assess, and manage 
risk in multiple ways.  
This research has enhanced previous understandings of policy and risk as situated, 
relational and with abilities to socially organize (Shore and Wright 2011; Wedel et al. 
2005). ECCC and TRCA have inherited the social floating categories of risk, which have 
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become embedded in their respective social, cultural and organizational thinking and 
their everyday practices. In keeping with Mary Douglas (1992), Åsa Boholm (2015) and 
Manning (2014: 283) the cases described in the preceding chapters illustrate how these 
elements blend together and influence ECCC meteorologists’ and TRCA flood 
forecasters’ interpretations of policy and their negotiation processes during warning 
generation. This situatedness is akin to the multiple layers experts must work through in 
order to assess risk upon which policy is applied situationally through processes of expert 
negotiation. At the same time, policy and risk processes were shown to socially order and 
organize by coordinating people and activities, especially in meteorological and flood 
forecasting organizational settings. It did so by binding the expert to certain workflows 
and practices, directing their interactions among colleagues, and enacting certain decision 
possibilities and risk management solutions, depending on the situation. The outcomes of 
these interactions and risk decisions were shown to effect how experts perceive 
themselves as well as how they present themselves in the workspace. In this way, policy 
shapes work practices and constructs relationships experts have with others as well as 
with themselves. Paying special attention to flooding as opposed to other weather and 
hazards, the results of this research shed unique light on policy and risk as it relates to the 
effects of weather (rather than weather itself) that materialize across geographic space 
and on situations where multiple agencies are involved in risk assessment and 
management practices. 
In addition to building on previous scholarship, the context in which this effort 
was undertaken opened the anthropology of policy and risk up to new and valuable 
perspectives. Particularly, the insights gleaned from this research contribute to the 
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theoretical domains of policy and risk by advancing our understanding of the influential 
role of interaction in shaping these concepts and their related processes, and the effect 
interaction has in policy-work for propagating risk in unintended ways. Early in the 
dissertation I showed how working within the constraints of policy, meteorologists 
interacted relationally with the atmosphere, other experts on the forecast floor, the mental 
image publics have of them, along with the image they have of their publics, to construct 
and manage risk. There I argued that these interactions framed the management of high 
risk weather events in so much as they assisted in the development and communication of 
risk notifications, or meteorologists’ pursuit of operational success, as well as influenced 
meteorologists’ perceptions of achievement, both organizationally and personally. 
Relatedly, the discussion of alternative risk management solutions revealed the 
importance of habitual thought, coherence, framing and mental models on risk (Benford 
2013; van Dijk 2014, Whorf 1956), and the ways these co-mingle to produce varied 
understandings and responses in public groups. In saying this, it was shown how 
alternative notifications must be thoughtfully framed in order to bridge understandings 
and how, when carefully articulated, information will have greater resonance. At the 
same time, the findings revealed that in some cases, attempts to create shared 
conceptualization are no match for the alternative mental model employed by individuals 
to make sense of risk situations.  
In the case of flood forecasters and key recipients of their information, I showed 
that interactions reinforced and challenged people’s ideas, expedited as well as delayed 
actions, and created effects within and beyond the walls of the immediate forecast 
environment. Chiefly, I argued flood forecaster negotiation and deliberation played a 
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critical role in in their implementation of urban river flood policy, which had the real 
effects of limiting the usefulness of the notification as well as weakening the established 
relationship between their group and key recipients. In other words, expert negotiation in 
this case revealed the instrumental role uncertainty has in shaping conceptualizations and 
management of risk and how these elements combine to influence improvisations of 
policy and creative agency on the part of the flood forecasters. Collectively, a focus on 
interaction revealed the triangulation of uncertainty, risk and policy-work and the 
trickling and unintended consequences that can result. 
Lastly, I examined the evolution of different yet related flood risk discourses and 
argued that current non-river flood risk management in Toronto, coupled with the 
incoherence surrounding non-river flood risk, has left the general public on their own to 
prepare and protect themselves against the sudden onset of flooding in Toronto, a threat 
for which they are neither experts in meteorology nor hydrology. This chapter veered 
from the micro-level analyses of the previous chapters to focus instead on policy and risk 
at the level of discourse. Taking a step back and capturing the macro-level perspective 
helped to illustrate the scale of the policy and risk space, it showed how discourses are 
produced and perpetuated interactionally, and it exposed how these discourses shape the 
classification of policied and unpolicied risks. To that end, a look at discourse revealed 
how knowledges are produced and the influence of mental models and coherence on 
these understandings. This examination showed how, in the context of flooding, 
discourse assists in the identification and classification of risk, which has in turn 
influenced the ways in which risk becomes officially managed or not.  
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The comparative analysis underscored how policy and risk are social objects 
mobilized through negotiation and management processes. This is to say that as much as 
policy stands for the official rules that may be written on paper in a manual, it is itself an 
idea or set of ideas. The ideas travel through space to multiple sites and come to life, so to 
speak, by the actions of people negotiating them and appropriating them through various 
mechanisms, including verbal face-to-face, over the phone and text-based conversations. 
To that end, this particular investigation brought greater clarity to Nielsen’s (2011: 69) 
notion of policy as an interconnected triad of themes. Including risk in her definition, the 
examination of flood discourses in Toronto revealed that risk-based policies emerge from 
experiences which inspire political rationalities that then inscribe everyday practices and 
methods for the purpose of governing and guiding people, which in turn, contribute to 
differing perceptions, experiences and forms of conduct in those who are governed. 
Reflecting upon Nielsen, the case illustrated how momentum in one strand of the triad 
influenced others, generating shaping effects to neighbouring strands. Altogether, the 
case of policied and unpolicied risk revealed how in the context of flooding, events and 
their impacts inspired political rationalities, which then culminated in policy in one 
circumstance but not in the other with deleterious and unintended consequences.  
 Altogether, the research complements existing literature by elaborating a 
dramaturgical and frame analytic perspective on the management of meteorological 
uncertainty. It also extends empirical research on meteorological uncertainty management 
and communication from weather to river and non-river flood forecasting practices, 
however the endeavour is not without limitations. For example, the geographic focus and 
relatively small sample size of participants is somewhat of a disadvantage of this research 
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in so much as the results are not generalizable beyond the cases presented here. Having 
said that, this is as much a strength of the study in the sense that keeping the project 
localized and looking densely at policy and risk in a handful of different organizational 
and urban residential environments enabled me to build from the ground-up a detailed 
accounting of perspectives. Furthermore, the approach included real-time, micro-scale 
interactions and involved, in the one case, a comprehensive view of the flood prediction 
process from its atmospheric beginnings to various interpretations and actions taken by 
publics in response to the notification. Therefore, despite the lack of generalizability, this 
method generated rich and contextual understandings of policy and its implementation as 
well risk and its management, and helped to expose subtle differences between and across 
groups, which uncovered unexpected insights.  
In considering future research, worthwhile ideas include: (1) a closer look at 
expert interaction during large scale events characterized as certain and managed via 
policied risk to explore how certainty shapes negotiation and deliberation the same or 
differently in these circumstances, and with what effects on communication and public 
responses; (2) an examination of interaction in the social media environment and how 
policy and risk are experienced differently, particularly how risk propagates differently 
over platforms such as Instagram where videos are often used to share ideas; and (3) a 
national or international comparison of urban non-river flood management practices to 
highlight different approaches and to shed light on the ways different organizations 
navigate perceptions of meteorological impossibility to provide residents with advanced 
warning of imminent non-river flood threat.  
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Overall, as the experience of unpredictable weather and urban flood risk is 
predicted to increase, the findings from the three analyses herein offer both theoretical 
significance as well as useful insight for weather and flood policy-makers and policy 
implementers in Toronto to consider as they look toward enhancing policy and risk 
management initiatives for the protection of the publics they serve. 
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Appendix A: Participant List 
Participant Category Pseudonym Organization/Description 
ECCC   
1 Norma Meteorologist- ECCC 
2  Meteorologist- ECCC 
3  Meteorologist- ECCC 
4 Elon Meteorologist- ECCC 
5  Meteorologist- ECCC 
6 Elaine Meteorologist- ECCC 
7  Meteorologist- ECCC 
8 Samuel Meteorologist- ECCC 
9  Meteorologist- ECCC 
10  Meteorologist- ECCC 
11  Meteorologist- ECCC 
12  Meteorologist- ECCC 
13  Meteorologist- ECCC 
14 Sam Meteorologist- ECCC 
15  Meteorologist- ECCC 
16  Meteorologist- ECCC 
17 Sadie Meteorologist- ECCC 
18 Hazel Meteorologist- ECCC 
19  Meteorologist- ECCC 
20  Meteorologist- ECCC 
21  Meteorologist- ECCC 
22  Meteorologist brought in for TO2015 
23 Nash Meteorologist brought in for TO2015 
24  Meteorologist brought in for TO2015 
25  Meteorologist brought in for TO2015 
26 Benny Meteorologist- ECCC  
   
TRCA   
1 Olivia Flood Duty Officer 
2 Stuart Flood Forecaster 
3 Nancy Flood Forecaster 
4 Ed Chief Flood Duty Officer 
5 Bobby Flood Forecaster 
6  Flood Forecaster 
7  Flood Forecaster 
8  Flood Forecaster 
9  Flood Forecaster 
10  Flood Forecaster 
11  Flood Forecaster 
12  Flood Forecaster 
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GENERAL PUBLIC (PUBXX)   
1 Theo Sport Manager 
2 Rebecca Sport Manager 
3 Brooklyn Sport Manager 
4 Gabriel Sport Manager 
5 Nasir Sport Manager 
6  Sport Manager 
7 Stephanie Sport Manager 
8 Lucas Sport Manager 
9 Umberto Sport Manager 
10 Cathy Resident 
11 Donald Resident 
12  Resident 
13  Resident 
14 Ginny Resident 
15  Resident 
16 Ingrid Resident 
17 Joseph Resident  
18 Kate Resident 
19 Leonard Resident 
20 Maggie Resident 
21 Noah Resident 
   
INSTITUTIONAL 
REPRESENTATIVES 
(INSTXX) 
  
1  Ron Local Private Business (LPB) located 
along flood vulnerable Bayview 
Extension 
2   Local Private Business (LPB) located 
along flood vulnerable Bayview 
Extension 
3  Municipal Emergency Management 
4   Municipal Emergency Management 
5  Municipal Emergency Management 
6  Municipal Emergency Management 
7 Oakley Municipal Water Authority 
8  Sawyer Municipal Hydro Authority 
9   Local Private Transit Authority 
10   Local Private Transit Authority 
11   Local Public School Authority 
12  Josh Municipal Road Authority- East 
13   Municipal Road Authority- East 
14  Stanley Municipal Road Authority- West 
15  Tim Municipal Road Authority- West1 
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COMMUNICATORS 
(COMMXX) 
  
1  Public Weather Communicator ECCC 
2  CTV meteorologist 
3 Kevin CBC meteorologist 
4 Beatrice CBC journalist 
5  TWN 
6  TWN 
7  TWN 
8  TWN 
9  TWN 
10 Connor CP24 meteorologist 
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Appendix B: Special Weather Statement (SWS) issued on Tuesday, July 14, 2015 
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Appendix C : Transcript of TRCA Flood Forecaster Recorded Interaction  
Transcription Key 
 
[ ] overlapping speech 
: lengthened segment 
__ speaker emphasis 
-- brief pause 
(.) one second pause 
? rising intonation 
! exclamation 
. final intonation 
(( )) non-verbal gestures 
< > acronyms 
{ } reconstructed speech 
XX indicates personal name 
 
Speakers: 
Ed- Chief Flood Duty Officer (FDO) 
Olivia- FDO 
Stuart- Management/Flood forecaster 
Nancy- Flood forecaster 
 
A: October 28, 2015 at TRCA; approximately 1:49pm.  
Data: fieldnotes 
 
Olivia:  So we’re not issuing the Warning right now? 1 
Ed:  Holding off on the Flood Warning. 2 
Nancy:  ((popping head over the partition)) So we’re just not going to do it? 3 
Ed:   I’m thinking we’re going to wait. 4 
Nancy:  So far only Todmorden at risk.  5 
What about the extension? 6 
Ed:  Flooded 7 
Nancy:  We could speak to what is flooding and tone down the --  8 
Stuart:  you could also say Flood Warning based on. 9 
Ed:  We have the Watch out to cover Bayview.  10 
I’m thinking with the Warning -- at least right now --  11 
to transportation that it {the water is} leveled -- receded but could climb.  12 
You know what I mean, 13 
Nancy:  Kind of wishy washy.  14 
We either issue or don’t issue. 15 
Ed:   That’s the thing -- I’m not 100% sure the DVP is going to flood.  16 
Right now we’re at 76.3m.  17 
We’re at .4m away and it’s tapering off. 18 
Nancy:  We don’t have any rules around it.  19 
The challenge has always been the flood location.  20 
 Since July 8th -- issuing covers off any questions that may occur. 21 
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Stuart:  If I were operating alone -- if we were 40cm away from being flooded  22 
I would call over to XX {the local private transit authority}  23 
and ask them what they are seeing on the ground.  24 
Are their tracks flooded? 25 
Use Bayview extension flooding -- tracks flooded -- and potential for DVP 26 
as rationale. 27 
 
 
 
B: October 28, 2015 at TRCA; approximately 2:00pm 
Data: audio-recorded talk 
 
…..Olivia returns from placing a phone call to the local private transit authority… 
Olivia:  So: I got off the phone with them {Local Private Transit Authority} 28 
U::m: they’re not going to run- they’ve cancelled  29 
[those tracks]  30 
Ed:  [They’re not going to run them?] 31 
Olivia:  They’re going to run them --  [around]  32 
Ed:       [Okay]  33 
Olivia:  a different way [instead]  34 
Ed:   [Because of the flooding?] 35 
Olivia:  U::m yes 36 
Ed:  [Because they have] 37 
Olivia:  [Yes] 38 
So they confirmed that there was water on the tracks.  39 
They said about halfway up the tracks not completely submerged 40 
10 feet {high} on either side. 41 
Stuart:  10 -- feet (.) 42 
Oh oh oh -- makes sense makes sense 43 
So 10 feet on either side --  [so halfway] 44 
Olivia:      [Yeah] 45 
Stuart: Okay -- so there’s this much water on the track -- spreading 10 feet under 46 
them. 47 
It’s not completely submerged -- but that’s enough for them to 48 
That’s flooding. 49 
Ed:  Did they mention water levels? 50 
Olivia:  Did they give -- or 51 
Stuart:  Yeah. 52 
Ed:  Do we know water levels? 53 
Olivia:  They never mentioned anything -- like that -- 54 
  they did mention sending field staff out to -- u::m - confirm 55 
Ed:   Okay -- and see if we can get pictures, 56 
not today -- maybe tomorrow give them a call and see if we can get photos  57 
just to see where it is.  58 
And exact location -- so we see that.  59 
{to Stuart} I absolutely see your point of view? (.) 60 
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but in the past and I can do that -- like we can issue the message 61 
{Warning} 62 
and it’s a different set of eyes right? from what we see  63 
based on what we’ve done in the past. 64 
My hesitation about the Warning is -- 65 
I’m so associated with the DVP that this is the biggest u::m  66 
the most u::m -- I guess -- highest level Warning that we have right,  67 
and that’s always been what my hesitation is  68 
but I absolutely see your point of view.  69 
Stuart:  I defer to you. 70 
Ed:   Yeah -- Yeah. 71 
Stuart:  Again -- you’re the decision maker today so -- 72 
and not that one that one is more right than the other.  73 
Ed:   No -- but we need -- I need a different  74 
like reading u::h reading the actual definition of the Flood Warning, 75 
Stuart:  Yeah. 76 
Ed:  That makes sense what you’re saying.  77 
But going to back to like we issue this? to me -- it’s a -- it’s like a bigger -- 78 
issue.  79 
Stuart:  Okay 80 
Ed:  It’s like u::h I see the Warning being more -- August or -- July 8th right? 81 
but that’s but that’s not to say that it might 82 
Stuart:  But the good thing is that we’ve confirmed with [XX] 83 
Ed:              [There’s flooding] 84 
Stuart:  That they know 85 
Ed:  Yes. 86 
Stuart:  And that they have -- taken -- action to go around it. 87 
  So at least -- like from a covering of our butts perspective?  88 
Right? 89 
at least that’s there. 90 
Again -- I will -- defer to you -- your experience on that 91 
The only thing I’m thinking of is do we want to --  92 
make it clear [right?] 93 
Ed:    [What] areas are flooding 94 
Stuart:  That that area is and that area hasn’t you know what I mean? 95 
  like there is some rationale from from the train. 96 
  Second of all – that – other people - right, know that it’s  97 
 and I guess the other question is what about the DVP  98 
because if we do actually think there is potential for it [then] 99 
Ed:            [then] 100 
  Then we -- contact the right people -- for them to -- be -- on standby, that 101 
you know we have to give -- just like with the u::h lower u::h Bayview 102 
right? 103 
  we gave head’s up that this is -- this is going to happen -- right? 104 
Stuart:  Yeah that’s true. 105 
Ed:  Be ready for it and again with the DVP -- it’s like it looks like right now  106 
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it’s not as as imminent as it was earlier today 107 
Stuart:  Yeah 108 
Ed:  Because of the lull in rainfalls but there’s still a potential right? 109 
Stuart:  My concern is that it’s 2 o’clock right? 110 
Ed:   Exactly - we’re in rush [hour.] 111 
Stuart:       [we’re in] 112 
Like at four -- it’s going to be so much harder for them to go in at 4:30 -- 113 
Ed:  Yeah. 114 
Stuart:  And close it {the DVP} than it is to tell people at [3:45] 115 
Ed:         [Stay off the roads] 116 
Stuart:  don’t take the DVP home right? 117 
Ed:  Yeah 118 
Stuart:  So that’s the -- like operationally -- right? 119 
is there a benefit right?  120 
to saying -- you know going into Flood Warning as in --  121 
we’ve already experienced it here -- and a reminder that there is potential  122 
on the DV--  123 
And then when we say potential flooding like like potential -- then 124 
people right? 125 
{cross talk} 126 
Stuart:  What I would just rather have people do is no matter what 127 
people should just shouldn’t -- the action -- if I’m downtown right? 128 
like what is the message that -- 129 
that Toronto Transportation would want to have people downtown know 130 
right? 131 
and I would say -- just in case take a different route home. 132 
Because we know if more rain is going to come -- 133 
and we’re this close ((thumb and pointer finger scrunched together)) -- 134 
And we have to do -- 135 
we don’t want to have to do it when there’s people on the road. 136 
We want fewer people on the road --  137 
that means fewer people diverting onto that side right? 138 
and that means fewer people taking Avenue taking whatever 139 
just -- not even going onto that area 140 
And again -- I tr -- 141 
I de -- 142 
Knowing that one is no more right than the other 143 
I’m just -- [voicing]  144 
Ed:     [That] frame of mind is good.  145 
  The message we need to send is -- the potential and not give the direction 146 
  To do it. 147 
Stuart:  I agree -- no no I agree so just and then but the potential for that so -- 148 
  That that -- again -- leave it to that  149 
  And maybe that’s where the wording in that {inaudible} goes in 150 
  leave it leave it to that that’s my -- my stance I don’t know 151 
Ed:   I don’t want to put details in the actual message u::m [rather I’d] 152 
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Stuart:           [Except that] 153 
  We’ve seen -- 154 
except that flooding has been reported on the tracks at Bayview Extension 155 
Ed:   Yeah yeah. 156 
And- that’s a good point -- there’s potential there but I also don’t want to 157 
  I’m wishy washy with this too what I’m afraid of later is -- you know -- 158 
we’re so focused on this area there -- 159 
obviously there hasn’t been any reports anywhere else? --  160 
but are we going to get [slammed later] 161 
Stuart:      [I think you could say flooding is reported here] 162 
  Water levels 163 
Ed:  And then say  164 
Stuart:  No no -- in those areas and say water levels are high throughout the 165 
rivers and streams throughout the GTA. 166 
And then that covers it off and says {inaudible} 167 
Ed:  Yeah. 168 
  You know what -- let’s issue the message. 169 
  And I’ll talk to XX{Nancy} and confirm things because of the -- 170 
  Previous -- the the -- you know the frame of mind that we were always in 171 
{inaudible} 172 
But that’s a good point 173 
We’re not very u::m -- we haven’t issued a lot of Warnings ((giggle)) 174 
Stuart:  Fair fair 175 
Ed:  So it’s something -- I guess -- we need to u::h figure out the details 176 
 
C: October 28, 2015 at TRCA; approximately 2:10pm 
Data: fieldnotes 
 
Stuart and Ed continue to discuss reasons for and against issuing a Flood Warning and 
shortly after 2pm Ed decides to go ahead and upgrade the Watch, but then hesitates. 
Huddled altogether, the group continues:  
 
Ed:   We should still contact Toronto Transportation. 177 
Nancy:  Is the fuzzy process all clear in your head? 178 
Stuart:  What is the trigger? 179 
Nancy:  Easier to issue a flood warning --  180 
balancing begins earlier.  181 
When you’re in the flood warning situation -- you’re already in it -- 182 
you’re not wrong. 183 
Stuart:  Maybe what we’re saying in the Flood Warning  184 
is we want people to be aware that precipitation continues to fall  185 
will still come  186 
and that we’re not out of the woods yet. 187 
Nancy:  {to Stuart} you need to have conversation with XX and XX{upper 188 
management} about flood warning.  189 
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Not issued very often and usually only when our key areas -- our key 190 
vulnerabilities are at risk. 191 
Stuart:  Does this also cover us off for areas that we don’t have great monitoring? 192 
Ed:  Going to issue a message but my gut feeling is that we don’t need to.  193 
{To Olivia} Did you issue the message? 194 
Olivia:  No. 195 
Ed:  Okay -- don’t.  196 
My feeling is that we are going to be creating chaos for the DVP  197 
or at the DVP if we issue.  198 
I want to call Environment Canada.  199 
I know our timing is terrible but -- 200 
 
At 3:04pm Ed calls and explains the situation to a meteorologist at ECCC. He asks for a 
further breakdown and shares that the Don River at Dundas is what he is really worried 
about.  
 
D: October 28, 2015 at TRCA; approximately 3:10pm 
Data: fieldnotes 
Ed is off the phone at 3:10pm. At 3:10pm, still unsure, Ed then looks to Nancy once 
again:  
 
Ed:   Still another 5-10mm expected {according to ECCC}.  201 
A little bit of drizzle here and there.  202 
In one hour to 2.5 hours we’ll see another 2.5-5 mm of rain.  203 
Don at Dundas is at 76.2 and it’s receding.  204 
Send it {the Flood Warning} out and nothing and create chaos.  205 
Send it out and flooding happens and we create chaos. 206 
Nancy:  The arguments for doing it are just as valid as arguments against. 207 
Ed:   Issuing is a big deal -- it’s not just about people getting wet.  208 
I am not liberal at issuing these kinds of messages. 209 
Nancy:  This is predicated based on the assumption that as soon as you issue  210 
the Warning they are going to close the road?  211 
I seriously don’t think they are going to do anything  212 
directly based on your message. 213 
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Appendix D: TRCA October 28, 2015 Flood Warning  
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Appendix E: ECCC Severe Thunderstorm Warning  
*emphasis added by Spinney 
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Appendix F:  Map of Study Area- Don Valley Flood Vulnerable Areas  
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Appendix G: Map of Study Area- Zoomed out 
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Appendix H: Map of Study Area- Lower Simcoe St. 
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Appendix I: REB Approval 
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Appendix J: Sample Survey Protocol – Producers of Weather and Flood 
Information 
 
Producing and Consuming Weather Information:  
An ethnographic study of working and living the weather 
 
XXXXXXXX, PhD Student 
University of Western Ontario 
 XXX-XXX-XXXX 
XXXXX@XXX.XX 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
You are being asked to complete this brief questionnaire in the above-titled 
research project. The purpose of the questionnaire is to gain a better 
understanding of risk communication from the perspective of XXXX employees. 
Responses will be used to inform the development of this study’s interview and 
survey protocols intended for various members of the public. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The responses you give will remain anonymous and your identity will not be 
revealed. XXXXXX will compile all responses. 
 
CONSENT 
Your participation in answering this questionnaire is optional. While participation 
is optional, completion of the questionnaire indicates your consent to participate.  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please answer the ten questions below. Once you have completed answering the 
questions, fold pages 2-4 of the questionnaire and place them in the sealed box 
located on the counter underneath the TVs of the room allocated as the 
Emergency Operations Centre. Please be as specific and descriptive as possible 
with your responses (use the back of page 2/3/4 if more space is required). TO 
REPEAT: Your responses will remain anonymous and your identity will 
not be revealed.  
 
QUESTIONS 
If you have any questions about this study or the questionnaire, please contact 
the student researcher, XXXXX, at XXX-XXX-XXXX or by email at XXXXXXX 
 
 
 
 
XXXXXXXX will retrieve the sealed box with responses on XXXXXXXX. 
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1. What is your role with XXXX? (circle most appropriate) 
a. Flood Duty Officer 
b. Other:  
 
2. Explain, in your words, what is meant by ‘urban flood’ and identify what you  
believe is/are the cause(s) for urban flooding. 
 
3. For each of the following TRCA message types please describe (in your own 
words) what you think each means and indicate all of the trigger(s) (including 
types of data, information from others, etc.) that influence your decision to 
issue. 
Message Types Describe Triggers  
Watershed 
Conditions 
Statement- 
Water Safety 
  
Watershed 
Conditions 
Statement- 
Flood Outlook 
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4. In terms of TRCA flood information list the groups/organizations you feel 
comprise your target audience.  
 
 
5. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is least useful and 5 is most useful; please rate 
the perceived usefulness of each of TRCA’s flood message types, according to 
you. 
 
Watershed Conditions Statement- Water Safety  
Watershed Conditions Statement- Flood Outlook  
Flood Watch  
Flood Warning  
 
6. Given your role with TRCA, list the biggest challenges you experience in 
communicating flood risk with your target audiences. You may experience 
different challenges with different groups and with different products. Please 
elaborate as much as possible. 
 
7. List what you believe the target audiences misunderstand when flood risk 
information is issued. Different target audiences may misunderstand different 
products in different ways. Please identify, as much as possible, what you 
believe each group misunderstands. 
 
8. To improve communication, what would you like to know about how your 
target audiences relate to your suite of flood information products?  
 
9. Referring to the examples below, explain (in the right-side margin) what 
makes each of these statements different? 
Flood Watch   
Flood Warning   
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10. Identify (underline, highlight, or circle) important words and phrases in each 
message above, those you expect your target audience to focus on during their 
decision-making process.  
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Appendix K: Sample Interview Protocol – Public User Groups 
 
Urban Flooding:  
Understanding the interpretation, communication and response  
to urban flood information in Toronto  
 
In the survey below you will be asked questions about four different topical themes: 
A. General weather knowledge 
B. Flood specific  
C. Different Weather Scenarios 
D. Demographic information 
 
This is a research effort intended to learn about the interpretation, communication and 
response to flood information and weather and flood events in the City of Toronto.  
 
 
If you have any questions about this study or your treatment as a participant, please contact 
the study Investigator, XXXXXXX, at XXX-XXX-XXXX or by email at XXXX. If you 
have questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact The Office of 
Research Ethics at The University of Western Ontario at XXX-XXX-XXXX or by e-mail 
XXXXX.  
 
If you would like to receive a copy of the published results of this study or attend any public 
presentation of the results, please provide the researcher with your name and contact 
information.   
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A. General weather knowledge 
As someone working in an urban community please think about your daily needs and uses 
for weather information as it relates to your employment and answer the following 
questions: 
 
Q1. From May until October, to what extent do you pay attention to the following types of 
weather? Please select ONE option for each. 
 To great extent To some extent To a small 
extent 
Not at all 
Rainfall     
Thunderstorms     
Tornadoes     
Flooding     
Lightning     
Heat     
 
 
Q2. In your own words, describe the difference between a weather watch and a weather 
warning. 
 
Q3. Sumer time forecasts often include a percent chance of rain, or POP (probability of 
precipitation). When a weather forecast indicates a 40 POP for the City of Toronto, what 
does that mean? From the options listed below, select the ONE response you believe best 
describes 40 POP. 
 That it will rain for 40% of the day in the City of Toronto 
 That in 100 similar weather situations, rain has fallen 40 times at any point in the City 
of Toronto 
 That rain is expected to fall on 40% of the City of Toronto 
 That it rained 40 times out of 100 on that particular date in the past 
 I don’t know what is meant by 40 POP 
 It means:  
 
Q4. Read the following Rainfall Warning. Think about your needs and uses for weather 
information and the weather conditions noted in the warning message that are important to 
you. Consider how important each of the factors is in determining the success of the 
warning, or that the forecaster ‘got it right’.  
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This Rainfall Warning would be successful if:  
 Very 
important 
Somewhat 
important 
Not 
important 
The rain fell in the manner described, or 
“heavy”  
   
The rain began at the described time, or 
“later tonight” 
   
The rain continued for the length of time 
described, or “until Wednesday evening” 
   
The warned amount of rain fell, or “45 to 
55 millimetres” 
   
The warned amount of rain fell within 
the warned area, or “the City of Toronto” 
   
The conditions led to the described 
impacts, or “water pooled on roads” 
   
It rained    
I personally felt rain    
The Tuesday night warning allowed me 
to adjust my Wednesday plans 
   
The Tuesday night warning gave me the 
head’s up I needed to modify my travel 
route to work on Wednesday 
   
Water pooled on my residential road    
 
Q5. Continue thinking about your daily needs and uses for weather information as it relates 
to your employment. Consider now what reasons you have for accessing weather 
information. List all of the different motivators you have for accessing weather information 
(for example, travel, commute).  
 
 
 
 
RAINFALL WARNING 
FOR SOUTHERN ONTARIO 
UPDATED BY AGENCY Y 
AT 9:56 P.M. EDT TUESDAY 27 OCTOBER 2015. 
----------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
RAINFALL WARNING FOR: 
      CITY OF TORONTO 
----------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
==DISCUSSION== 
 
HEAVY RAINFALL WILL BEGIN LATER TONIGHT ACROSS THE REGION[] AND 
CONTINUE UNTIL WEDNESDAY EVENING. RAINFALL AMOUNTS OF 45 TO 55 
MILLIMETRES ARE EXPECTED. WATER POOLING ON ROADS MAY RESULT FROM 
HEAVY DOWNPOURS OR DEBRIS BLOCKING DRAINS. 
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B. Flood specific 
Q6. People understand flood events and flood information in different ways. In thinking 
about flooding as it relates to your employment, how strongly do you disagree or agree with 
the following statements. Please select ONE option for each statement. 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
I am knowledgeable about urban 
floods  
     
I am experienced with urban 
flooding 
     
I am aware of the risk of urban 
flooding in my jurisdiction prior 
to being officially notified or 
warned  
     
I think it is difficult to understand 
official flood warning information 
     
I think that urban floods may 
cause extreme destruction 
     
I can control our organization 
from being impacted by flooding 
     
 
 
Q7. List the different types of urban flooding you are familiar with. 
 
Q8. What kind of urban flooding are you concerned about as an employee? 
 
Q9. Based on your understanding, what is a riverine flood? 
 
Q10. In your opinion, what is the difference between a riverine flood and a non-riverine 
flood in an urban setting? 
 
Q11. In your opinion, what are the causes for urban flooding of areas away from rivers and 
watercourses? 
 
Q12. In your opinion, which group/organization do you imagine is responsible for 
providing flood information for you and other employees in your organization as it relates to 
flooding of roadways and basements (away from rivers)?  
 
Q13. How do you learn about flooding in your work community? (Check all that apply) 
 Radio 
 TV 
 Someone at work 
 smartphone app 
 website 
- if radio- which station(s): 
__________________________________________________________ 
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- if TV- which station(s): 
___________________________________________________________ 
- if smartphone app- which one(s): 
____________________________________________________ 
- if website- which one(s): 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q14. Presented here are three different levels of flood information issued by Agency X. 
Rank each in the order of increasing flood threat, where 1 is the most threatening and 3 is 
the least threatening. 
 notice of the potential for flooding 
 flooding is imminent or already occurring in specific watercourses or municipalities 
 flooding is possible in specific watercourses or municipalities  
 
 
Q15. As someone who works in the City of Toronto or the GTA, and in terms of your daily 
needs and uses for weather information as it relates to your employment, at what point in 
time do you begin paying attention to the threat of urban flooding? Please select ONE 
option for each statement. 
 Not at 
all 
A 
little 
Some 
what 
A 
great 
deal 
N/A 
Once rain is forecast for my work 
area 
     
Once the rain begins to fall      
Once rain exceeds a certain millimetre 
threshold 
     
Once I am notified by official sources      
Once I hear about possible flooding 
on the radio  
     
Once a warning alert pops up on my 
phone/computer 
     
Once water begins pooling on my 
work street 
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Q16. If rain is one factor motivating you to pay attention to the threat of a flood, from the 
different ways that rain is characterized below please indicate the extent to which each 
characterization/phrasing motivates you to pay attention. Please select ONE option for each  
statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q17. People can have multiple experiences with flooding over the course of their lifetime. 
Please think about all of your experiences with flooding and indicate how much experience 
you have with each of the statements listed below. Please select ONE option for each 
statement. 
 No 
experience 
A little 
experience 
Some 
experience 
A great deal of 
experience 
My workplace has 
been threatened by a 
flood 
    
My workplace has 
been under a flood 
warning 
    
I have seen a flood 
firsthand 
    
I have altered my 
driving route as a 
result of flooding 
near my workplace 
    
I have worried about 
my home due to a 
flood 
    
 Not at all A little Somewhat A great 
deal 
N/A 
50 millimetres 
over the next 
three hours 
     
50 millimetres 
over the next 
24 hours 
     
Band of 
showers 
     
Isolated cells      
Heavy rain      
Drizzle      
Torrential 
downpour 
     
Thunder-
storms 
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I have had property 
damage due to a 
flood 
    
I have heard or 
watched live news 
coverage of a flood as 
it was happening 
    
I have seen the 
aftermath of a flood 
firsthand (people 
who were affected, 
damaged areas or 
debris) 
    
I have seen news 
coverage about the 
aftermath of a flood 
(people who were 
affected, damage, 
images) 
    
I have volunteered to 
help others who were 
affected by a flood 
    
I have taken action to 
protect myself or 
loved ones from a 
flood threat that did 
occur 
    
I have taken action to 
protect my property 
from a flood threat 
that did occur 
    
I have prepared an 
emergency kit in 
response to a flood 
threat 
    
 
Q18. Approximately what is the closest (in kilometres) that you have ever been to a flood? 
 _________ (kilometres) 
 not applicable 
 
 
Q19. People can also have multiple experiences with flooding that was warned for, but did not 
occur. Please think about all of your experiences with flooding that did not occur and 
indicate how much experience you have with each of the statements listed below. Please 
select ONE option for each statement. 
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 No 
experience 
A little 
experience 
Some 
experience 
A great deal of experience 
I have taken 
action to 
protect 
myself or 
loved ones 
from a flood 
threat that 
was unnecessary 
    
I have been 
inconvenienc
ed by 
responding to 
a flood threat 
that did not 
occur 
    
I have been 
warned about 
a flood that 
did not occur 
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C. Weather Scenarios 
Q20. Agency Y issues a Severe Thunderstorm Warning for several areas, including the City 
of Toronto on Sunday, July 19, 2015: 
 
 
In reference to the Severe Thunderstorm Warning above: 
a. This Severe Thunderstorm Warning is issued to the public at 4:27pm on Sunday, July 19, 
2015. What are you normally doing at this time on a Sunday? 
 
b. List/circle the important words and phrases that you are focusing on when you read this 
Severe Thunderstorm Warning.  
 
 
c. What are the main weather-related threats discussed in this Warning?  
 
d. What are you doing with this information? (for example: making decisions, changing 
plans, communicating with others) 
 
SEVERE THUNDERSTORM WARNING 
FOR SOUTHERN ONTARIO 
ISSUED BY AGENCY Y 
AT 4:27 P.M. EDT SUNDAY 19 JULY 2015. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SEVERE THUNDERSTORM WARNING FOR: 
=NEW= CITY OF TORONTO 
=NEW= VAUGHAN - RICHMOND HILL - MARKHAM 
=NEW= PICKERING - OSHAWA - SOUTHERN DURHAM REGION. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
==DISCUSSION== 
 
AT 4:27 P.M. EDT, AGENCY Y IS TRACKING A  
SEVERE THUNDERSTORM CAPABLE OF PRODUCING VERY STRONG WIND GUSTS,  
QUARTER TO TOONIE SIZE HAIL AND HEAVY RAIN. 
 
THE THUNDERSTORM IS CURRENTLY LOCATED NEAR RICHMOND HILL AND IS  
TRACKING EAST TO SOUTHEASTWARD AT ABOUT 40 KM/H. 
 
COMMUNITIES IN THE PATH INCLUDE: EASTERN SCARBOROUGH. PICKERING AND  
AJAX. 
 
TAKE COVER IMMEDIATELY, IF THREATENING WEATHER APPROACHES. REMEMBER,  
SEVERE THUNDERSTORMS CAN PRODUCE TORNADOES. GO INDOORS AND MOVE AWAY  
FROM WINDOWS AND SKYLIGHTS. LIGHTNING KILLS AND INJURES CANADIANS  
EVERY YEAR. REMEMBER, WHEN THUNDER ROARS, GO INDOORS(EXCLAMATION MARK) 
 
THE OFFICE OF THE FIRE MARSHAL AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDS  
THAT YOU TAKE COVER IMMEDIATELY, IF THREATENING WEATHER APPROACHES. 
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e. Given the timing of the Warning, the activities you are normally engaged in at 4:27pm on 
a Sunday, and the track and speed of this storm system, has the warning been issued with 
enough time to prepare/act? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
f. What does 40km/hr mean to you? Is 40km/hr fast or slow?  
 
g. In assessing the threat and how it relates to you and your employment, what important 
information is missing from this Warning, if anything? (What do you wish you were 
told…) 
 
h. Based on where you work and the location and track of this storm system, is the Severe 
Thunderstorm Warning issued by Agency Y intended for you? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Q21. Agency X issues a Flood Outlook on Tuesday, July 7, 2015:  
 
In reference to the Flood Outlook above: 
FLOOD OUTLOOK 
WATERSHED CONDITIONS STATEMENT 
 
DATE:  TUESDAY JULY 7, 2015 
 
TIME:   2:30PM 
 
Weather Conditions: 
Agency X is advising that Agency Y has issued a Special Weather Statement and is 
forecasting a frontal system moving through the GTA Tuesday afternoon and evening.  Total 
rainfall amounts are forecasted to be 10-15mm through the Greater Toronto Area, but there is 
also a risk of isolated thunderstorms that may bring higher rainfall amounts in a short period of 
time in localized areas. 
 
Issues: 
Forecasted rainfall amounts will result in higher than normal water levels and flows. Rivers 
and streams will be faster flowing, creating unsafe and/or dangerous conditions. There may be 
flooding on roadways and in low-lying areas.  
 
The combination of slippery and unstable banks will create hazardous 
conditions close to any river, stream or other water bodies. 
 
Actions:  
Please stay away from rivers and streams and exercise caution around all 
bodies of water. Please alert any children under your care of these dangers 
and supervise their activities. 
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a. This Outlook is issued to the public at 2:30pm on Tuesday, July 7, 2015. What are you 
normally doing at this time on a Tuesday? 
 
b. List/circle the important words and phrases that you are focusing on when you read this 
Flood Outlook.  
 
c. What are the main weather-related threats discussed in this Flood Outlook?  
 
d. What are you doing with this information? (for example: making decisions, changing 
plans, communicating with others) 
 
e. Given the timing of the Outlook, the activities you are normally engaged in at 2:30pm on 
a Tuesday, and the timing of the forecasted weather conditions, has the Outlook been 
issued with enough time to prepare/act? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
f. What does ‘frontal system’ mean to you? -OR- What does ‘localized rainfall’ mean to 
you? 
 
g. In assessing the threat and how it relates to you and your employment, what important 
information is missing from this Flood Outlook, if anything? (What do you wish you 
were told…) 
 
h. Based on where you work and the location and track of this storm system, is the Flood 
Outlook issued by Agency X intended for you? 
 Yes 
 No 
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Q22. Agency X issues a Flood Warning on Wednesday, October 28, 2015: 
 
In reference to the Flood Warning above: 
a. This Flood Warning is issued to the public at 3:20pm on Wednesday, October 28, 2015. 
What are you normally doing on a Wednesday at this time? 
 
b. List/circle the important words and phrases that you are focusing on when you read this 
Flood Warning.  
 
c. What are the main weather-related threats discussed in this Flood Warning?  
 
d. What are you doing with this information? (for example: making decisions, changing 
plans, communicating with others) 
 
e. Given the timing of the Flood Warning, the activities you are normally engaged in at 
3:20pm on a Wednesday, and the forecasted weather conditions discussed, has the Flood 
Warning been issued with enough time to prepare/act? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
f. The Flood Warning mentions reports of “flooding of the Bayview extension”, flooding 
of “Metrolinx rail line within lower parts of Don River Watershed”, and the potential for 
flooding of “low-lying areas including the Don Valley Parkway”. Do you find knowing 
about flooding in these areas useful for you in carrying out your work operations? If so, 
why?  
 
g. In assessing the threat and how it relates to you, what important information is missing 
from this Flood Warning, if anything? (What do you wish you were told…) 
 
FLOOD WARNING 
Date:                October 28, 2015 
Time:                 3:20 PM 
 
Weather Conditions: 
Agency X advises that the Greater Toronto Area has received 25 - 50 mm of rainfall since 
early this morning. Agency Y is forecasting another 15 mm of rainfall this afternoon.  
 
Issues: 
Flooding of the Bayview Extension and the Metrolinx rail line within the lower parts of the 
Don River watershed have been reported. With the additional rainfall, there remains a 
potential for flooding of low-lying areas including the Don Valley Parkway.  
The water levels and flow in [the region’s] watersheds are higher than normal resulting in 
dangerous conditions. Flooding on roadways and underpasses may be experienced.   
 
Actions:  
Please stay away from rivers and streams and exercise caution around all bodies of 
water.  Please avoid driving through flooded roadways in low-lying areas and at 
underpasses. Please alert any children under your care of these dangers and supervise 
their activities. 
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h. Based on where you work and the location and track of this storm system, is the Flood 
Warning issued by Agency X intended for you? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
D. Demographic Information 
Q23. Indicate whether you are:  
 male, or  
 female 
 
Q24. Which of the following age categories describes you: 
 18-24 
 25-34 
 35-44 
 45-54 
 55-64 
 >65 
 
 
Q25. Please indicate your occupation: 
 
Q26. Please indicate your highest level of education/training: 
 
Q27. Please provide the postal code for your place of employment: 
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